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Enhanced non-nuclear deterrence undermines allied assurance

Morgan and Péczeli 21 (Amelia Morgan - research associate at the Center for Science and Security Studies and a doctoral candidate in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College, Anna Péczeli - postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory , “Europe’s Evolving Deterrence Discourse”, Center for Global Security Research, February 2021, https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_euro_det_final.pdf, MG)

All this suggests that the paramount role of the United States in setting the overall direction of Western deterrence thinking will remain unchanged.27 However, as the U.S. strategic community—like U.S. society more broadly—appears more and more polarized, deterrence thinking, too, has become bifurcated. While U.S. policy remains firmly grounded in what Keith Payne has termed “difficult deterrence” (e.g., strong conventional forces, limited nuclear options, missile defenses, little or no arms control), there is also an idealist streak that ranges from advocating more sweeping arms control measures all the way to nuclear abolition.28 While this latter school of thought had failed when President Obama sought to adopt some of its elements during his first tenure, it still commands considerable political respectability and could return with a new Democratic administration.

Both schools of thought can be a challenge for European security. By giving short shrift to arms control and by advocating new weapon systems to fill alleged gaps in the Western deterrence posture vis-à-vis a more risk-prone Russia, the orthodox deterrence school tends to irritate those Europeans who worry about the effects of such policies on their own public opinion. By contrast, the arms control school’s preference for cooperative solutions runs the risk of interpreting certain alliance achievements (e.g., nuclear sharing arrangements or U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Europe) as a potential hindrance on the way to new agreements. Hence, some Europeans, notably in the continent’s East, could get nervous about what in their view would constitute a naïve U.S. approach in dealing with Russia or other opponents.

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