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US Nuclear-based commitment is the only one that assures allies – anything else enables proliferation

Anderson et al. 13 (Justin V. Anderson PhD - Senior Policy Fellow at National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Jeffrey A. Larsen PhD - Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Polly M. Holdorf - Program Support Specialist at the United States Air Force Academy , “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS Occasional Paper, https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf, September 2013, MG)

Extending deterrence against regional risk-taking states in possession of limited nuclear arsenals – or determined to develop these weapons – requires the United States to clearly demonstrate it possesses nuclear forces capable of imposing “unacceptable costs” against any actor contemplating a nuclear attack against a U.S. ally or partner.64 While each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad possesses this capability, nuclear-capable aircraft (bombers and dual-capable aircraft (DCA)) are particularly important to extended deterrence against this type of opponent. In response to nuclear saber-rattling by a risk-taking state with a limited nuclear arsenal, the United States can rapidly fly these delivery systems into the region in question, showing this state – and local U.S. allies – that it can immediately respond to any provocation with superior nuclear capabilities.65

U.S. nuclear forces are also essential to the assurance of allies and partners. Other than the United Kingdom and France, no U.S. ally or partner openly possesses their own nuclear arsenal. As a result, many allies and partners are entirely dependent upon the United States for the provision of a nuclear deterrent against potential adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The importance of this fact – which is a day-to-day reality for many U.S. friends abroad – cannot be overemphasized; for these states, the only weapon they view as fully effective against nuclear coercion or attack is not in their possession.66 This highlights the importance of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to nuclear nonproliferation efforts; it is vital for the United States to convince allies and partners they have no need to consider developing their own, independent nuclear deterrent.67

Within the U.S. nuclear arsenal, allies and partners particularly value visible and mobile U.S. nuclear forces.68 As noted above, within current U.S. nuclear forces these characteristics are associated with nuclear-capable aircraft. U.S. allies and partners recognize the United States can also deliver nuclear payloads globally with submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Many find greater assurance, however, in forces they can directly observe stationed or forward deployed on their territory, or regularly rotating in theater. They also share the U.S. conviction that the rapid, visible generation or deployment of U.S. nuclear forces can prevent nuclear-armed potential adversaries from engaging in nuclear brinkmanship.

Planners and strategists must demonstrate to allies, partners, and potential adversaries that U.S. nuclear forces are not solely restricted to central deterrence. Potential adversaries must also recognize that the United States is capable of rapidly matching any type of nuclear provocation or escalation. In addition, U.S. strategists and planners need to balance allied requests for nuclear forces sufficient to deter and defeat prospective opponents against allied concerns regarding the potential consequences of nuclear conflict (such as fallout drifting across their borders). At present, due to the threats posed by risk-taker states, the role of nuclear airpower is critically important to a range of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies. As such, strategists and planners must understand the unique (and differing) capabilities and requirements of bombers, DCA, and the warheads they can deliver.

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