Double Bind: Either A) The alt doesn’t solve the K because anti-blackness is inevitable within the pessimist frame, and we win because only we have unique offense; or B) The alternative double turns the K because their solvency claim is cruel optimism
Hartman 1997. (Saidiya, Associate prof of English at Cal Berk. Scenes of Subjection p. 12-14)
The effort to examine the event of emancipation is no less riddled by inescapable¶ ironies, the foremost of these being the discontinuity between -substantial freedom¶ and legal emancipation. Inevitably one is forced to confront the discrepant legacy of¶ emancipation and the decidedly circumscribed possibilities available to the freed. In¶ short, how does one adequately render the double bind of emancipation-that is,¶ acknowledge the illusory freedom and travestied liberation that succeeded chattel¶ slavery without gainsaying the small triumphs of Jubilee? Certainly one must contend¶ with the enormity of emancipation as both a breach with slavery and a point of¶ transition to what looks more like the reorganization of the plantation system than¶ self-possession, citizenship, or liberty for the "freed." In the place of the grand¶ narrative of freedom, with its decisive events and incontrovertible advances, I offer¶ an account that focuses on the ambivalent legacy of emancipation and the undeniably¶ truncated opportunities available to the freed. Lacking the certitude of a definitive¶ partition between slavery and freedom, and in the absence of a consummate¶ breach through which freedom might unambivalently announce itself, there is at best¶ a transient and fleeting expression of possibility that cannot ensconce itself as a¶ durable temporal marker. If periodization is a barrier imposed from above that¶ obscures the involuntary servitude and legal subjection that followed in the wake of¶ slavery, then attempts to assert absolutist distinctions between slavery and freedom¶ are untenable. Fundamentally, such assertions involve distinctions between the transient¶ and the epochal, underestimate the contradictory inheritance of emancipation¶ and the forms of involuntary servitude that followed in the wake of slavery, and¶ diminish the reign of terror that accompanied the advent of freedom. Put differently,¶ does the momentousness of emancipation as an event ultimately efface the continuities¶ between slavery and freedom and the dispossession inseparable from becoming¶ a "propertied person"? If one dares to "abandon the absurd catalogue of official¶ history," as Edouard Glissant encourages, then the violence and domination perpetuated¶ in the name of slavery's reversal come to the fore. 1• From this vantage¶ point, emancipation seems a double-edged and perhaps obfuscating label. It discloses¶ as well as obscures since involuntary servitude and emancipation were synonymous¶ for a good many of the formerly enslaved. This is evidenced in "commonsense"¶ observations that black lives were more valuable under slavery than under¶ freedom, that blacks were worse off under freedom than during slavery, and that the¶ gift of freedom was a Hhard deaL" I use the tenn "'common sense" purposely to¶ underline what Antonio Gramsci described as the "chaotic aggregate of disparate¶ conceptions" that conform with "the social and cultural position of those masses¶ whose philosophy it is." It is a conception of world and life "implicit to a large¶ extent in determinate strata of society" and "in opposition to 'official' conceptions¶ of the world. " 20 In this case, common sense challenges the official accounts of¶ freedom and stresses the similarities and correspondencies of slavery and freedom.¶ At a minimum, these observations disclose the disavowed transactions between¶ slavery and freedom as modes of production and subjection.¶ The abolition of chattel slavery and the emergence of man, however laudable,¶ long awaited, and cherished, fail to yield such absolute distinctions; instead fleeting,¶ disabled, and short-lived practices stand for freedom and its failure. Everyday practices,¶ rather than traditional political activity like the abolition movement, black¶ conventions, the struggle for suffrage, electoral activities, et cetera, are the focus of¶ my examination because I believe that these pedestrian practices illuminate inchoate¶ and utopian expressions of freedom that are not and perhaps cannot be actualized¶ elsewhere. The desires and longings that exceed the frame of civil rights and¶ political emancipation find expression in quotidian acts labeled "fanciful," "exorbitant,"¶ and "excessive" primarily because they express an understanding or¶ imagination of freedom quite at odds with bourgeois expectations. Paul Gilroy, after¶ Seyla Benhabib, refers to these utopian invocations and the incipient modes of¶ friendship and solidarity they conjure up as "the politics of transfiguration. "21 He¶ notes that in contrast to the politics of fulfillment that operate within the framework¶ of bourgeois civil society and occidental rationality, "the politics of transfiguration¶ strives in pursuit of the sublime, struggling to repeat the unrepeatable, to present the¶ unpresentable. Its rather different hermeneutic focus pushes towards the mimetic,¶ dramatic and performative." From this perspective, stealing away, the breakdown,¶ moving about, pilfering, and other everyday practices that occur below the threshold¶ of formal equality and rights gesture toward an unrealized freedom and emphasize¶ the stranglehold of slavery and the limits of emancipation. In this and in other ways,¶ these practices reveal much about the infrapolitics of the dominated and the contestations¶ over the meaning of abolition and emancipation.