Declassified government documents say it became feasible 30 YEARS AGO
O’Shei 91 (Donald M. O’Shei – U.S. Army General that represented the US in SALT talks with Russia, “IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION”, Department of State, Revised 1991 [Eighteenth Session of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy for the Department of State Originally], https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/769-Donald-M.-OShei.pdf, MG)
There is a school of thought that any concentration of Pu-240 or Pu-242 in a fuel of over 1-2% renders the fuel unsuitable for weapons manufacture. Since the enriched uranium reactor produces such a waste, and since isotopes of plutonium cannot be separated chemically, this is equivalent to saying that only the plutonium produced by a natural uranium reactor is of weapons quality. This view is subject to question. It is conceded that a great power interested in only very high quality and control standards in weapons would avoid such fuel. This would not necessarily follow for a nuclear aspirant. If high Pu-240 content, say up to 8-10%, plutonium were the only available material, a country might accept the unreliability and fabrication complexities associated with such fuels in preference to having no weapons at all. While there is no evidence that this has ever been done, it should not be ruled out as a possibility.
Recapitulation
Virtually any nation can come up with a delivery system for a nuclear weapon. The construction of the device is considerably more difficult but, with the possible exception of an implosion mechanism suitable for high Pu-240 plutonium fuels, a long list of countries could manage a low yield solution if they were to decide to give priority to the task and if they will accept fairly low standards. It may be sometime before technology will permit refinement of weapons grade U-235 fuels for all but the very rich industrial nations. In the interim, however, enough plutonium can be processed by chemical methods from reactor waste to permit any country with even a very modest reactor program to charge a few bombs a year. The short answer to the question "Can they build the bomb?" would appear, except for very undeveloped fourth world countries, to be yes.