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Centering debates on specific operational aspects of military policy trades off with analyses of cultural constructs that justify the use of force – their model of debate doesn’t challenge militarism

Levy 15 Levy, Yagil. Prof. Yagil Levy. Department of Sociology, Political Science and Communication at Open University of Israel "What is Controlled by Civilian Control of the Military? Control of the Military vs. Control of Militarization." Armed Forces & Society (2015): 0095327X14567918. rishi

What is controlled by civilian control of the military? One might think that effective civilian control restrains the use of force. However, that is not always the case. On the contrary, a glance at developments in civil–military relations during the post– Cold War period shows that while civilian control has been tightened in many democracies, militarization also increased. Militarism is defined as an approach that regards war and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity.1 Militarization is therefore a process through which militarism increases while demilitarization signifies a decline in this propensity. As an illustration, in the United States, as the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate, militarization with an increased propensity to use force2 thrived in an era of increased political scrutiny of the military.3 In Israel, civilian control has been enhanced since the 1970s, leading to an overly subordinate military whose professional autonomy has been impaired,4 while the government has enjoyed more legitimacy to launch offensive campaigns in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.5 In Russia, during Putin’s rule, the military’s subversive behavior toward elected politicians has been moderated and its freedom of action restricted,6 however, militarization in terms of patriotic education,7 and the inflation of external threats8 has flourished. Thus, increased civilian control of the military may be coupled with militarization, although not necessarily. This case raises the need for two scholarly investigations. The first, which I will leave unexplored, is the extent to which there is a causal link between civilian control and militarization. The second, and the focus of this article, is the extent to which control of the military should be distinguished from the mechanisms controlling the use of force, an underdeveloped aspect in the study of civil–military relations, as I explain in greater detail subsequently. I argue that a distinction should be made between two modes of civilian control over military affairs: control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military, the main focus of students of civilian control, concerns itself primarily with the military organization, particularly the operational aspects of the military’s performance (doctrine, deployment, resources, etc.) and their expected political implications. In contrast, the control of militarization deals with controlling the mechanisms that legitimize the use of force, first and foremost military force. It draws on political discourse, seeking to guarantee that the use of force follows a thorough, open, and deliberative process of decision making in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role in addressing the legitimacy to use. The encounter between the modes of control yields several possible results. It follows that this article is an analytically motivated study rather an empirically motivated one. My aim is to develop a theory that distinguishes between the control of the military and the control of militarization and propositions regarding the encounter between the two modes of control. These propositions can be viewed as hypotheses that set the stage for future empirical inquiry.9 The first section presents the gap in the literature, leading, in the second section, to a revised conceptualization of civilian control. In the third section, I analyze the relationship between the modes of control. The Theoretical Gap Scholars disagree whether civilian control of the armed forces is positively correlated with the reduction in the use of force. Lasswell argued for such a positive correlation. In his classic ‘‘garrison state’’ theme, he expressed concern that the empowerment of the military establishment in reaction to an external threat would undermine civil–military relations by letting the officers, as ‘‘specialists in violence,’’ run the state and impose their warlike inclinations on politics.10 Choi and James validated this concern statistically by concluding that as the influence of the military increases, the likelihood that the state will be involved in a military dispute becomes greater.11 Similarly, Snyder echoed the Lasswellian view by claiming that the offensive bias is exacerbated when civilian control is weak, and this bias grows more extreme when the military leverages the operational doctrine to improve its position in civil–military disputes.12 Sechser linked civilian control with the use of force by suggesting that the cautious nature of military officers may be a consequence of strong civilian control.13 Officers are concerned that a strong civilian leadership will punish them for botched military adventures. Mills went even further by arguing that there is no prospect for peace without a monopolistic control of violence, an approach that strongly links control with the restraint of force.14 In a different manner, students of militarism such as Bacevich,15 Mann,16 and Shaw17 implicitly recognized that the restraint of the military may take place within a militaristic mind-set. At the extreme, as Mann asserted with regard to the post– Cold War expansionist trends of the United States, ‘‘the notion of civilian control of the military became meaningless, since civilians were the leading militarists’’.18 It follows that civilian control may not reduce the proclivity to use force. Recognizing that militaristic pressures can come from civilian origins, other scholars even assume that officers may be less war-prone than politicians. Huntington famously contended that the military is more conservative than civilians regarding the propensity to use force, largely due to organizational cautiousness.19 Similarly, Betts concluded that military leaders rarely recommend the use of force, and their advice is more influential when counseling against military intervention.20 Along these lines, Feaver and Gelpi showed that militarily inexperienced leaders in the United States, more than militarily experienced ones, extended the use of force to deal with interstate conflicts that did not present a substantial threat to national security. 21 Desch acknowledged that, ‘‘the most prevalent civil-military relations problem of the post-Vietnam era has not been keeping the dogs of war on the leash, but rather getting them off of it’’.22 In other words, civilians may be more warprone than the military.23 It follows that civilian control may even promote the use of force when war-prone civilians successfully mobilize the society for war and even push the reluctant military to battle.24 Therefore, effective civilian control can rein in the military but not the use of force. Here, therefore, is the gap in the literature. Students of militarism do not link the propensity to use force to the broader issue of what type of civilian control may restrain the use of force, aside from the cultural process of demilitarization. Furthermore, students of militarism have not extended the theme of civilian control from controlling the military to controlling the civilian institutions that legitimize the use of force. Similarly, even students of civilian control who acknowledge that civilian control and military restraint do not necessarily go hand in hand have not questioned the extent to which we should decouple the two different processes as different modes of control rather than different effects of control. In other words, they have not scrutinized the mechanisms legitimizing the use of force decoupled from the mechanisms monitoring the armed forces. Given this gap in the literature, in the following section I present a revised conceptualization of civilian control by introducing the distinction between control of the military and control of militarization. Two Modes of Control Control of the Military A distinction should be made between control of the military and control of militarization. Control of the military refers to the extent to which the citizenry, through civilian state institutions, sets limits on the freedom of action of the military in the areas of activity that have political implications, such as military doctrine and policies, operational plans, weapons systems, organization, recruitment, and promotion of officers. Such limits correspond with political objectives and the resources required to attain those goals that civilians (in a democracy, popularly elected civilians) shape autonomously. These goals are regarded as expressing the will of society as a whole. The military, in turn, abides by these civilian directives.25 To a large extent, relations of exchange are formed, in which the military subordinates itself to civilian rulers in exchange for the resources (material and symbolic) that the state possesses and provides to the military.26 It follows that control of the military should be broadly conceptualized and should not be limited to the relations between elected civilians and generals. Viewed in this vein, although authoritarian regimes effectively control their militaries (Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy are good examples), control of the military is deficient without the engagement of the citizenry. Control over the military operates mainly through institutional mechanisms that have an effect on the manner in which policy makers activate the military. In addition to the monitoring of the military by elected civilians, collective actors working outside the formal institutions, mainly social movements and interest groups, often affect institutional policy making through lobbying, protests, court appeals, and the media. Ultimately, what is important is not whether the troops are deployed to fight or remain in their barracks but the political process that leads to the decision about the deployment, pertaining to the broader political implication of military activity as presented earlier. As a highly developed theme, control of the military is not the focus of this article but control of militarization and its relationship with the control of the military is. Control of Militarization While the control of the military is aimed at controlling the organization and its supervisors, the control of militarization is concerned with controlling the mechanisms for legitimizing the use of force. Drawing on Burk’s ‘‘way of war,’’27 Johnston’s ‘‘strategic culture,’’28 Mann’s ‘‘militarism,’’29 and Beetham’s ‘‘political legitimacy,’’30 the legitimacy to use force relates to the extent to which the state’s legal mode of using armed force against an external adversary is socially accepted as a normal, pervasive, and enduring strategic preference. Such legitimacy encompasses social beliefs about the role of war in human affairs, the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses, and the efficacy of the use of force. Legitimacy can be evaluated along a spectrum whose most extreme pole at one end is pacifism. Pacifism opposes the use of force to resolve international disputes. In the middle of the spectrum, the use of force is legitimized when it is instrumental in defending what is perceived as the nation’s security. The other extreme pole is militarism, meaning that the legitimacy for using force is unquestionable or barely questionable. Militarism ranges from regarding the use of force and the preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity,31 an approach that typifies many industrialized democracies (and therefore is the definition used in this article), to an irrational value system that espouses war as a goal in itself.32 The degree of this legitimacy can be determined by monitoring public opinion and political debates. However, public and elite opinion and rhetoric can be more deeply analyzed as a multilayered structure, which reflects deeper cultural constructs that are less easily detectable. Focusing on the level of legitimacy for using force moves beyond the narrow focus on the military’s institutions, influence, and resources, and the attitude toward the use of force to address militarized political cultures that are often generated outside of the military. Assuming that militarism is a socially and politically driven phenomenon, the military is not necessarily the most salient part of the political culture nurturing militarism. When it is more restrained than warmongering politicians, the influence of the military does not result in militarization. Hence, an exclusive focus on the military may be misleading. The control of militarization involves the political discourse in which the citizenry plays an active and autonomous role. This discourse aimed at subjecting the elected civilians’ use of force to a deliberative process that takes place within the public and political arenas and addresses the legitimacy to use force. Several conditions promote this deliberative process: 1. Relative slowness in decision making to guarantee that decisions are made through argumentation in which everyone’s opinion is in principle equally valuable and equally fallible. As Huysmans held, such deliberation takes time and can always be questioned again. Thus, speedy decision making in response to a perceived threat thwarts this principle, strengthens the executive branch of government, and suppresses dissent.33 2. Debates should not be confined to the operational aspects of military policies but should extend to the broader logic behind and rightness of such policies. In other words, the debates should focus on the very legitimacy for using force and its utility in promoting the public good.34 Thus, the focus is on affecting the political cultures legitimizing the use of force, rather than taking this legitimacy for granted. Therefore, during the debates there should be a thorough consideration of nonlethal or less belligerent policy alternatives. 3. Access to information is not obstructed by manipulation, such as threat inflation.35 4. Relatedly, debates should be conducted through an open discourse in which the dominant discourse does not hinder the political opposition from challenging decision makers.36 Such a dominant discourse often takes the form of asserting the need for unity in times of crisis, thereby muting dissenting voices.37 By extension, challenging the decision makers should also challenge the power relations in society that affect the legitimacy of using force and may create barriers to deliberation. In general, deliberation alone does not necessarily ensure a more democratic outcome unless actors have other power resources as well, such as the ability to mobilize to overcome entrenched interests.38 This is why free and fair elections, along with constitutional mechanisms such as checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law and impartial courts, are preconditions for the deliberative process.39

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