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Relying on nuclear doesn’t reassure allies but encourages nuke prolif – enhanced conventional deterrence solves

Blechman and Rumbaugh 15 (Barry Blechman PhD - co-founder and a Distinguished Fellow of the Stimson Center, Russell Rumbaugh - American defense policy advisor and retired military officer who was the nominee to serve as assistant secretary of the Navy, “Protecting US Security by Minimizing the Role of Nuclear Weapons: A NEW US NUCLEAR POLICY”, Stimson, May 2015, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/ProjectAtom_051315%20(1).pdf, MG)

Maintaining allies’ confidence in US commitments requires frequent consultations, political reassurances, high-level meetings, and cooperation in military planning. US conventional forces also provide a global, visible, flexible, and credible means of reassuring allies — particularly when they are deployed on the ally’s territory or conduct temporary deployments to exercise jointly with allied forces. Though nuclear guarantees are an important component of US security commitments, allies doubt them more than they doubt US conventional commitments because of the greater risk they pose to the US homeland. If an adversary in fact attacked a US ally with conventional forces, the adversary would have already discounted the US commitment to defend the ally. And if US credibility had already been discounted, the potentially graver consequences of a nuclear response would make nuclear guarantees even less credible in the eyes of the adversary. Consequently, the US should make clear repeatedly that it will fulfill all of its treaty obligations and would respond conventionally to conventional attacks against allies, and with nuclear weapons in the event of nuclear attacks. The long history of US security commitments, and the sacrifices in blood and money which the American people have repeatedly made in defense of these commitments, provide ample evidence that US security guarantees are credible.

Although the US should pursue all feasible conventional and diplomatic means to assure allies, there is no level of force deployment, whether conventional or nuclear, that can guarantee allies’ confidence in American security commitments. Some allies have expressed concerns about American security commitments despite the presence of tens-of-thousands of permanently based US forces, underscoring the dependence of allied confidence on factors beyond military presence. Joint command and control of tactical nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements has apparently failed to reassure some NATO members, which demonstrates that the forward deployment of nuclear weapons may also be insufficient to assure allies. Furthermore, though it is undiplomatic to acknowledge, allies often express grave concerns about potential threats and worry about US security commitments, but then fail to take steps to significantly increase their own defense capabilities, raising questions about the seriousness of their concerns. And the frank truth is that the alternatives to dependence on US security guarantees are even less palatable for most US allies. Allying with Russia or China is not a reasonable alternative to a US alliance, attempting to balance Russian or Chinese military capabilities unilaterally or in combination with neighboring states would be a difficult and unnecessary choice, and developing nuclear weapons of their own is in most cases too far a stretch financially or politically.

By making clear that the US believes nuclear weapons can serve only to deter nuclear attacks, the US also would be helping to weaken perceptions of the importance of these weapons and to strengthen perceptions of the dangers they pose, thereby facilitating efforts to limit or reverse pro- liferation and reduce nuclear arsenals. In contrast, if the United States were to make clear it relies on nuclear weapons for a larger set of roles, it would legitimize these weapons, falsely draw attention to their potential uses, and thereby encourage nuclear proliferation. US threats to respond to conventional attack with nuclear weapons exaggerate the utility of nuclear weapons and could reinforce other states’ inclination to acquire nuclear arsenals. If the US were to threaten a nuclear attack despite its conventional superiority, states with weaker conventional forces might have even more incentive to follow suit. The repetition of explicit threats to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could render such threats more credible and gradually weaken the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.

In all of these potential use of military force scenarios, save nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons do not provide any capabilities or attributes US conventional superiority does not also provide. In short, nuclear weapons do not advance US interests, diplomacy, or nuclear policy, and its nuclear posture should therefore minimize them.

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