These emergent technologies are rooted in a scientific calculation and false objectivity that relies upon blackness as metaphysical nothingness that sutures legal epistemology within an anti-black telos.
Warren 18 (Calvin, is an Associate Professor in African American Studies. He received his B.A. in Rhetoric/Philosophy (College Scholar) from Cornell University and his MA and Ph. D. in African American/American Studies from Yale University. “Ontological Terror.” Pages 4-8. May 18, 2018) //NT
The event also put the metaphysical infrastructure into perspective for me. Two philosophical forces were colluding (and at times conflicting) to orient the solutions proposed and the audiences’ responses, and both presented “free black” as a concept with meaning: black humanism and postmetaphysics. I use these two terms to docket a certain posture toward metaphysics—and the ontological ground metaphysics offers. Black hu- manism enters into romance with metaphysics. It appropriates schema- tization, calculation, technology, probability, and universality—all the instruments of metaphysical thinking—to make epistemological, ethical, and ontological claims concerning blackness and freedom. Freedom is possible, then, because metaphysics provides it with ontology; from there, all sorts of solutions, policies, and practices emerge to address antiblackness. Scientific reasoning, technological innovation, and legality are tools black hu- manists use to quantify suffering, measure progress, proffer universal nar- ratives of humanity, and reason with antiblack institutions. All problems have solutions for black humanists, and their task is to uncover the solution the problem conceals, as this uncovering equates to an eradication of the problem. Black humanism relies on an eclectic approach to antiblackness— Hegelian synthesis, Kantian rationalism, Platonic universals/idealism, Car- tesian representation, and empiricism. In short, black humanists lay claim to the being of the human (and the human’s freedom) through metaphys- ical thinking and instruments. Postmetaphysics, in contrast, attempts the surmounting or twisting [verwunden] of the ground and logic of metaphysics.3 It insists that meta- physics reproduces pain and misery and restricts human freedom. Rep- resenting the human as an object of scientific thinking (e.g., biology, economics, law) destroys the spontaneity and uniqueness of the human— things that make the human special. The ground, then, upon which meta- physics relies is problematic, and this ground must be destroyed (i.e., twisted) and deconstructed (i.e., displaced) to free the human. Postmeta- physics would advocate for a self-consumption of this ground through hermeneutical strategies, unending deconstructions, and forms of plu- rality (such as hermeneutic nihilism). The post is rather a misnomer, if we think of post as an overcoming [überwunden]; the postmetaphysician will never overcome metaphysics. A residue will always remain, but the postmetaphysician hopes to reduce this metaphysical residue to render it inoperative. The postmetaphysician understands antiblackness as a prob- lem of metaphysics, especially the way scientific thinking has classified being along racial difference and biology. The task of the postmetaphysi- cal project is to free blacks from the misery metaphysics produces by un- dermining its ground. Hermeneutical strategies, which contest ultimate foundations, would question the ground of race (racial metaphysics) and its claim to universal truth. Black humanism and postmetaphysics, however, leave the question of being unattended as it concerns black(ness). Both assume being is ap- plicable and operative—black humanism relies on metaphysical being and postmetaphysics relies on multiple interpretations or manifestations of being. In other words, the human’s being grounds both philosophical perspectives. Although postmetaphysics allows for a capacious under- standing of the human and being, it still posits being universally as it con- cerns freedom; no entity is without it, even if it manifests differently, or as difference, if we follow Deleuze. This is to suggest that both discourses proceed as if the question of being has been settled and that we no longer need to return to it—the question, indeed, has been elided in critical dis- courses concerning blackness. Ontological Terror seeks to put the ques- tion back in its proper place: at the center of any discourse about being. Ontological Terror meditates on this (non)relation between blackness and being by arguing that black being incarnates metaphysical nothing, the terror of metaphysics, in an antiblack world. Blacks, then, have func- tion but not being—the function of black(ness) is to give form to a ter- rifying formlessness (nothing). being claims function as its property (all functions rely on being, according to this logic, for philosophical presentation), but the aim of black nihilism is to expose the unbridgeable rift between being and function for blackness. The puzzle of blackness, then, is that it functions in an antiblack world without being—much like “nothing” functions philosophically without our metaphysical under- standing of being, an extraordinary mystery. Put differently, metaphysics is obsessed with both blackness and nothing, and the two become syn- onyms for that which ruptures metaphysical organization and form. The Negro is black because the Negro must assume the function of nothing in a metaphysical world. The world needs this labor. This obsession, how- ever, also transforms into hatred, since nothing is incorrigible—it shat- ters ontological ground and security. Nothing terrifies metaphysics, and metaphysics attempts to dominate it by turning nothing into an object of knowledge, something it can dominate, analyze, calculate, and schema- tize. When I speak of function, I mean the projection of nothing’s terror onto black(ness) as a strategy of metaphysics’ will to power. How, then, does metaphysics dominate nothing? By objectifying nothing through the black Negro. In this analysis, metaphysics can never provide freedom or humanity for blacks, since it is the objectification, domination, and extermination of blacks that keep the metaphysical world intact. Metaphysics uses blacks to maintain a sense of security and to sustain the fantasy of triumph—the triumph over the nothing that limits human freedom. Without blacks, I argue, nothing’s terror debilitates metaphysical procedures, epistemolo- gies, boundaries, and institutions. Black freedom, then, would constitute a form of world destruction, and this is precisely why humanism has failed to accomplish its romantic goals of equality, justice, and recognition. In short, black humanism has neglected the relationship between black(ness) and nothing in its yearning for belonging, acceptance, and freedom. The Negro was invented to fulfill this function for metaphysics, and the hu- manist dream of transforming invention into human being is continu- ally deferred (because it is impossible). Ontological Terror challenges the claim that blacks are human and can ground existence in the same being of the human. I argue that blacks are introduced into the metaphysical world as available equipment in human form. Black thinking, then, must return to the question of being and the relation between this question and the antiblack violence sustaining the world. It is my contention that black thinking is given a tremendous task: to approach the ontological abyss and the metaphysical violence sustaining the world. Ontological Terror suggests that black thinking cannot be overcome— we will never reach the end of black thinking or its culmination, unlike the end of philosophy describing postmetaphysical enterprises.4 In other words, postmetaphysics has broached the question of being and has com- menced the destruction [Destruktion] of the metaphysical infrastructure, which systemically forgets being. Postmetaphysics, then, is a project of remnants, as Santiago Zabala suggests. After we have used hermeneutics, deconstruction, rhizomes, and mathematical sets to devastate metaphys- ics, we are left with ontological rubble—a trace of metaphysics and a re- constructed being. Postmetaphysics, then, must ask, “How is it going with being?” Or what is the state of being in this contemporary moment, and how does the world remain open to being’s unfolding and happening (as well as its withdrawal and abandoning of Dasein)? “How is it going with being?” is the fundamental question of our era, according to postmeta- physics; only the twisting and severe rearranging [verwunden] of meta- physics can usher this question into the world. Both metaphysics and postmetaphysics, however, have forgotten the Ne- gro, just as they have forgotten being—to remember being one must also re- member the Negro. The Negro Question and the Question of being are in- tertwined. Postmetaphysical enterprises reach a limit in destruction, since it is the Negro that sustains metaphysics and enables the forgetting of Be- ing (i.e., metaphysics can forget being because it uses the Negro to project nothing’s terror and forget being). In a sense, the global use of the Negro fulfills the ontological function of forgetting being’s terror, majesty, and incorrigibility. The consequence of this is that as long as postmetaphysical enterprises leave the Negro unattended in their thinking, it inadvertently sustains metaphysical pain and violence. This, I argue, is why we will never overcome [überwunden] metaphysics because the world cannot overcome the Negro—the world needs the Negro, even as the world despises it. This is, of course, a Heideggerian approach to the thinking of being and Nothing. More than any other philosopher, Heidegger pursued metaphysical violence and the question of being relentlessly, and for this rea- son I find his philosophy indispensable and necessary. Ontological Terror thinks with and against Heidegger, since I believe Heidegger’s destruc- tion of metaphysics can assist black studies in the tremendous task of thinking being and blackness, as Grant Farred has suggested.5 Heidegger’s Destruktion covers a wide range of philosophical issues, and it is not my objective to address all of these complexities; my interest is the relation between Heidegger’s critique of metaphysical violence, available equip- ment, and the task of remembering as it concerns blackness. What I hope to broach in this book, with all the aporias such as broaching encounters, is that the Negro is the missing element in Heidegger’s thinking (as well as in that of those postmetaphysicians indebted to Heidegger, such as Jean- Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and Gianni Vattimo). If, as we learn in being and Time, Dasein uses tools to experience its thrown- ness in the world (establishing its facticity) and to develop its unique proj- ect oriented toward the future (projectionality), the Negro—as commod- ity, object, slave, putative backdrop, prisoner, refugee, and corpse—is the quintessential tool Dasein uses. The use of the Negro metaphysically and ontologically, as a tool, is what black thinking is tasked with pursuing. Thus, black thinking (and postmetaphysics) must ask the unasked ques- tion “How is it going with black being?” Without broaching this question, all forms of destruction are just reconstitutions, since the world continues to use the Negro (as black and nothing) to forget being and the sadistic pleasure of this forgetfulness.