That causes a nuclear daisy chain – escalation and miscalc are likely
Kahl et al. 13 (Colin H. Kahl - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton - Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine - Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?”, Center for a New American Security, February 2013, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/161866/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf, MG)
The bad news is that low probability is not the same as no probability, and all of the possible Saudi responses entail significant risks and costs. In the near term, it is technically impossible for Saudi Arabia to indigenously develop nuclear weapons; the risk of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapons to the Kingdom is also overstated. Nevertheless, the risk of the latter scenario is not zero. Moreover, even if Riyadh fails to acquire its own nuclear weapons shortly after Iran does, a Saudi hedging strategy could still produce such a capability over the long run. Either the low-probability Pakistani option or the higher-probability hedging path could lead to the emergence of a poly-nuclear Middle East, with profound consequences for the region. The basic principles of nuclear deterrence that held during the Cold War, and that continue to hold in South and East Asia today, would likely hold if there were multiple nuclear powers in the Middle East. However, tensions and crises would probably increase. And even if all the relevant actors were assumed to be rational, various factors – the absence of secure second-strike capabilities (at least for some period of time), unreliable early warning and command-and-control systems, close geographic proximity and deep mutual distrust – could still inadvertently produce a regional nuclear war via miscalculations, accidents or unauthorized use.183
It is also good news that the Saudis are less likely to be attracted to a Pakistani extended deterrence guarantee (and Islamabad is less likely to offer one) than is commonly assumed. But should this moderate-probability scenario emerge, it would extend the South Asian geopolitical competition directly into the Middle East, thereby connecting two of the world’s most crisis- and conflict-prone regions into a nuclear daisy chain.