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Emerging tech coop signals a decline in US nuclear commitments to NATO

Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173, MG)

Constraining assurance: The drawbacks of emerging technology in alliances

While the impact of emerging technologies may yield some positive dividends in strengthening US’s ability to extend deterrence, it may indeed result in a different set of effects in how assured allies actually are. During the Cold War, the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of delivery of nuclear weapons another continent, without requiring forward basing on allied territory, changed the way that allies and the United States viewed their opportunity and willingness to protect allied territory.29 An increasing reliance on mobile ICBMs that did not require the same degree of infrastructure as forward-deployed conventional forces or military personnel raised concerns about how credible the US was in its commitment to defend another territory, potentially at the risk of inadvertently creating vulnerabilities in US national defence.

Despite political rhetoric to the contrary (especially from the current administration), it was challenging to convince allies in Europe and East Asia that the US would be willing to undertake action that could potentially risk the security of the US homeland. This raises an important question: how is this costly trade-off likely to operate in a cross-domain world where an act of aggression, potentially a provocation of war, may begin in a non-kinetic domain? Perhaps the United States may be willing to enter into a conflict in defence of an ally if the dispute begins in cyberspace though the uncertainty in response may produce concerns about the strength of the assurance. While allies are likely to want a generous interpretation of provocation to encourage action from the United States, it is not clear the extent to which the US may be willing to ‘risk New York for Paris’ with the use of conventional or nuclear force if an ally is attacked with a cyber weapon.30 If the threshold or ‘redline’ for a US military response is uncertain in the most traditional of security environment, where known enemies can use physical weapons against a distant US or allied targets, how security umbrellas are likely to manifest in the multi-theatre, cross-capability environment is likely to be even more complex. Though the foundation of NATO and other multilateral institutions is argued to be one of capability aggregation,31 the practice of alliances often reveals the uneven distribution of resources and assurances through ‘pivots’ of attention.32

Indeed, these concerns are likely to be even more prescient with the development and inclusion of new forms of capabilities (mobile and easy to deploy to multiple places simultaneously) that can be easily moved and used elsewhere.33 If this is likely to be a consequence of the positioning of submarines, aircraft carriers, or other mobile but discrete assets, it is difficult to assess how the ‘deployment’ of cyber or drone technology, that is easier to redeploy to different theatres in defence of an ally, will impact their perception of US permanence and commitment to deter foreign aggressors. As with existing military technologies, costly trade-offs may complicate cross-domain strategies of extended deterrence that may perversely destabilise already tense regional environments.

The current state of US extended deterrence commitments to NATO/Western Europe has been significantly impacted by a new set of costly challenges (namely recent Russia behaviour) and the US conventional and nuclear ‘pivot to East Asia’. 34 While several studies have pointed again to Japan and South Korea as examples of protégé states seeking and receiving renewed assurances from the US against possible North Korean and Chinese nuclear and conventional threats, whether the evolving geo-strategic environment in which emerging technology plays a prominent role yields the same set of outcomes is uncertain.35 Given these challenges, the US has had increasing difficulty assuring its NATO allies (and subsequently its allies in East Asia) about its capacity to adequately defend both regions from their respective adversaries.36 These competing demands for the US to project hard military power in two distinct regions simultaneously have only prompted both sets of allies to become less persuaded of US’s capacity to actually defend them in the event of external aggression (sometimes opting to take matters into their own hands by pursuing indigenous advances in military power). Furthermore, adversaries themselves may be less convinced of US’s commitment to defend its allies – motivating some aggressors to use this opportunity to provoke allies into disputes when the extent of the US ability to provide adequate defence is uncertain.37

Some states may begin to mirror investment in similar, new types of technology to counteract the emergence of cross-domain capabilities that can be used between patrons and their client states. By pinpointing weaknesses in defensive alliance commitments, some major powers, such as China, have started to develop ‘puncture’ capabilities that are low cost, high technology and highly effective means of countering advances in extended deterrent capabilities. In the case of China, for example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is beginning to establish ‘new-type combat forces’ that merge naval aviation, cyber and special forces to adapt to changing demands for combat readiness and military doctrine.38 Additionally, China has begun to use ‘lowintensity coercion’ to advance its maritime objectives in the East and South China Seas – often threatening US allies in the region, including the Philippines and Japan. While these moves are made to increase China’s presence and control over disputed islands in the region, their strategy regarding escalation – and avoiding conflict with the US – remains unknown.

These discussions yield several important implications, especially when we consider how they impact allied decision-making. This uncertainty may result in a variety of other second and third-order effects. First, potential allies may seek commitments from other patrons seen to be more reliable – new patrons that still rely on hard military power. Other the other hand, allies may seek other forms of assurance or seek to challenge adversaries on their own – engaging in moral hazard. Allies may even begin to develop counter-balancing technology that allows them independence from their patrons and as a means to challenge adversaries. Without the benefits of capability aggregation in alliances or enhanced security through substitution, this could impact the value of alliances for allies (or their patrons). In aggregate, such consideration raises important concerns about how emerging technologies will influence the allied side of the strategic interaction.

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