Ukraine set the brink – it’s up to US credibility now
Schepers 6/2 (Névine Schepers - a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, “Russia’s War and the Global Nuclear Order”, Volume 10 of Policy Perspectives, 2 June 2022, https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-6_2022-EN.pdf, MG)
By bringing nuclear weapons back in the international limelight, the war seems to have emphasized the benefits of relying on nuclear deterrence, inciting fears of renewed proliferation. Given that the outcome of the war remains unknown, it is too early to draw conclusions about whether this will encourage more states to develop nuclear programs. However, some preliminary effects are already apparent.
On the one hand, Ukraine’s history as a former Soviet Republic that inherited and subsequently returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Moscow in exchange for security assurances gives a different tone to Russia’s use of deterrence in this war. The appeal of such negative security assurances has therefore diminished. Within the NPT regime, many non-nuclear weapon states have previously placed particular emphasis on negative security assurances as a means to protect themselves from nuclear conflict. The breaching of such an assurance to Ukraine further undermines efforts to address security gaps posed by the imbalance between nuclear haves and have-nots. More than 100 non-nuclear weapon states rely on negative security assurances included in the protocols to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones treaties. If those are no longer deemed credible and a state feels under existential threat, developing a domestic nuclear deterrent may appear more appealing in the future.
On the other hand, the relevance of positive security guarantees, established through legally binding frameworks such as NATO, has increased, as Sweden and Finland’s requests for NATO accession illustrate. This reinforces the perceived value of extended deterrence, meaning the commitment of a nuclear power to deter and respond to attacks in defense of allies. When allies are confident in the credibility of extended deterrence, they refrain from developing their own deterrent.3 However, increased reliance on such security guarantees in Europe adds further weight on the US as the central deterrence provider. While Washington’s allies are moving to reinforce conventional deterrence capabilities, the credibility of nuclear deterrence will mostly remain a US responsibility, one that has to withstand future election cycles and potential Trump-like leadership figures.