Shared cyber shifts US planning away from kinetic forces
Herr and Schneider 18, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, ** an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Trey and Jacquelyn, “Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato)//BB
Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions. Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD’s announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.