Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Refusal to forefront African femme thinkers is anti-black erasure. Whiteness lacks the enunciative grammar to express the conditions of black experience.

Heredia 18 – Marta Iñiguez de Heredia is a Marie-Sklodowska Curie Fellow at the Institute Barcelonaof International Studies. She holds a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). She has taught at the University of Cambridge, the LSE, Rouen Business School, Deakin University and La Trobe University. Her research concentrates on the historical sociology of peacebuilding processes, with a focus on the relationship between order, violence, state-making and resistance, and on Africa in particular. She draws on historical sociology, critical Africanist and practice literatures, as well as on extensive fieldwork. Current research is focused on EU’s peacebuilding policies, the militarisation of peacebuilding and political transitions through the emergence of African social movements. [Of Privileged Viewpoints and Representation of Subordinated Experiences: A Response to Sabaratnam] neil

This is a very controversial point and I would not like to be misunderstood, so let me be clear. Firstly, it is obvious that part of thinking about African subjects’ historical presence is to think in pan-Africanist terms, not just from the continent but also from the whole of the diaspora, constructed out of specific experiences of slavery and abduction so ingrained for the political thought of anti-colonial thinkers worldwide. African thought makes no sense without taking account of these broader diasporic and panafricanist connections. Secondly, as Meera says, Fanon, Césaire, Du Bois and Cabral were all part and parcel of an anti-colonial movement that spurred independence across the African continent. Contemporary African thought cannot be understood without this legacy, Fanon’s in particular. Thirdly, Fanon and Du Bois even went and lived in Africa, and Fanon participated directly in the Algerian revolution. Finally, they do provide good guidance for analysing the political significance of interventions in how they theorised the experience of colonisation and racism. Yet none of these rationales on its own makes a strong enough justification for diminishing African thinkers’ presence. For instance, is tied to . The Négritude movement that they co-founded was crucial for developing Fanon’s work. The movement was given much echo thanks to the founding of the journal by Senegalese Alioune Diop. Their thought reflects the ideas that made the intellectual basis of the anti-colonial movement and as such, can also be found in the work of many African intellectuals and activists at the time, not least the so-called founding fathers of independence like Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Ahmed Sékou Touré. Cheik Anta Diop, one of the most acclaimed African historians, “[t]he restoration of African Historical Consciousness” as the number one priority to develop Black Africa’s economic basis. This was for him both a historical and a political argument. He not only wanted to demonstrate the historical basis for the need to unite as African peoples but also to that “[c]ollective historical consciousness is one of man’s chief means of survival and a source of creation” and necessary to achieve political, economic and psychic autonomy. Fast-forwarding a bit, V.Y. Mudimbe has almost exact claims to those made in the book about the relationship between forms of knowledge, material distribution and power production. There is also an absence of African voices in the umbrella theoretical framework the book proposes to understand the broader structure of power in world politics. In the book, what Cabral, Césaire, Du Bois and Fanon propose is ultimately “read through the concept of coloniality” (p. 47). The relation between the two is at first sight enlightening but it raises a number of questions: How do these form a whole from which “to affirm a collective subject that has been previously negated, denied or ignored but which can share truths about the nature of oppression?” (p. 53). If decolonising strategies are an appropriate response to the problems of Eurocentrism in research and provide a more philosophically robust platform for thinking about global order, what is the “coloniality of power” adding to this already robust framework? Why do we need such a concept to “think differently about intervention”? Alternatively, is the coloniality of power, as exposed by Quijano, Mignolo and Grosfoguel, the ultimate framework that elucidates that “[w]hen we think about statebuilding interventions as structured by and through a contemporary global colonial matrix of power […] it becomes relatively obvious why, as a project, it would not work in producing or contributing to the production of autonomous and coherent self-governing political entities” (p. 137)? If so, what are Cabral et al. adding to the concept of coloniality? Or, put otherwise, what are these anti-colonial thinkers offering that the concept of coloniality is not? Ultimately, Quijano, Mignolo and Grosfoguel very much premise their work on the need to recover such historical presence, political consciousness and material conditions in their work. So, while it is argued in the conclusion that the book has contributed to expand the coloniality of power in methodological, historiographical and epistemological ways, how is this so, specifically? Finally, to come back to the initial point, if, again, the coloniality of power is the ultimate umbrella framework, isn’t this creating a hierarchy of voices in which some give us the big picture, others do the methodological work, while yet others can speak but only to tell us their experience of oppression? Does this not clash with the claim about the privileged insight of thinking with subjects from their histories, consciousness and experiences? This last point becomes even more puzzling when in the section about standpoint feminism we find no African women. If Third-World/Southern women provide the most distinctive viewpoint on systemic violence, and we need to be wary of essentialising women’s and, in general, all experiences (p. 28, 52), then why not draw from those writers directly? Why are most of the scholars this section draws on white Northerners (e.g. Dorothy Smith, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Nancy Hartsock)? Meera is trying to construct, almost chronologically, the main tenets of standpoint theory. However, in so doing, she is missing important insights from African feminists and in fact, disregarding the reasons Meera herself is arguing for turning to standpoint feminism to think “with” rather than “for” “targets.” People like , and , for instance, argue that African women experience distinctive circumstances and violence and that the ways of knowing and overturning such experience requires knowledge of African languages and culture. We can take up Molara Ogundipe-Leslie’s : “what is the specific condition of the women in Africa?” She argues that African women’s condition (which is to be studied with account of the particularities of women’s own class and origin in historical perspective) is defined by the endurance of colonial realities and the global socio-economic structures of oppression represented in what she calls “the six mountains on her back”: colonialism, tradition, poverty and ignorance, man, race and herself (due to her negative self-image). For Ogundipe-Leslie, the African feminist approach brings theory and action together to claim not just this distinctive experience and its understanding but also women as necessary subjects in society’s reconstruction. This can be seen as a blow to interventions in that the problems that they address require challenging the fundamental structures of society, from tradition and custom to scientific knowledge and capitalism.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.