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But, within the plane of territorial domination comes the emergence of a new era in which technological systems of control and biopolitical governance have become the currency for warfare. The cyber-securitized medium of surveillance, information gathering, and scientific metaphysics are all backed by the liberal “objectivity” of artificial intelligence and biotechnology. The racialized heuristic of emerging technologies is rooted in the slow masking and camouflage of anti-black violence away from explicit plantation politics into implicit technical codes.

Howell and Richter-Montpetit 19 (Alison Howell, Rutgers University – Newark AND Melanie Richter-Montpetit, University of Sussex “Racism in Foucauldian Security Studies: Biopolitics, Liberal War, and the Whitewashing of Colonial and Racial Violence” International Political Sociology (2019) 13, 2–19) //NT

Molecular and Digital Revolutions and the Whiteness of Post-human Life FSS’s undertheorization of racism and colonialism also produces inaccurate genealogies of (life) sciences and technologies, most strikingly regarding the so-called digital and molecular revolutions. FSS scholars of these revolutions purport to update Foucault for “the age of life as information” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 106) and to describe epochal breaks in scientific understandings of life, corresponding with an equally epochal shift from a biopolitics of scientific racism to a new postracial form of biopolitics. However, they do so without any serious attention to Foucault’s postcolonial critics or any serious inquiry into lines of continuity between White supremacist scientific racism and these digital and molecular “revolutions.” Thus, for instance, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2008, 273) argue that “biopolitics is critically dependent, epistemically and ontologically, on what the sciences of life say that species life is.” As such, “[i]n the molecular age life is no longer simply the life of population as Foucault documented . . . because molecular science has transformed what we understand a living thing to be” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 286). Dillon and Reid similarly claim to trace shifting notions of life. They assert that over the past five decades “the very ontology of biological life has shifted to the ground of ‘information’” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 22) and that distinctions between animate and inanimate, biological and nonbiological “have been newly construed and problematized” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 22). Though much of this is derivative of Ian Hacking and Nikolas Rose’s work, attention to the digital and molecular has particular impacts in the international and security fields. According to Dillon and Reid (2009, 22), digital and molecular “reproblematizations” of life have impacted the biopolitical strategies of liberal internationalism: “[t]he very space of enmity is itself re-problematized. Who is dangerous, what is dangerous, how things become dangerous are all transformed” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 107). This has apparently resulted in a shift from scientific racism to “new racism,” with an emphasis on cultural difference rather than biological hierarchies. FSS’s ability to examine how science has shaped the biopolitical strategies of security and liberal internationalism is limited by its persistent Eurocentrism and undertheorization of race. Societal notions of “life” are treated as interchangeable with the life sciences’ supposedly postracial understanding of life as generic data. This fails to engage with either the ingrained (settler) coloniality of technoscience or the stubborn (and institutionalized) persistence of broader structures of White supremacy and anti-Blackness. This has serious empirical implications. For instance, Dillon’s discussion of “new” risk analysis and biometrics does not consider how these security technologies have been designed to police enslaved populations and surveille Black people (cf. Browne 2015), as part of a long-standing legacy of colonial techniques of “identity dominance” (Bell 2013). Similarly, FSS discussions of the molecular fail to engage with the contemporary racial politics of genetic science (Duster 2003; TallBear 2013; Nelson 2016); how molecular life sciences were and are fueled by experimentation on the bodies of racialized and indigenous people (Washington 2006; Dudley 2012; Mosby 2013), including the movement of pharmaceutical clinical trials from US prisons to the Global South (Petryna 2009); or the neo-eugenic functions of genetic reproductive technologies (Roberts 2011, 2013) and related racialized economies of labor in the global surrogacy industry (Twine 2011) to name just a few examples. Instead, highly abstract formulations stand in for historically specific forms of power. Dillon and Reid write that “[p]ower is palimpsestuous. New forms and relations of power become superimposed on older ones. Previous relations and accounts of power are rubbed out but may not be entirely effaced” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 124). This statement comes with no serious empirical engagement with the persistence—and modulation—of scientific racism into the twenty-first century. Instead we are to believe that racism is now cultural, not scientific—and, for that matter, that science itself isn’t cultural. The result is an e(race)sure (Moore 2012) of the ways that racialized subjects continue to always already signify violence that once again shores up the foundational White FSS mythology that everyone is (potentially) dangerous and, therefore, vulnerable to the punitive and/or lethal dimensions of liberal power. Ironically, FSS discussions of post–WWII biopolitical liberal internationalism thus reproduce, rather than challenge, the promise that liberal war will transcend the global color line (Richter-Montpetit 2014b).

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