Their performance of an ideal world mirrors a reversal of suffering without addressing subject constitution – this reinstates the structure of oppression which they attempt to fight
Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, published by Princeton UP, p. 7; spp)
But this opens rather than settles the problem of how to formulate a discourse¶ of freedom appropriate to contesting contemporary antidemocratic¶ configurations of power. One of the ironies of what Nietzsche boldly¶ termed the "instinct for freedom" lies in its inceptive self-cancellation, its¶ crossing of itself in its very first impulse. Initial figurations of freedom¶ are inevitably reactionary in the sense of emerging reaction to perceived¶ injuries or constraints of a regime from within its own terms.¶ Ideals of freedom ordinarily emerge to vanquish their imagined immediate enemies, but in this move they frequently recycle and reinstate¶ rather than transform the terms of domination that generated them. Consider¶ exploited workers who dream of a world in which work has been¶ abolished, blacks who imagine a world without whites, feminists who¶ conjure a world either without men or without sex, or teenagers who, fantasize¶ a world without parents. Such images of freedom perform mirror reversals of suffering without transforming the organization of the activity¶ through which the suffering is produced and without addressing the subject¶ constitution that domination effects, that is, the constitution of the social categories, “workers,” “blacks,” “women,” or “teenagers.”¶ It would thus appear that it is freedom’s relationship to identity-its¶ promise to address a social injury or marking that is itself constitutive of¶ identity – that yields the paradox in which the first imaginings of freedom¶ are always constrained by and potentially even require the very¶ structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose.