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Widespread AI integration destabilizes nuclear guarantees

Lohn and Geist 18 (Andrew J. Lohn - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Edward Geist - policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?”, RAND Corporation, January 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324723351_How_Might_Artificial_Intelligence_Affect_the_Risk_of_Nuclear_War, MG)

Nuclear strategy is about more than just deterrence (see the table opposite). Deterrence is the use of retaliatory threats to dissuade an adversary from attacking oneself or one’s allies. Deterrence can be categorized into central deterrence (deterrence of an attack on one’s homeland) and extended deterrence (deterrence of an attack on one’s strategic partners) (Cimbala, 2002). Nuclear weapons can also be used for compellence—coercing the enemy into doing something that it does not want to do (Long, 2008, p. 9). In addition to coercive deterrence and compellence threats, nuclear weapons can be employed for warfighting, the way they were at the end of the Second World War. The practical complexities of nuclear strategy stem from the challenges of assurance—making extended deterrence credible. During the Cold War, the United States accumulated its massive stockpile of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to convince its allies that that it would be willing to retaliate to conventional Soviet attacks in Europe with nuclear responses. As United Kingdom Defence Minister Denis Healey observed, it took “only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans” (Healey, 1989). The scale of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, however, alarmed Soviet leaders, who believed that the Americans might be attempting to develop a first-strike capability against them. This distrust underscored the need for reassurance—convincing adversaries that they will not be attacked as long as they refrain from the behavior that is being deterred (Schelling, 1966).

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Strategic stability exists when adversaries lack a significant incentive to engage in provocative behavior.5 There are several kinds of strategic stability that are distinguished by their varying temporal scales. First-strike stability exists when no state can carry out an attack out of the blue against its opponent without significant fear of a devastating retaliation. Such a possibility is best deterred by the threat of overwhelming and automatic retaliation from secure second-strike forces (Cimbala, 2002, p. 66). Crisis stability, by contrast, aims to prevent or manage escalation during crises, as occurred in Berlin and Cuba in the early 1960s (Cimbala, 2002, p. 98). In these circumstances, national leaders are under immense pressure not to show weakness by backing down, but the chance of inadvertent escalation increases significantly as states attempt to maneuver the nuclear forces for signaling purposes. In this context, the kind of large automatic retaliation that is ideal for maximizing first-strike stability is a recipe for disaster.

Finally, arms race stability is achieved when there are no exploitable inequalities in adversaries’ military capabilities (Cimbala, 2002, p. 110). States avoid these inequalities to manage the risks and costs of long-term competition and to avoid compromising first-strike stability and crisis stability in the future. Nuclear strategy is difficult because these objectives are in tension with each other.

In an extreme case, AI could undermine the condition of MAD and make nuclear war winnable, but it takes much less to undermine strategic stability. AI advancements merely need to cast doubt on the credibility of retaliation at some level of conflict. Major nuclear powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, have a shared interest in maintaining the credibility of central deterrence, but they seek regional advantages in pursuit of what they regard as their core strategic interests. Areas where credibility is already strained, such as certain extended deterrence guarantees, are particularly vulnerable to destabilization. The increasingly multipolar strategic environment is also encouraging forms of competition that threaten stability. For instance, the United States is interested in developing the capability to track and target a minor nuclear power’s mobile missile launchers, but Russia and China fear that the same technology could mature into a threat to their more sophisticated retaliatory forces. In a crisis situation, the employment or availability of AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or weapon systems could stoke tensions and increase the chances of inadvertent escalation. Finally, the pursuit of advanced military capabilities is liable to cause arms race instability even if those technologies are nonviable, as in the historical case of missile defense. The challenge AI poses to strategic stability is not unique to this particular technology, but it is more acute because of rapid technical progress in AI and its many potential intersections with nuclear strategy. Most of the specific applications AI are likely to be used for, such as analysis of ISR data, controlling autonomous sensor platforms, and automated target recognition (ATR) have been eagerly sought for decades but were beyond the capability of available technology. Even without further breakthroughs, incremental progress using existing AI techniques may make these long-sought goals practical realities in the foreseeable future.

Both Russia and China appear to believe that the United States is attempting to leverage AI to threaten the survivability of their strategic nuclear forces, stoking mutual distrust that could prove catastrophic in a crisis. As Paul Bracken observes, ongoing improvements in technology such as AI threaten to “undermine minimum deterrence strategies” and “blur the line between conventional and nuclear war” (Bracken, 2017).

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