Lack of confidence in the US nuclear commitment enables nuclear proliferation
Pelopidas 15 (Benoit Pelopidas - CISAC affiliate and lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, “Chapter 3: The Nuclear Straitjacket”, The Future of Extended Deterrence, Pages 73-74, Georgetown University Press, 2015, MG)
In international relations theory, the most famous proponents of structural realism, area studies specialists inspired by it, and even critical voices have formulated forecasts and policy recommendations based on the nuclear straitjacket, even if their analytical assessments are often formulated in probabilistic terms.8 Major proponents of structural realism argued that the protection offered by the two superpowers during the Cold War was the essential cause of nuclear nonproliferation during that period. This led to a series of proliferation forecasts about the post– Cold War period.9 Benjamin Frankel offers the clearest formulation of this alternative when he writes that “there is an inherent contradiction between welcoming the end of bipolarity and deploring the spread of nuclear weapons” and “it is precisely the large size and sophistication of the superpowers’ nuclear forces, and the avowed willingness of the superpowers to threaten to use them on behalf of their clients, . . . that have prevented a more pervasive weapons proliferation.”10 Most recently, Michael Horowitz phrases the nuclear straitjacket in terms of likelihood when he writes that “[i]n a world where progress towards arms reductions reverses, some states with civilian nuclear power might begin to prepare quietly for a world where they need to build their own small nuclear arsenal. Such an outcome might become likely if the economic struggles in the United States lead the country to pull back significantly from its international obligations, including its extended deterrence umbrella.”11
A similar tendency can be identified in works of area studies specialists inspired by structural realism. Beyond the works of John Mearsheimer on the necessity of an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent in Ukraine, Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett can be mentioned.12 A few months before Kiev decided to give its weapons back to Russia, it insisted on the protection that these weapons would offer against a Russia depicted as expansionist, notably because of the remaining Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine.13 Similarly, Yair Evron accepts the idea that the end of bipolarity created additional incentives to get nuclear weapons.14 Some interpretations of the German case and, more broadly, of nuclear abstinence inside the Eu ro pean community tend to rely on the nuclear straitjacket.15 Most recently, Andrew Kennedy argued that “implicit nuclear umbrellas” and disarmament diplomacy were key drivers of Indian nuclear restraint until 1998.16
Even critical voices like Glenn Chafetz, who intends to build an “alternative to the neo- realist perspective” for the post– Cold War world, ends up transposing the argument of the nuclear straitjacket at the level of perceptions. In his view, what matters for forecasting proliferation is not whether the protector will maintain its security guarantee but if the protégé believes the protector will do so.17 This approach leaves room for the possibility that the protégé could misinterpret the intentions of the protector and decide not to go for the bomb even though the protector has not made a sincere credible pledge. Thus, the protégé in this instance would not go nuclear because it believes that the protector’s defective pledge of extended nuclear deterrence is valid. The fact that the protégé makes a mistake should not mask that its supposed reasoning remains the same.18 Most recently, Francis Gavin argues that the resolve to strike as a foundation of a credible nuclear security guarantee might have created incentives to go for the bomb for countries to which the deterrent pledge is not extended, but he does not criticize the effi - cacy of extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation tool.19