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Hypersonics cooperative development alienates allies and risks war with Russia and China

Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173, MG)

However, in considering Hypothesis 2 – the potential benefit of emerging technology in deterring large-scale conflict but potentially inviting small-scale disputes – the emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles gets somewhat more complex. Despite the rhetoric and posture aimed at third parties (such as North Korea) that pose threats to its allies, the US’s two primary adversaries, Russia and China, view the development of CPGS and hypersonic weaponry as destabilising, prone to miscalculation, and potential escalation. This emerging technology may produce more risk than deterrent value and increase both the likelihood of smaller-scale crises, as well as large-scale conflicts.62

Importantly, it is this concern that highlights why allies may be less assured by the inclusion of this capability in the broader extended deterrent arsenal. Worried about being caught as collateral damage in a fight between major powers such as Russia and China against the United States, allies may fear that even conventional-only hypersonic vehicles may increase the risk of conflict to unacceptable levels – producing uncertainty about whether they would actually be used in combat. This concern about the actual likelihood of use mirrors that in the conversations over nuclear use. Most allies are uncertain as to whether the United States would actually invoke nuclear weapons in their defence for fear of escalation.63 If hypersonic glide vehicles produce the same cycles of miscalculation, strategic instability and uncertainty, they are unlikely to serve as useful complements to extended deterrence.64

Second, if we consider this dynamic from the opposing perspective, allies may be concerned about the efficacy and credibility of the US extended deterrent, in the context of hypersonic weaponry. In contrast to the United States whose development of hypersonic vehicles is primarily conventional, both Russia and China are projected to have ‘upped the ante’ by developing capabilities for nuclear delivery as well.65 Allied observers of this progress may be increasingly concerned about the asymmetry between the US capability and that of its two significant adversaries. As with other forms of uncertainty, allies may again begin to question their reliance on US’s extended deterrent, and potentially seek their own offensive capabilities to counter these new threats. Further, uncertainty about escalation management may encourage other forms of behaviour that diverge from alliance preferences. These dynamics may produce negative repercussions for broader regional and international stability – namely by encouraging allies to take up riskier behaviour that increases the likelihood of conflict. As with other instances of moral hazard in the nuclear arena, there are concerns that allies may effectively threaten efforts at strategic stability.

As both vignettes illustrate, through preliminary examinations of the four hypotheses discussed earlier, the introduction of emerging technologies into the extended deterrence and assurance equation produces a whole host of complex and unforeseen implications. Seemingly non-uniform in their broader effects, more research is required to assess how exactly these technologies may enhance the US’s ability to provide deterrence to distant allies, while still maintaining credibility in its commitments.

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