Allies have no incentive to go nuclear – assumes nuclear guarantees
Korb and Cimbala 4/17 (Lawrence J. Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Stephen J. Cimbala - Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, “Nuclear Proliferation Is Not the Answer to the War in Ukraine”, National Interest, 17 April 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-proliferation-not-answer-war-ukraine-201862, MG)
States may not gain much from going nuclear, even if they live in a dangerous regional neighborhood and fear aggression or coercion from one or more of their neighbors. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is quite high, and most military coercion takes place at lower levels. Advanced conventional weapons, including smart drones, long-range precision strike missiles, and network-centric battle management may be as important in deterring prospective attackers as is a small nuclear arsenal. For countries such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia, for example, building and deploying next-generation conventional weapons, along with regional cooperation and U.S. support, could pay greater dividends in deterrence than joining the growing list of nuclear weapons states. Conventional weapons often deter because they can actually win a war at an acceptable cost, whereas nuclear weapons only deter if the threat of use—and prospect of mutual annihilation—is credible.
Considering the downside costs of regional nuclear arms races—including massive financial costs, increased risks of proliferation or accidents, and potential sanctions—it is doubtful that any state in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific will improve their security by developing nuclear weapons. Instead, a growing number of states with small- or medium-sized nuclear arsenals will create more anxieties about the first-strike vulnerability of those forces. Few of these prospective nuclear weapons states can afford a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, currently the most survivable platforms among operationally deployed launch systems. These countries will therefore depend almost exclusively on aircraft or missiles that are less survivable and require their commanders to preempt their opponents. More states will deploy more forces, fears of a surprise attack will multiply, and the need for survivable counter-strike capabilities will lead to more nuclear weapons deployed on a “hair trigger.”
Although Russia’s war against Ukraine might lead some to conclude that nukes are a prescription for safety, the opposite is more likely to be true. Nuclear deterrence in a post-post-Cold War world is less dependable than it was during the Cold War because: first, the stability provided by U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear bipolarity is gone; second, some hot zones such as Asia are already overcrowded with nuclear state actors whose leaders have no democratic accountability; and, third, leaders with or without nuclear weapons are perfectly willing to act in ways that some might judge as “irrational” according to their own definitions of victory. In this environment, nuclear guarantees might turn from deterrents into black holes.