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Defense forces don’t need to be overwhelming – 1 third is enough to deter because Russia knows the long-term response will be bad

Michael E. O’Hanlon, 6-21-2022, He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and George Washington universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board at the U.S. Department of Defense. O’Hanlon was a member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-12.["Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/]//EZAY

Washington should also attempt to persuade other NATO nations to make increases in combat capability in the Baltic region comparable to its own increases. Collectively, the rest of NATO has a larger GDP and larger armed forces than the United States. Admittedly, it only spends in aggregate about half as much on national defense. But because the countries of Europe do not in general share the global burdens of the United States, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, they should in principle be capable of the kind of additional efforts proposed here — to wit, the equivalent of a combat brigade, with combat aviation and air support, and a plan to surge more forces into the Baltics if need be. It will take time for Europe, and Canada, to respond in this way, but the goal should be established now. Other changes, such as expedited procedures for NATO to gain priority access to central Europe’s rail network in a crisis, can perhaps be made sooner and should be pursued promptly.

The American changes would however be enough to deny current Russian force dispositions more than a three-to-one force advantage in normal peacetime conditions or in the early days of any crisis response — as  by U.S. Army officers Colonel John B. Gilliam and Major Ryan C. Van Wie. (My recommendations are similar to those of Gilliam and Van Wie, as developed before February 24, 2022, except that in response to the Russian invasion, I would add U.S. combat forces in the Baltics themselves rather than Germany, and would add forward air power as well.) That 3:1 ratio is not an ironclad law of force planning; far from it, as former Brookings scholar Joshua Epstein convincingly argued in rigorous work several decades ago. But it is popular enough among militaries that it has some perceptual significance in its own right. My own simple modeling suggests that if NATO has engaged forces that are one-third the size of Russia’s, it would have a good chance — though hardly a guarantee — of stymieing the Russian attack long enough to flow reinforcements into theater. Thus, as an interim capability, it makes sense. It strikes a balance reflecting, on the one hand, a much tenser European security environment, but on the other a rather mediocre and weakened Russian military.

In conducting force planning, it is important neither to underestimate nor overestimate the potential adversary. Russia could, in a future war, avoid some of the mistakes witnessed in its initial onslaught against Ukraine — sticking to the roads where forces can be easily located and attacked and bottled up, failing to cover vehicle flanks with dismounted infantry, failure to provide adequate artillery support for maneuver forces, communicating in the open without encryption, providing poor tactical leadership for combat units. But it will still be saddled with an outdated military, severely weakened by the war in Ukraine. Further, it will  to advanced Western electronics with which to modernize its armed forces for years to come. Again, the argument seems compelling for a relatively modest NATO force posture in the Baltics — yet one made up of major combat units organized as such, unlike the current eFP.

CONCLUSION

As 2022 unfolds, and tragedy in Ukraine continues, NATO is nonetheless in strong military and political shape. No major surgery is needed to right-size or reposition the alliance for the challenge of a more reckless Russia. Moreover, NATO is already adapting somewhat to the new strategic environment, and the general trend is sound. Its responses include modest growth in defense spending across much of the alliance and the likely addition of Sweden and Finland to the alliance’s roster, as well as ongoing efforts in the realm of economic warfare.

Yet more change is needed nonetheless. In the crucial Baltic region, NATO should shift from what has been an impressive tripwire stance since 2017 to a modest but meaningful forward-defense posture. NATO should have enough combat power in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and nearby locations that it could immediately resist any Russian attack, be it in the form of “,” other covert aggression, or a more classic cross-border attack. But Russia’s capacities in these areas are generally limited, so NATO’s response need not be monumental in scale. The United States should station a brigade combat team, a combat aviation brigade, and two to three squadrons of tactical fixed-wing airpower in the Baltics; it should complete planned prepositioning of vehicles for a brigade combat team in Poland while also adding transport, engineering, and air and missile defense capabilities there. NATO allies should commit to making comparable additions to those recommended here for the U.S. presence in the Baltics as soon as they can.

The good news is that these changes do not require huge additional expense and therefore need not fundamentally disrupt the Pentagon’s understandable desire to focus much future modernization on the Indo-Pacific. Once facilities are built, keeping U.S. forces abroad rather than at home typically  to their annual cost. For 15,000 U.S. military personnel, that would equate to the rough vicinity of $1 billion a year. Local partners can handle many of the expenses of building those new facilities.

NATO’s longstanding policy of not basing combat units in eastern member states — as a nod to Russian security sensitivities — is no longer relevant in light of Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

If the Army and Air Force permanently station small numbers of units abroad, in Poland and the Baltics, rather than maintaining a new forward posture with frequent rotations of numerous units, they can likely sustain this burden without enlarging their force structures. The Army’s past preference to rotate units into Poland (and South Korea) is understandable. This approach gives more soldiers experience at preparing for deployment, as well as a chance to serve abroad. But it also creates strain on the force structure, given that at least three units are needed to sustain a single continuous deployment (due to the need for training, preparation, and then recovery). At this juncture, NATO’s longstanding policy of not basing combat units in eastern member states — as a nod to Russian security sensitivities — is no longer relevant in light of Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Moreover, the very modest stationing of combat units proposed here for the Baltics and Poland cannot pose a meaningful threat of cross-border aggression against Russia.

Permanently stationing 15,000 more American troops in the Baltics and Poland, while asking European and Canadian allies to make similar additional efforts in eastern Europe as well, is an affordable and prudent response to the increased Russian threat to NATO’s forward regions.

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