Europe perceives cyber replacement as an offensive tactic as less capable than nuclear
Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963, MG)
We were principally concerned with whether technologies that improve the discriminate and precise application of smart conventional weapons could decrease reliance on nuclear weapons for strategic tasks and even, perhaps, make the substitution of nuclear weapons (by conventional capabilities) more feasible. Experts and policymakers generally agreed that it is not likely that emerging technologies will substitute nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks. However, among the experts whom we surveyed there was a slight variation depending on their region. Experts who were the most skeptical of cyber supplanting nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks came from the United States, followed by those in Europe. By contrast, around 60% of those experts belonging to the category “Other” seemed to believe that cyber capabilities are likely to replace nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks (see Table 2).
Decision-makers whom we interviewed tended to agree with experts from the United States and Europe. One interviewee reasoned that when it comes to trying to guarantee a strategic outcome, cyber is not the best capability because it is still far too complex and there is still much we do not know (Interviewee A). Another interviewee agreed saying that cyber is “not designed to be a strategic weapon” (Interviewee F). Other respondents agreed that new technologies are not likely to supplant nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks simply because nuclear weapons have such a significant place in international politics and play such a pivotal, central role in deterrence. On this point, one interviewee remarked that the very debate that we have over nuclear weapons “is a vindication of the importance of nuclear weapons in politics and society” (Interviewee K). Another interviewee stated that the “horrifying stigma” around nuclear weapons evokes a certain respectability for the weapons as an effective deterrent (Interviewee L). This is particularly true when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence by punishment, which elevates the costs of attack (Mazarr, 2018). Moreover, another policymaker stated that there is a conservative, doctrinal and institutional vision in their country that sees nuclear weapons as essential in the country’s strategic thinking, making it very difficult to “relativize their importance” (Interviewee D).
Policymakers generally agreed that the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons, which is—in the minds of experts and policy elites—assured and certain, makes them different from any other technology. These views come close to arguments outlined by Ford (2010), who argued that nuclear weapons are uniquely well-suited for both counterforce and countervalue targeting. Other experts, particularly those versed in cyber technology, pointed to a curious contradiction: The effectiveness of offensive cyber weapons is unclear unless they are tested, but as soon as they are used, the gaps they exploit might be patched up.