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Changing biotech defensive posture away from ambiguous nuclear gives the perception of weakening US commitments

Péczeli 17 (Anna Péczeli - postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Best Options for the Nuclear Posture Review”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 11, Fall 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26271605.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6fe35810b46ec7d6f99b78951d9cc1c9&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1, MG)

During the debate under the Obama administration, the DOD cautioned against dramatic changes in declaratory policy and emphasized the benefits of the long-standing tradition of the so-called calculated ambiguity strategy. The main idea behind this strategy is that the United States does not specify the nature of response to a non-nuclear aggression but at the same time it threatens with an overwhelming and devastating counterattack. This could mean an asymmetric nuclear attack in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons.28 Maintaining this option implies that the Obama administration still saw a few non-nuclear scenarios when the threat of a devastating nuclear response was deemed essential for the security of the United States or its allies and partners.

As a result, the 2010 NPR concluded that sole purpose was acceptable as a long-term goal but the current circumstances were not adequate to implement it immediately. The document stated, “the United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”29 To create these conditions, the United States outlined two goals: first, it “will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons”30 and, second, it will “continue efforts to strengthen regional security architectures and eliminate chemical and biological weapons, so that over time all states possessing nuclear weapons can be secure in making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”31

It is very unlikely that the adversaries of the United States could pose an existential threat with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons (CBW). Taking into consideration the unquestionable conventional superiority of the United States, conventional weapons could provide an adequate response option in any of the above scenarios. However, a number of allies (such as the Baltic States or Israel) still believe that their neighbors could actually threaten their existence with non-nuclear means. In these cases, US extended nuclear deterrence and calculated ambiguity are considered crucial to prevent such an attack. Therefore, declaring a sole purpose posture under the current circumstances would be seen by some allies as a weakening of US commitments. This, however, does not mean that the Trump administration should renounce sole purpose. It should, in fact, recommit to sole purpose as a long-term goal because it would be a demonstration of its intention to live up to its NPT commitments by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the future. Just as during the 2010 NPT Review Conference, this could strengthen US negotiating positions at the 2020 RevCon by alleviating criticism from the non-nuclear weapon states.

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