2ac/1ar --- China Regs Don’t Work
China’s regulations for AI aren’t feasible.
Makenzie Holland 03-17-2022 [News writer covering big tech and federal regulation, Tech Target, “China’s AI regulations face technical challenge,” https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/news/252514781/Chinas-AI-regulations-face-technical-challenge//ZW]
China is one of the first countries to regulate AI algorithms -- a regulation that may prove technically difficult for businesses to adhere to. China's AI algorithm regulations took effect March 1, requiring businesses to provide explainable AI algorithms and be transparent about their purpose, such as for recommending products or services. The new regulations also prohibit businesses reliant on AI algorithms from offering different prices to different people based on personal data collected. Technical feasibility will be one of the most challenging aspects facing the new regulations, said Russell Wald, director of policy for Stanford University's Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI). Explainable AI has proven to be difficult for businesses to offer up. In this Q&A, Wald talks about the AI regulations' impact on businesses, as well as how they're unlikely to affect the Chinese government's own use of AI when it comes to surveilling its citizens. What do you think about China taking this step? Wald: What I find most interesting is China has done this first. We can see and watch in real time what happens to some of these businesses now being regulated for the first time. Questions remain about the technical feasibility of this. The question is, are we seeing regulation in theory or regulation in practice? One key part is a continuing need for human-centered AI. How do you define human-centered AI? Wald: AI that is inspired by the human brain and comes from what you've seen in human development. AI that doesn't replace humans but augments human capability. And the third part of that is AI that doesn't harm but rather benefits humanity … technology fostering instead of eroding democratic aspects. That's the key part. It's a recognition of the rights of everyone to be able to go in and look at these technologies and have fair access to them and the rights to challenge their governments when they're in use. How will requiring AI algorithmic accountability and transparency impact businesses? Wald: There is the technical issue here of whether that's feasible. That's one layer that has a big question mark hanging over it. Then there's the aspect of following regulation where you could and being in compliance with that. To that end, whether or not those companies will be able to do it, I think they'll have to. I don't think they have a choice. The larger question is not whether Chinese businesses are able to comply with this, it is whether other international companies will now be affected by this. If you're selling into the Chinese market, you are going to have to work on that. That's where a unique tension is going to come through. What if China says, 'It is technically feasible'? Then there will be other countries that say 'No, it's actually not, we've had these problems.' Will these regulations apply to the Chinese government's use of AI? Wald: The government will not cede, from my view at least, its surveillance of its citizens. Because of that, I think it'll always have access to that technology. It's too tempting. It even remains tempting for local law enforcement in the U.S. But here, at least in the United States, we're having a debate about an AI bill of rights. We're debating about facial recognition use by police, by the federal government at the border. There is this open debate. That debate is not happening in this case of the [Chinese] government's use of it. Do you think there needs to be more debate before moving forward with AI regulations? Wald: The EU or U.S. system of open debate around this is ultimately driving us in the right space. Not fast enough, but still a better pathway forward. What I do have concerns about in the U.S. is we are woefully behind. You're starting to see an increase in legislation. You're starting to see a Federal Trade Commission that's trying to lean a little more forward on some of this. But I think the best way to have these dialogues and national debate is through legislation where all the interest groups, all the advocacy organizations, everyone comes to the table and hashes it out. Are there aspects of the Chinese legislation you'll be paying attention to, like how they handle consumer complaints about potential harms caused by AI algorithms? Wald: I mentioned that technical feasibility part, that's really important. I'm more curious about what the petition process will be. I'd like to watch that space more than anything. Is it significant, is it public, are a lot of people openly complaining? I would be curious to see the registration of these complaints. That would be important for when Europe or the U.S. starts to get into this model. What's the mechanism for them to be able to do this? If we all had a contact at the FTC or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, they'd be flooded and overwhelmed and unable to manage that process appropriately. The logistics of managing that has huge application towards ultimate effectiveness. Editor's note: Responses have been edited for brevity and clarity.
China led AI strangles innovation---American standards are key.
Arijit Sengupta 09-15-21 [Founder and CEO of Aible, Fast Company, “China’s new proposed law could strangle the development of AI,” https://www.fastcompany.com/90676516/china-ai-law-problems//ZW]
China’s internet watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), recently issued a draft proposal of regulations to manage how technology companies use algorithms when providing services to consumers. The proposed law mandates that companies must use algorithms to “actively spread positive energy.” Under the proposal, companies must submit their algorithms to the government for approval or risk being fined and having their service terminated. This is an incredibly bad and even dangerous idea. It’s what happens when people who don’t understand AI try to regulate AI. Instead of fostering innovation, governments are looking at AI through their unique lenses of fear and trying to reduce the harm they worry about most. Thus, western regulators focus on fears such as violation of privacy, while Chinese regulators are perfectly okay with collecting private data on their citizens but are concerned about AI’s ability to influence people in ways deemed undesirable by the government. If the Chinese law is adopted, it will create a lengthy bureaucratic process that will likely ensure that no small company or startup will survive or even enter the market. The moment you allow government regulators to be the final arbiters of what emerging technologies can and cannot do, you’ve strangled innovation. The only people who will profit under such a law are large companies that can invest in unproductive bureaucratic activities due to massive cash reserves and bad actors because they’ll ignore regulators and do whatever they want. Cash-starved startups who wish to follow the law will be most disadvantaged by this approach. China is not alone in taking bureaucratic approaches to AI. In April, the European Union released a draft Artificial Intelligence Act that would ban certain AI practices outright and mandate that AI applications deemed “high risk” meet strict data governance and risk management requirements. This includes requirements on testing, training, and validating algorithms, ensuring human oversight, and meeting standards of accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. Businesses would need to prove that their AI systems conform with these requirements before placing them on the European market. Imposing algorithm requirements or requiring companies to justify approaches can sound less onerous than the outright banning of technologies. The reality is that in either case, startups do not have the resources to participate in such bureaucratic slow processes. Smaller companies will be forced out of the arena even though they are most likely to create true innovations in this space. Imagine a world where startups had to get patents on their technology before building their software. Only about half of U.S. patents are approved, which is not terrible, but it takes about two years for approval to come through. Algorithms are more difficult to examine than patents—especially deep learning algorithms which very few experts understand. Based on the lengthy timelines in the patent office, we can surmise that algorithm approval processes are likely to take longer than two years. This is simply not fast enough: Technology in a rapidly evolving space like AI would already be outdated by the time it was approved. Any approach that involves regulators preapproving algorithms would strangle innovation in this space. There’s another reason why such legislation would be more onerous for small companies. For startups reliant on venture capital investments, typical funding cycles are 18 months long, which means that investors expect to see tangible results from the investment in less than 18 months. Thus, current investment approaches would not support waiting years to get algorithms approved before launching a product. While some VCs may adopt a different investment approach, similar to medical investments for example, many entrepreneurs would simply turn away from AI and pursue other opportunities. The U.S. is in a unique position to get AI guidelines right. While China and the European Union outline ever-stricter guidelines banning certain types of AI, the U.S. has an opportunity to establish ethical guidelines without inhibiting innovation. The only appropriate approach to regulating AI is one where we make our societal goals clear from the start and hold companies liable if they violate those goals. For example, we don’t force every company to undergo Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections before being able to operate. However, labor safety expectations are enshrined in law and violators are prosecuted. If companies find alternative approaches to keeping their employees safe, they are not penalized as long as the societal goals are achieved. Giving government regulators the power to limit broad technology categories is not the approach that built the internet or the smartphone. That’s why the U.S. should tackle AI regulation by making our societal goals clear and giving organizations flexibility in achieving such goals.
New regulations create steep barriers for tech companies.
Ellen Lu and Ryan Fedasiuk 12-13-2021 [Ellen Lu is a research assistant at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, Ryan Fedasiuk is a research analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, The Diplomat, “Will China’s Regulatory “Great Wall” Hamper AI Ambitions,” https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/will-chinas-regulatory-great-wall-hamper-ai-ambitions///ZW]
In September the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced a three-year plan to regulate predictive algorithms, and Chinese companies scrambled to comply with new regulations. News of the plan came on the heels of two other stringent policies – the Data Security Law (DSL) and Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) – which were passed earlier this year and came into full effect in November. China’s push for data security and algorithmic governance should be viewed as a new chapter in the country’s storied attempts to regulate the technology sector. In all likelihood, these moves will minimally affect state security bureaus’ data collection capabilities, but will create steep compliance costs for internet companies that could hamper the state’s long-term development goals. The DSL is designed to curtail invasive data collection by Chinese tech companies. Specifically, it restricts the collection of data by Chinese companies within and outside of China that may “harm the national security or public interests of the PRC.” Given the ambiguous nature of the law, many Chinese companies have erred on the side of over-compliance, rather than risk facing exorbitant penalties – which range from $1,000 to over $150,000, and may result in the suspension or revocation of a business’ license. The PIPL imposes even more day-to-day compliance costs on Chinese tech companies that work with personal data. Under the law, Chinese companies are now obligated to create cybersecurity teams, conduct training sessions, and classify data according to the potential for national security threat. The sweeping regulatory framework consists of 74 articles, and it applies to any company that handles individual Chinese citizens’ personal information. Taken collectively, the DSL and PIPL should be viewed as a new chapter in Beijing’s push to regulate the Chinese technology sector. At first glance, the steep limits they place on data collection stand at odds with Beijing’s long-standing ambition to become the world leader in AI by 2030. But the laws’ long-term effects will hinge on two hotly debated questions about how China’s national tech champions interact with the state. The first question is whether the new regulations will actually apply to China’s “national AI champions,” or whether the special relationship between big tech and the state might exempt them from the most onerous requirements. On the one hand, the Communist Party under Xi Jinping seems adamant about curtailing the massive power China’s tech companies have accumulated over the past decade, and is using these data governance regulations to reassert control. For their part, investors do expect China’s internet titans to take a hit. Immediately after the DSL was passed, the Hang Seng Tech index measured a 2.5 percent decrease in China’s largest internet and e-commerce stocks, to include those of Tencent and Alibaba, amounting to a loss equivalent to tens of billions of U.S. dollars. In the same month, when China’s most popular ride sharing app Didi Chuxing filed for an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange, Chinese regulators yanked it from app stores, citing violations of DSL’s data security regulations. The company has since lost 30 percent of users and seen its share value decline by more than 40 percent. On the other hand, however, the Chinese government has historically relied on Chinese internet giants Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent to aid in intelligence and police work, by collecting and processing troves of information these companies collect about Chinese netizens. Through Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law, Article 77 of the National Security Law, and Article 28 of the Cybersecurity Law, the government is able to deputize internet companies to assist with intelligence gathering. The codependent relationship between Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Chinese security services could imply that China’s AI champions are too big to regulate. But if they are subject to the full force of the DSL and PIPL, the second question is whether the limitations set out in these laws will materially limit Chinese tech giants’ ability to collect and process data at scale. Neither the DSL nor PIPL constrains data collection by China’s state security apparatus – only internet and data companies. But it’s not clear to what extent state security offices rely on data collected data in-house or outsourced to these firms. If public security bureaus have immediate and unfiltered access to the collection platforms operated by private companies, as has been claimed about Huawei 5G platforms and Lenovo computers, then the government would have little incentive to spare Chinese AI companies from stringent restrictions on data collection. But, because of their special relationship with the state, it’s possible that China’s internet companies will benefit from data collected and provided by Chinese security services to continue their AI development. Under the auspices of China’s national security and cybersecurity laws, Chinese businesses are compelled to work with the state’s security apparatus. Companies that handle data related to “national security” are further required to allow the Ministry of State Security access to their companies’ servers. Even if Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent face data collection limitations, they could theoretically continue to rely on data provided by Chinese security services to fine-tune their AI products. Although it’s not clear how exactly China’s large internet companies may be affected by new regulations on data and algorithms, the composition of China’s private tech industry will be fundamentally altered. The DSL and PIPL will make it substantially harder for existing businesses to continue operating with the same degree of autonomy they had enjoyed in the past, and may create steep barriers for new players hoping to enter China’s tech market.