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Their attempt to order politics around women’s freedom requires the specter of patriarchal unfreedom – this locks in the power dynamic they criticize

Brown, 1995. (Wendy, Professor of Political Science and Rhetoric at UC-Berkeley, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, published by Princeton UP, p. 8-9; spp)

Invoking Marx recalls a second dimension of this paradox in which¶ freedom responds to a particular practice of domination whose terms are¶ then often reinstalled in its practice. When institutionalized, freedompremised upon an already vanquished enemy keeps alive, in the manner¶ of a melancholic logic, a threat that works as domination in the form of¶ an absorbing ghostly battle with the past. 7 Institutionalized, freedom arrayed¶ against a particular image of unfreedom sustains that image, whichdominates political life with its specter long after it has been vanquished¶ and preempts appreciation of new dangers to freedom posed by institutions¶ designed to hold the past in check. Yet the very institutions that areerected to vanquish the historical threat also recuperate it as a form ofpolitical anxiety; so, for example, functions the "state of nature" or the¶ "arbitrary sovereign" in the liberal political imagination.¶ It may be the extent to which freedom institutionalized transmogrifies¶ into its opposite that led Foucault to insist upon understanding liberty as¶ a practice rather than a state, as that which can "never [be] assured¶ by ... institutions and laws" but "must be exercised. "B Sheldon Wolin¶ presses a similar point in his provocation that "a constitution, in setting¶ limits to politics, set limits as well to democracy .... Democracy thusseems destined to be a moment rather than a form. "9 In Jean-Luc¶ Nancy's account, "freedom ... is the very thing that prevents itselffrom being founded. '' And a similar concern can be discerned in¶ Hannah Arendt's insistence on the perniciousness of equating freedom¶ with sovereignty, along with her counterproposition that freedom as "virtuosity" is defined by the contingency of action, as the place where¶ "the I-will and the I-can coincide" as power.11¶ Recognition of the tension, if not the antinomy, between freedom and¶ institutionalization compounds the difficulties of formulating a politics of¶ freedom in the late twentieth century, the age of institutions. Not only¶ do we require a historically and institutionally specific reading of contemporary¶ modes of domination, but freedom’s "actualization" wouldappear to be a frustratingly indeterminate matter of ethos, of bearingtoward institutions, of the style of political practices, rather than a matterof policies, laws, procedures, or organization of political orders. This is¶ not to say that freedom becomes aesthetic, but rather that it depends¶ upon a formulation of the political that is richer, more complicated, and¶ also perhaps more fragile than that circumscribed by institutions, procedures, and political representation.

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