Nuclear is dead – everyone moved on
Chalmers and Lunn 10 (Malcolm Chalmers - Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Simon Lunn - Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma”, RUSI, March 2010, https://static.rusi.org/201003_op_natos_tactical_nuclear_dilemma.pdf, MG)
Since the Cold War ended, however, the role of these weapons in NATO strategy has been dramatically reduced, as have their numbers. Unofficial estimates suggest that only around 150-250 US warheads remain in Europe, all free-fall gravity bombs designed for use with US and allied tactical aircraft. This reduction has largely taken place away from the public spotlight, with little interest beyond the specialist defence and arms control communities.
Yet the prospect that this protracted drawdown might soon lead to their final elimination has now triggered a major debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. This is between those who believe that elimination could be a relatively cost-free approach to taking forward the disarmament agenda set out in President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech; and those who fear it could do serious damage to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. As a result, reducing from 200 weapons to zero looks set to be much more controversial than the 90 per cent reduction (from 2,500 to 200) that has taken place since 1991. What these weapons lack in operational utility (given their short range and location, together with the continuing availability of larger and more powerful strategic arsenals) is now greatly outweighed by their symbolic significance.
On the one hand, key NATO governments, including those of the US, the UK and Germany, now accept the argument that a credible non-proliferation policy also requires a strengthened commitment to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, some influential voices (within and outside government) increasingly argue that the continuing deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe, alongside the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) of European NATO members, is an obstacle to fulfilling this commitment. The case for withdrawing these weapons has been bolstered by reports that safety standards have been compromised at the nuclear storage facilities, as well as by concerns at the budgetary cost to the US of providing protection of a sufficiently high standard. Moreover, even supporters of continuing deployment recognise that these forces are of little operational relevance. A combination of diplomatic, budgetary and operational reasons, therefore, is pointing to the need for a reformulated approach.