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History proves norms don’t resolve proliferation

Green 18 (Matthew Green – Journalism Teacher at Fremont High School, “How to Stop a Nuclear War: The Non-Proliferation Treaty, Explained”, KQED, 21 March 2018, https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/30398/how-to-stop-a-nuclear-war-the-non-proliferation-treaty-explained, MG)

Despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the limitations of existing nonproliferation instruments to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, political calculations have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran and North Korea to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. Multiple UNSC resolutions condemning these countries’ nuclear programs, including several that imposed sanctions, have done little to stem their nuclear ambitions. The outcome of the P5+1 negotiations to stem Iran’s nuclear program represents a major test for the nonproliferation regime’s ability to stop proliferation by states.

Another problem is the lack of adequate verification and enforcement mechanisms available to the IAEA, whose access, budget, personnel resources and technological resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect every NPT violation. In 2014, the IAEA’s overall budget was approximately $345 million, but an advisory panel determined that the IAEA’s budget would need to double by 2020 in order to meet future demands on its capabilities. Even discounting nuclear facilities that the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from facilities under IAEA safeguards, namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the widespread adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which strengthens the agency’s inspections mandate and is in force in 124 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and, as of 2014, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet to agree to the additional safeguards and inspections capabilities allowed under the Additional Protocol. And despite U.S. efforts, the 2010 NPT Review Conference failed to achieve consensus to make the Additional Protocol mandatory for all member states.

Other multilateral, informal organizations also play a role in implementing and enforcing the NPT, notably the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Made up of forty-six states with advanced nuclear power programs, the NSG prohibits the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to states outside the NPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards. However, the NSG’s export bans are not legally binding, and members (including the United States, Russia, and China) have pursued civilian nuclear projects with non-NPT members. In addition, many developing countries have criticized [PDF] the NSG as a club of developed economies that limits developing countries’ access to nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, the NSG’s effectiveness as an export control regime may decline as nuclear trade increasingly involves [PDF] states outside of the NSG.

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