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No Turkey Prolif or inevitable – tons of alt causes

Eldridge 11 (William G. Eldridge – United States Air Force Commander, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent The Case of the Republic of Turkey”, Air University Press, September 2011, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wp_0018_eldridge_extended_nuclear_deterrent.pdf, MG)

Turkey likely will “tip” if Middle East nuclear proliferation becomes widespread and NATO is perceived as ineffective and if US-Turkish relationships collapse. According to one Turkish diplomat, “things would have to get really bad” for Turkey to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Despite a rocky history, current NATO-Turkish and US-Turkish relations remain fundamentally sound, but leadership or regional security changes could strain those relationships. Factors working against Turkish nuclear weapons proliferation include the lack of support by senior Turkish leaders, the high value Turkey places on alliance relationships, the lack of funding for civilian or military nuclear programs, and Turkish treaty agreements forswearing nuclear weapons.

Despite these proliferation disincentives, Turkey will probably hedge against falling behind a potential Middle East nuclear energy (or nuclear arms) race by developing a civilian nuclear power program. As Iran continues pursuing nuclear enrichment and possibly a nuclear weapon, Turkey will likely begin to develop a nuclear power program beyond its current research stage. Turkish leaders do not fear an attack from Iran, but instead they are concerned with the shift in the regional balance of power that may result from a nuclear-armed Iran. Hedging with civilian nuclear power provides scientific and engineering expertise needed for an aggressive Turkish nuclear program if Iran’s regional influence increases or a broader Middle East nuclear arms race begins. Therefore, the United States should continue its involvement in Turkey’s emerging civilian nuclear programs utilizing the existing 2008 US-Turkish nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement), develop additional cooperation agreements that encourage Turkey to forgo nuclear and spent fuel processing, encourage scientific exchanges, and consider financially supporting Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy program. The credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is best signaled not through US nuclear inventory types or numbers, but by demonstrations of US political, economic, and security relationships with Turkey. Turkey’s most important political and security concerns include

• credibility of NATO, EU, and US support for Turkish security;

• Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorism;

• Kurdish activism in Iraq supporting a separate Kurd state;

• Cyprus;

• relations with Iran and Armenia;

• energy security and access; and

• economic strength and domestic stability.

A close US-Turkish partnership that addresses these issues can strengthen US credibility as a reliable ally. A strong US- Turkish relationship also serves as a disincentive for Turkish nuclear weapons acquisition.

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