The US’ commitment credibility specifically is the brightline for potential proliferators
Mehta 20 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Delaying Doomsday”, Bridging the Gap, Page 53-54, 2020, MG)
Second, questions of credibility and reputation have resurged in the modern geo-strategic era.60 Decline in U.S. reputation in the twenty-first century has been exacerbated after a series of foreign policy failures (e.g., the Iraq War in 2003, the creation of failed redlines in Syria in 2013), and potentially worse, the idiosyncratic “America First” foreign policy of the Trump Administration that even extols the benefits of nuclear proliferation. If adversaries and allies alike mistrust the United States and its commitment to both the nonproliferation regime and existing alliances, concerns will continue to escalate about whether the U.S. would be willing to actually abide by a nuclear agreement and provide the promised inducements from negotiations or forgo threats of military force if the proliferator actually complies. If proliferators or other actors in the international community doubt the United States’ credibility, proliferators on the cusp of nuclear reversal may question whether they should proceed with their planned denuclearization. Future research may choose to relax these assumptions and assess whether the same theoretical mechanisms are as salient in a new geopolitical environment where state (and specifically leader) credibility is up to debate.
Role of Non-U.S. Actors: Other Superpowers and Regional Adversaries
The theoretical framework in this book focuses primarily on the role of the United States as the key actor involved in nuclear negotiations. This is not without reason. First, its role as the head of the nonproliferation (and thus counterproliferation) regime is generally unequivocal. Since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the international system in 1945 (by the United States), the U.S. scientific and policy communities, as well as policymakers and heads of states, have done their utmost to both manage and curtail the spread of nuclear technology throughout the international system.61 Second, as discussed throughout this study, the United States has traditionally been both the primary donor of positive inducements and imposer of sanctions and other negative inducements. This is true not just within the nuclear arena but often with regard to human rights violations, terrorism, or other security threats posed by external adversaries. Third, and relatedly, the United States, as the global hegemon, often has the most to lose from proliferation challenges to the status quo. As leader of the international world order, threats posed by proliferators to adapt or alter “the nuclear club” hold significant costs for the U.S., both in terms of security and with regard to its interests globally.62