US and Israel prove – citizen preferences for a capital-intensive military doctrine lock in aggressive foreign policy and protracted warfare – legal reforms fail.
Caverley 10 – Jonathan, Poli Sci Prof @ NU, The Myth of Military Myopia: Democracy, Small Wars, and Vietnam, International Security 34.3.
This article shows that, contrary to the consensus regarding U.S. military intransigence in the face of unconventional warfare, civilian officials in Lyndon Johnson's administration - and ultimately the American public - played an essential role in the selection of a capital-intensive strategy to fight insurgents in the Vietnam War. President Johnson was convinced that the American public would punish any administration that "lost" South Vietnam to communism, but he was equally certain that public preferences constrained the number of U.S. forces to be deployed and lives to be lost far more than the amount of money to be spent and ordnance to be consumed. In response, he and his sub- ordinates instructed the military to fight what they themselves acknowledged to be an ineffective, capital- and firepower-intensive strategy. The article ex- plains this seemingly nonstrategic behavior using a theory, generalizable be- yond this specific case, of the distribution of the costs of war within the electorate.138 Israel's experience in its 2006 war against Hezbollah suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to the Vietnam War or to U.S. strategic culture.139 Israel expended 170,000 artillery shells, twice the number fired in the conve tional 1973 Arab-Israeli War, in a month.140 The Israel Defense Force's (IDF's) initial campaign plan - a rapid air and small-unit ground assault that relied on firepower to control territory - was designed to minimize the number of ground forces and casualties. The Israeli cabinet rejected it; the transportation minister objected to "exposing 40,000 troops to the Lebanese reality."141 Four days into the conflict, the IDF deputy chief of staff recommended stopping the campaign: "We have exhausted the [aerial] effort; we have reached the peak; from now on we can only descend."142 Nonetheless, despite its intention to avoid a ground war, the Israeli government announced ambitious goals far beyond releasing hostages and deterring further rocket attacks.143 A report written by a subsequent government commission describing the strategic co- nundrum evokes the constraints faced by Johnson in Vietnam: "Declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly stated that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement." The report acknowledges the government's bind: no "other ef- fective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and pro- longed ground operation" existed, but this "would have a high 'cost' and did not enjoy broad support."144 Cost distribution theory makes such behavior explicable. From four ma- jor assumptions - security is a public good; voters weigh security benefits against taxes, conscription, and casualties; median wealth is less than mean wealth in every state; and the preferences of the median voter are heeded in a democracy - I derive a voter preference for a capitalized military. Like the democratic exceptionalist research program, this article finds evidence that the American public weighs the benefits of limited war against the costs. Although one recent study of American public opinion assigns expectations of success as the most important factor in the public's support for a conflict, it also points out that the public more generally carries out relatively competent cost-benefit analysis.145 This article extends this logic by arguing that when the ability to substitute matériel for personnel is low, as it is against unconventional opponents, democracies may still prosecute wars using an ill-suited military doctrine (and thus a lower chance of success), because the costs remain modest for this pivotal voter. Democratic exceptionalism's cost-internalization mechanism provides an overly optimistic assessment of democracies' discretion in how and even when they fight small wars. Neither an apolitical public, nor a dysfunctional military culture, nor a military doctrine divorced from grand strategy causes a flawed warfighting strategy. Rather, it results from political leaders' assessment of the average voter's preferences. Although claiming that democracies substitute capital for labor to reduce the costs of war for voters is not news, tying the pur- suit of such a strategy to a rational voter has two novel and important implications. First, many observers argue that most wars of the twenty-first century will be hybrid conflicts involving unconventional opponents; finding the root cause of poor counterinsurgency is an essential task. This article argues that fixating on reforming the armed services (or even the civilian tools of foreign policy) in an effort to improve democratic performance in small wars is its own form of myopia. My theory gives reason to be skeptical of how much the U.S. military will be allowed to shift by future administrations and the public to which they are held accountable. Dysfunctional organizations can eventu- ally learn and adapt. If the public suffers from foolish preconceptions, it may be dissuaded through public education and the marketplace of ideas. Even positing a powerful strategic culture underpinning U.S. doctrine suggests that "it is at least possible that by deconstructing the standard American 'way' . . . some pathways to improved performance may be identified."146 But if a rational, fully informed electorate views such a military doctrine as its best option, the prospects for change are less clear.