No link or we turn – policy makers think nuclear deterrence is eternal and AND think emerging tech makes nuclear deterrence better
Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963, MG)
We have studied the views that experts and decision-makers have when it comes to the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Beyond the substantial findings, discussed below, our article also demonstrates that expert surveys might be a suitable measure to map the views of epistemic community when faced with future, unpredictable developments. Regardless of a particular approach one uses, using multiple expert insights is a promising way to deal with uncertainty about the future. This is not related only to the field of security policy or international relations. As DeWees and Minson (2018) note, “the combination of multiple, independent judgments is often more accurate than even an expert’s individual judgment.” While there are possible risks (as DeWees andMinson make clear, once experts make up their mind, it is difficult to persuade them otherwise), faced with uncertainty the wisdom of the crowd offers an attractive option.
Our respondents noted that the destabilizing impacts of emerging technologies in the nuclear realm come from the fact that these technologies compound the risks of close calls, mishaps and misunderstandings. They were concerned about the potentials for future close calls and misinterpretation and therefore thought that as emerging technologies become more ubiquitous, they also make nuclear deterrence more unstable.
Some of the decision-makers felt that some of the threats commonly associated with emerging technologies in the scholarly discourse are overblown. There was, for example, skepticism about whether nuclear launch decisions will ever be delegated to an entity other than humans, or whether HGVs are anything other than fancy missiles. Our interviewees were concerned about cyber risks, but they also felt that the use of cyber technologies for strategic purposes is most likely not going to happen. These findings underline that in spite of the growing attention given to emerging technologies among thinktankers and academics alike, decision-makers are less concerned about these technologies. This means that either the experts are alarmist, or that they need to build better epistemic communities to convey to decisionmakers the risks that these technologies pose. Furthermore, the centrality attached to nuclear weapons in strategic thinking and planning appears to undermine any idea of weakening. Our survey and interviews showed that while the respondents could imagine that emerging technologies will have a more prominent role in deterrence by denial; nuclear weapons will remain dominant in deterrence by punishment. This is rather curious since recent work in thinking about long-range conventional strikes highlights that these technologies might change the calculus and appear to affect deterrence by punishment (Montgomery, 2020). However, when it comes to technologies like HGVs or cyberwarfare, the scholars are much more skeptical.
When referring to the positive applications of emerging technologies, many of those surveyed reported that technologies can be used to enhance nuclear safeguarding and verification measures. In this respect, decisionmakers felt that if there is one contribution that emerging technologies can make to nuclear disarmament, it would be here. Curiously, our experts were quite skeptical about the prospects for global nuclear disarmament. The majority of the experts did not think that nuclear disarmament was going to happen in the next 50 years, and a large portion of the experts did not think that nuclear disarmament would make us safer. This seems to support the realist view that nuclear proliferation is a result of the security dilemma, and the removal of nuclear weapons would not resolve the underlying calculus but might make conflict more likely (Waltz, 1981). This is doubly curious, since the majority of our experts came from European countries, where civil society pressure for nuclear disarmament is growing. Therefore, we observe that both the general public and civil society are out of step with the experts. The perception that nuclear disarmament is unachievable (in a reasonable timeframe) and that it would not make the world safer might explain why nuclear disarmament is not a policy priority for numerous experts. As Pelopidas (2020) recently remarked, if elites believe that nuclear weapons are eternal, then the motivation for doing something about disarmament is not as much of a priority for them.