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Enhanced conventional assets undermines the perception of credible US nuclear deterrence

Bradley 15 (Jennifer Bradley - provides on-site support at United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate as part of the Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group in Omaha, “Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence”, Air University, July-August 2015, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue-4/V-Bradley.pdf, MG)

The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declaration that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relationship. Failure to take into account that country’s deep-seated suspicion of the United States invalidated the NPR’s assumption that improved ties would allow the United States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that US policy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable. However, this perception contrasts with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consistent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.46 This situation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for miscalculation and deterrence failure.

Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional capabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also demonstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25 years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creating effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creating or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their nuclear forces are vulnerable and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and relying more on nuclear weapons to counter this perceived threat.

Conclusion

From nuclear weapons’ pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to today, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arsenal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall importance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear arsenals than does the United States, precisely to deter America’s unmatched conventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deterrent relationships with Russia and China.

The United States has fallen into a “mirror imaging” trap by assuming that other nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they have the same priority of reaching “Global Zero.” The Obama administration has even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.47 Part of this policy is that other nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our opponents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play in safeguarding their interests.

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