Developing cyber capabilities and OCOs raises questions over the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence
Vizier 21 (Soléne Vizier - holds a double Master's degree in Strategic Studies from the University of Paris and in Cybersecurity, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare from the INISEG (Spain), “New Technologies and Nuclear Strategy”, IDN, November 2021, https://www.idn-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/IDN-New-technologies-and-nuclear-strategy-VDef.pdf, MG)
States’ cyber capabilities are changing the composition of conventional and nuclear weapons systems, and challenging the principle of "nuclear deterrence".
While new technologies support system functionality, real-time decision-making and data processing, new computers and complex codes also make systems less secure, more difficult to protect and therefore easier to compromise. Increased reliance on increasingly complex information systems for nuclear operations increases the possibility of errors, failures and accidents. Similarly, the increasing use of commercial technologies creates significant risks. For example, several nuclear-weapon states rely on commercial technologies and components procured abroad for sensitive nuclear operations, because they are unable to manufacture high-tech components and computer chips.
The development of cyber capabilities also has a transformative effect on other weapons systems. The development of smart weapons, such as ballistic missile defences or satellite weapons, will have an impact on nuclear thinking and strategies. These new technologies may offer opportunities for "deterrence by denial": designed to intercept missiles or warheads after launch, they can also be used to prevent nuclear weapons systems from functioning as intended. This raises important questions for nuclear security, thinking and strategy: the ability of states to target adversary targets vulnerable to missile shields, the role of advanced technologies as a non-nuclear counterforce, the risks of dual-use technologies, the use of artificial intelligence (AI), etc. While AI can assist in decision-making, the RAND Corporation points to its powerful destabilizing potential. AI will strengthen the intelligence capabilities of the most advanced states, weakening "nuclear deterrence" and accelerating decision-making in nuclear crises.
Thus, the new cyber threat poses significant risks to the very principle of "nuclear deterrence". As a key element of future conflicts, offensive cyber capabilities, which give the advantage to the attacker rather than the defender, will increase tensions in times of crisis and could have important consequences for strategic stability, requiring a radical rethinking of established nuclear concepts.
The risks to nuclear command-and-control systems and to information and early warning systems could render the nuclear order inoperative in a crisis. In the case of both AI and cyber-attacks, the mere existence of such means of attack could undermine confidence in nuclear weapons systems and call into question the nuclear second-strike capability. Fear of losing the ability to retaliate could make states feel so vulnerable that they might be tempted to take pre-emptive action. These risks are heightened by the fact that several of the nuclear-weapon states maintain their nuclear forces on permanent alert, and launch times are becoming increasingly shorter. The development of offensive cyber capabilities could thus disrupt the traditional scale of escalation: states could be made vulnerable at any time by their enemies – state or non-state – and a “permanent state of rivalry” would be created.
According to Futter, these developments could have serious consequences for nuclear deterrence based on second-strike capability and the fear of mutually assured destruction. The potential use of cyber capabilities as precursors to delay or disrupt defensive systems before conducting a strategic attack introduces the risk that systems could be compromised and therefore not function as intended. States would then reintroduce the possibility of preemptive strikes against nuclear weapons or associated systems.
These cyber capabilities will also have an impact on the likelihood of a future nuclear arms reduction agreement, as well as on nuclear proliferation, because any arms reduction agreement could increase the influence of cyber threats. Cyber weapons thus represent a serious and growing counterforce risk and create a cyber security dilemma in terms of which nuclear-weapon states must assume that their national security infrastructure has been targeted. This leads to a growing incentive for these states to adapt their nuclear policies towards "preventive deterrence" based on "deterrence by denial" rather than "deterrence by punishment". The sanctity of nuclear norms is thus being entirely reassessed, raising fears of a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.