Their disembodied model of public deliberation is based on a utopian and masculine Cartesian subject – turns the aff
Pajnik, Mojca, 2006 ("Feminist reflections on Habermas’s communicative action the need for an inclusive political theory." European journal of social theory 9.3; p. 389-390)
Although Habermas broke with the monologic tradition, a frequent criticism among feminist authors is that his theory is too ‘Kantian’. According to this criticism, Habermas persisted in the conception of a moral individual who is disembodied and self-centred – in contrast to a relational and embodied female or male individual. Criticisms of the monologic stance of communicative action are frequent, although a closer reading of Habermas’s theory shows that Habermas’s individual is not tied to a deeper inner contemplation. Habermas’s individual is not liberated from communication with others, but is realized through interaction with others (Baynes, 1994: 319). Jane Braaten (1995) notes that Habermas, with his theory of communicative action, distances himself, on the one hand, from the Cartesian philosophy of the subject, but, on the other, reproduces it with the concept of communicative rationality. In explaining communicative rationality, Habermas becomes overly trapped in the patriarchy of traditional epistemology, which tries to defend the possibility of action in the period of the new historicism of late modernity. Braaten tries to understand Habermas’s theory through the perspective of feminist reasoning and feminist epistemology, on which she bases her alternative to communicative rationality. She calls it communicative thinking, which is based on two principles: the principle of solidarity and the principle of intersubjectivity. As an alternative to the technical image of rationality, grounded in Western, Anglo-American theoretical traditions, according to which rational action, to use Plato’s terminology, is reserved for the ‘enlightened’, Braaten advocates a rational feminist discourse which is based on the principle of solidarity and linked to the issues of discrimination against women. By defending different forms of rational action, she attempts to transcend the bounds of a technical explanation of the success and effectiveness of action, which Habermas also problematized, particularly with the critique of strategic, instrumental action (see Habermas, [1963] 1972, 1968). The difference between communicative rationality and communicative thinking is also explained by the author by drawing on the principle of intersubjectivity: in Habermas’s communicative rationality, this is too narrowly tied to the linguistic process of accepting and rejecting arguments, or is at least, as pointed out by Dallmayr (1984: 236), not clearly formulated. Communicative thinking is a concept which reflects the complexity of everyday life, and the multiple means of action and which takes into account the diversity of contexts of action. Braaten understands it as wider than communicative rationality – this she understands in a somewhat narrow sense as (merely) spoken agreement, achieved by the domination of the superior argument. Consensus, which in Habermas arises from a commonly defined objectivity, assumes ideal, abstract individuals, while communicative thinking considers life contexts and memories. Communicative thinking includes ‘imagination and flexibility’ (Braaten, 1995: 156) and relies on forms of action which try to aerate the stability of social structures. From the standpoint of the organization of society, communicative thinking does not mean a rejection or abandonment of communicative rationality, but rather an extension of rationality in the direction of conceptualization, which Darij Zadnikar recognizes in Habermas and calls ‘a multi-dimensional (“soft”) theory of rationality’ (Zadnikar, 1995: 9). Braaten, whose explanation of communicative thinking explicitly draws on a personal, even physical, feminist perspective, identifies several meanings for this concept. Communicative thinking foremost means respecting differences in everyday life with the inclusion of possibilities for the transformation of conventional politics, with the aim of meeting specific needs, for instance, those of women. It advocates the rethinking of the position of different groups of citizens to respect the specificities of life contexts and opportunities. By providing an alternative to one-dimensionality and the systematic, unified arrangement of structures, it stimulates the multi-dimensionality of expression (Braaten, 1995: 156, 157). Communicative thinking is a response to a technically defined rationality which, in the view of some critics, is still present in Habermas’s theory; it assumes the Kantian action of autonomous, rational subjects: we can speak of the success of speech acts, according to Habermas, when rational subjects act in order to achieve a rational consensus. In this, they are acting according to communicative norms, the rules of universal pragmatics, which assume a communicative competence for grammatical expression. This rigidly defined communicative rationality implies, as expressed in Benjamin Barber’s categories, too thin an understanding of communicative action and in this framework communicative thinking as an alternative is of interest.