They have to be on European soil in order to be credible
Audenaert 20 (Didier Audenaert - Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute, “Report Part Title: NATO’s nuclear role sharing: US nuclear weapon carried by European DCA”, Egmont Institute, 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep28847.10.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5975494adaef3139272fc055910ffad9&ab_segments=&origin=, MG)
Current warfare operating procedures are likely to prioritise the use of stand-off weapons above gravity bombs. Consideration could therefore be given for relying entirely on the powerful and modern weapons in the US’ vast nuclear arsenal30 in fulfilling the role of “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”. Of course, the quantity and the quality of the US’ nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to ensure deterrence and defence. But, again, there is no consensus among Allies to change the present nuclear sharing modus operandi and arrangements. Overreliance on the US’ vast nuclear territorial arsenal would erase the Allies’ “broadest participation in nuclear burden sharing” as well as their interest and involvement in nuclear consultations: transatlantic collective security would be diluted and European Allies would increasingly question American commitment to European security; some European Allies could even start looking for undesirable remedies. Furthermore, the European Allies will not accept a sole and direct dependence on the US’ vast nuclear arsenal without having access to a collective (albeit smaller) weapon on European soil or a political say in the decision-making process which should be multilateral; one should not forget that the use of such nuclear weapons would be on the European continent. NATO’s nuclear sharing at least provides European Allies with a decision-making capability in the worst case. Furthermore, while Europe is not ready or capable of assuring her own deterrence and defence, there would be a very high risk of decoupling European and American security as the US would be far less critically involved in European security: the European ‘supreme layer’ would be non-existent and European Allies could be more easily exposed to coercion. One should recall that, historically, the US has created the mechanism of nuclear burden sharing with American nuclear weapons on European soil in order to meet European security concerns and to prevent nuclear proliferation on the European continent: these objectives have not changed.
It is clear that the political benefits of nuclear role sharing in the NATO framework outweigh the military limitations.