Only nuclear solves deterrence and assurance
Wheeler 10 (Michael O. Wheeler – Colonel and Staff Secretary to the National Security Council, “The Changing Requirements of Assurance and Extended Deterrence”, Institute for Defense Analysis, July 2010, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA550264.pdf, MG)
Background. When this project began in 2007, it was not common practice to encounter American officials publicly discussing assurance and extended deterrence. In fact, as nuclear security became less of a central feature of great power relations after the Cold War, it was unusual to encounter much discussion of any nuclear deterrence issues at high levels of government. Today, however, the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence is a much more highly visible part of the security debate, and figures prominently in statements by cabinet officials and, indeed, by the Vice President and President. The following elements of the evolving policy environment since the project began are especially relevant to this paper.
The Schlesinger Task Force. An unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons by the Air Force in 2007 and the subsequent discovery that intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) components had been shipped to Taiwan by mistake a year earlier, triggered a series of investigations and reports. In June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management chaired by James R. Schlesinger to recommend improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
The Schlesinger task force produced two reports.9 Among other things, the task force concluded that U.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe, although modest in numbers, remain a “pillar of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] unity.”10 The task force also stressed the importance of extended nuclear deterrence as a non-proliferation tool. In a press conference at the Pentagon in January 2008, Dr. Schlesinger stated that, 11 the United States is obligated to provide a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus nations, and that number may increase. Thus, those 30 nations must retain confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If they fail to do so, some five or six of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own, and the consequence is to add to proliferation. The strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the credibility of that umbrella, is a principal barrier to proliferation.
This has become a standard, non-partisan theme in the contemporary American security policy debate.
The Perry-Schlesinger Commission. Under the chairmanship of two former Secretaries of Defense, William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, the Strategic Posture Commission (also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission) was chartered by Congress in 2008 to examine and make recommendations on the long-term strategic posture of the United States. In their final report, released in early 2009, the Posture Commission provided a broad and comprehensive analysis of the international nuclear order. The Commission concluded inter alia that assuring allies remains a principal function of the U.S nuclear posture and that the United States should expand consultations with allies regarding such assurances.12 The Commission also found that “assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned only with its own defense.”13 Finally, relevant to this discussion, the Commission also concluded that the United States “should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance.”14
The Perry-Scowcroft Task Force. In 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an independent task force chaired by William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft to examine U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In their consensus report released in 2009, the Perry-Scowcroft task force concluded inter alia: The United States does not need nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military inferiority and has no reason to fear a conventionally armed foe. But U.S. allies, including members of the NA TO alliance, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, depend on security assurances from the United States. A component of these assurances is protection against nuclear attack. U.S. nuclear weapons represent one facet of multilayered defenses—including diplomacy, economic support, and conventional military forces—that deter attacks and defend allies in the event of an attack. Without the nuclear aspect of these assurances, some U.S. allies may decide in the future to acquire nuclear weapons. The Task Force strongly supports maintaining and enhancing, where necessary, U.S. security assurances to allies (emphasis added).