Predictive technological imagination provide data fuel for the anti-black technosphere. Refuse AI’s quantification of human behavior that recreates enlightenment rationality and fungibilizes. blackness.
Zehner 19. (“Machines of subjection” August 2019, Peer-Reviewed Journal About Machine Feeling (https://doi.org/10.7146/aprja.v8i1.115414) *neil
As humans feed affect, thought, and sociality into algorithms, algorithms feed back into what used to be called subjectivity. This shift is what has given way to a post-representational politics adrift within information space. — Hito Steyerl 1. Machines of subjection For the past two decades, fields of knowledge production that utilize statistics have adopted machine learning as their primary mode of operation (Mackenzie, “Programming Subjects” 434). Due to the advances of computational technology, machines can now be programmed to fnd patterns in large datasets. ‘Machine learners’[1] recursively use patterns to infer correlations, essentially hailing new performative judgments on the world. Adrian Mackenzie goes so far as to claim that we now live within a regime of predictivity characterized by computational practices that rely less on verifcation than inference and abductive reasoning. With the widespread use of machine learning practices, abduction creates an overall “sensibility to change and alter events” (402). By abstracting concrete social practices into data vectors, machine learners measure, forecast and thus modulate human behaviors by essentially scripting performatives. Put simply, machine learners have become some of the most potent social inscription devices today. It is within this context that I ask – how does the recent ubiquity of machine learning affect the production of subjectivity? As the big data revolution ramps up, much attention has been drawn to online platforms that modulate political identities “situated at a distance from traditional liberal politics and removed from civil discourse” (Cheney-Lippold 165). On two ends of the extreme, we have seen the rise of white supremacists propagating through networks that segregate public opinions. Yet, on the ‘back end’ of computational culture, machine learning algorithms de-subjectify human users for proprietary gain. Capitalism doesn’t care if you’re a fascist, a passivist, or even a bot; so long as it can extract behavioral information from your actions to be packaged and resold by its advertisers. As Cheney-Lippold points out, machine learning shifts the site of identifcation into the “measurable, digital sphere” (165). Between the front-end user interface, and the back-end logics of computation — machine learners are embedded within the powerful contradictions of capitalist logics. Amidst this seeming contradiction, the concept of subjectivity may be an unhelpful category. ‘Enlightenment Man,’ the Cartesian subject divided between mind and body, the rationalist ‘view from nowhere’ — these eurocentric notions of subjectivity are founded on the measuring functions of coloniality and the technological organization of capital brought to bear on the individual.[2] Still, technological imaginaries have also been mobilized to trouble hegemonic notions of subjectivity. Donna Haraway’s feminist subjects, for instance, dethrone the “god-tricks” of scientifc rationalism through situated technopolitical practices (Haraway, 1988). The notion of technological subjection, or perhaps more accurately, the notion of de-subjectivization, occupies a set of complex problems that garner closer attention. Now emerging scholarship at the intersection of identity and machine learning has opened new pathways of research in digital cultural studies. Healy and Fourcade observe that the state used to be the only apparatus with the technological power to track its subjects. However, this is no longer the case (Fourcade and Healy). The recent ability for machine learners to track Brett Zehner: MACHINES OF SUBJECTION 50 APRJA Volume 8, Issue 1, 2019 online users’ digital footprints, or their “data exhaust,” marks an important moment for what Shoshona Zuboff calls surveillance capitalism. Every action a user performs on a digital system is considered a signal to be analyzed, packaged, and subsequently fed back into the system. The quantity of user data is much more important than quality. As long as an action online can be converted into data, it can be utilized in predictive behavioral models. Zuboff explains that no online action is too trivial to be aggregated, repackaged, and sold again (79). “Facebook likes, Google searches, emails, texts, photos, songs, geo-location, communication patterns” are all considered lucrative data to marketing frms and myriad other companies (79). Though let’s be clear. Surveillance capital is not merely a social media concern. The algorithmic bias of machine learners stems from a long line of quantitative racism and surveillance (Browne). The targeting of the poorest members of society continues, only now it operates through various forms of data surveillance and predatory credit scoring (Fourcade and Healy 31). Zuboff argues that technique supplants authority, and that “discipline and control produce a certain knowledge of human behavior independent of consent” (81). In this extractive logic, we see an impersonal form of subjection at the heart of surveillance capital. New forms of power emerge alienating persons “from their own behavior while producing new markets of behavioral prediction and modifcation” (75). The liberal idea of the rational decisionmaker then seems to unravel as a locus of power relations. In The Control Revolution, historian of technology James Beniger describes the automation of decision theory in the 1930s. “Any decision tree of fnite length can be duplicated by a fnite automaton, thereby equating the question of decidability with that of computability” (64 ). It was the automation of decision theory that set the stage for the frst machine learning program to be utilized for economic and military planning by the RAND Corporation in 1955. TungHui Hu advances this historical analysis by mapping the topography of power relations within ‘cloud computing’ where decisions are distributed across networked assemblages. He argues that borders seem to be out of date conceptions at the foundation of the sovereign subject (14). The Tiqqun collective in their cybernetic hypothesis posit that traditional class divisions and social confict no longer cut through the middle of society, but through the middle of each of us. What is troubling is that the production of subjectivity seems to be no longer about creating “people of substance” but of turning each person into a “fleshless envelope, the best possible conductor of social communication” (18). And most recently, in the Trump era, Luciana Parisi links the de-personalization of machine learning systems to the rise of post-truth politics. Here indeterminacy and the unknown “push automated cognition beyond knowledge-based systems” (“Reprogramming Decisionism” 10). What we ultimately fnd within the political subjection (and de-subjectivation) of machine learners is a brutal instrumentalism based more on mechanical functions than on ideological content. Now, despite considering machine learning’s effect on social identity,[3] the above scholarship on machine learning has left open an opportunity for rigorous scholarly attention to de-subjectivation. For instance, John Cheney-Lippold asks: “What does the banality of competing for a job interview using machine learning to predict future friendships say about subject formation” (8)? This line of questioning still focuses on subjection at the level of performatives and self-awareness. This limited viewpoint imagines the subject merely as a ‘user’ who 51 is always already ideologically ‘hailed.’ Even though data analysis seems to aggregate our most intimate habits, surveillance remains automated and deeply impersonal as it bypasses individuated modes of subjectivity and signifying semiotics. Both digital media studies, if focusing merely on identifcation through computational performatives, is limited in offering any new insights into the forces at play in our present moment. I argue that the acceleration of predictive techniques and impersonal forms of control require a more robust consideration of de-subjection. Along these lines, tactical machine learning would have two goals. First, the goal would be to update theories of subjection, and de-subjection, for the proliferation of machine learning devices with a keen attention to practices that bypass classical defnitions of the subject. And second, to provide an analysis of social practices externalized into the technologies of machine learning. We must describe and experiment with certain tactical media concepts that undergird machine learning today – scenario planning, training, and prediction. 2. A tactical media approach to machine learners Methodologically, a tactical media approach to machine learning must be situated within the perspectives of media philosophy as well as the practice of media arts. The legacy of tactical media (and its forebears in 1960’s intermedia, conceptual, and performance art practices) informs much of my project combining the felds of digital media with performance studies. For instance, tactical media was outlined in the late 1990s by David Garcia and Geert Lovink as a set of practices engaging technology as always being wrapped up in power relations. The activist ethos of tactical media has been mobilized in various registers by Rita Raley, The Critical Art Ensemble, and Beatriz da Costa. In each case, performance is considered a mediating process that enacts technological apparatuses. Each usage of the term tactical media is dependent upon the specifc set of technopolitical relations that the practitioners hope to intervene within. In the case of Beatriz da Costa and Kavita Philip, their tactical biopolitics replaces the term ‘media’ out of a consideration of specifc technoscientifc forms of knowledge production modulating the possibilities of life (da Costa and Philip). Jussi Parikka, in a similar manner, mobilizes a geological imaginary to intervene within extractive environmental politics and digital culture. In this vein of mapping a specifc set of technopolitical relations, the title of this essay mobilizes tactical media in the service of exploring the temporal regimes of machine learners. The title also borrows directly from Saidiya Hartman’s Scenes of Subjection. I hope to expand on scenographic modes of subjection by drawing on the cybernetic imaginary to elucidate forms of technological de-subjection at the heart of identity politics. My initial hypothesis is that through so-called new media regimes, old forms of subjection mutate through the new technopolitical conditions that arise. I look to unearth the technologies of subjection as they traffc through the digital sphere. To provide insight into the processes of de-subjection I rely on two threads of critical theory. The frst mode of critical theory that I utilize comes from post-autonomist marxism and its theories of signifcation and subjection within the late capitalist technosphere. I fnd it useful to consider the performative statements and decision architectures of machine learners via the philosophy of language found in the work of Michel Foucault, and Brett Zehner: MACHINES OF SUBJECTION 52 APRJA Volume 8, Issue 1, 2019 Félix Guattari. Especially useful is Foucault’s concept of the dispositif — the structural yet mutable union between institutions, subjectivity, and discourse. He defnes the dispositif as an autonomous technique which exists “on the other side of juridical and political structures of representation” (Foucault 40). The dispositif is a mechanism of capture, both material and discursive, which directly manages the experience of everyday life. Guattari further identities two dispositifs of power that operate in a contradictory manner. On the one hand, we face systems of social subjection. Social subjection categorizes us with assigned identities — it gives us a gender, a race, a profession — a position of symbolic representation. However, the production of an individuated subject is also coupled with a different process that proceeds though desubjectivization. Guattari defnes this process as machinic enslavement which dismantles the individuated subject, consciousness, and representations, acting on both pre-personal and supra-individual levels. In machinic enslavement, the individual is no longer instituted as an “economic subject” or a “citizen.” She is instead considered “a gear, a cog, a component in fnancial and various other institutional assemblages” (ctd. in Lazzarato, Signs and Machines 25). For instance – advertising focus groups stopped using questionnaires long ago in favor of measuring biometric response to stimuli such as taste tests or eye tracking. Capitalism is so successful because it operates heterogeneously at the intersection of social subjection and machinic enslavement. We are all caught in a double bind between performative individuation and the dissolution into our dividual parts, unknown to ourselves. Guattari’s critique (which I extend to the analysis of machine learners) is of critical theories that deal only with language and/or recognition while ignoring de-subjectivizing processes and their non-representational semiotics. Although the post-autonomist critique of technology is quite useful in understanding both processes of subjection and desubjection within the logic of computational capital, there is still the problem of the specifc historical and material contexts in which machine learners are situated. One must wonder if Guattari’s exploration of de-subjection can fnd a more radical usage today. In this manner, and concerning de-subjection, the second strain of critical theory we must engage with is queer-of-color-critique. We must turn to the negative identity politics that refuse to validate, affrm, or strengthen forms of subjectivity presently produced under capitalism. Recent antagonistic positions and pessimisms are powerful not because they have to do with identity “but because they have to do with the “mundane radicalism of the desire to de-subjectivize all categories” (Menon). Queer-of-color critique has long grappled with processes of de-subjection as a crucial step in forming minoritarian collectivity. Disidentifcation operates “in and against dominant ideologies” while refusing assimilation. Hortense Spillers’ theorization of the flesh and the body is important to consider in relation to present data practices which quantify human behaviors. Spillers positions the distinction between body and flesh as the central difference “between captive and liberated subject positions”. For Spillers, the body is possessed by an individual who is the sole owner of their selfhood. Yet for a captive, as in the case of chattel slavery, the body is reduced to flesh. This flesh is exposed to violence without protection from legality, equality, or democracy. In fact, Jasbir Puar writes that the violence of capital is legitimated through the right to maim. Outside of representation, vision, or ideology, the flesh records the primary narrative of the horrors of liberal humanism. It is the suffering of the flesh which exceeds white coloniality 53 and acts as transgenerational memory, highlighting the ways black bodies remain as flesh. Spiller’s political antagonism is an attention to the memory of the flesh existing on the side of the de-subjectifed, the already outside, beyond the limits of the subject or the law. Of course, the right to maim emerges in the data practices of predictive policing that quantifes black behaviors which are correlated to racist databases. All of this digital magic is merely a weapon to legitimate police horrors in the streets.