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2ac/1ar --- China is Aggressive

Island Building

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

6.1 Model Case 1: Island building in the South China Sea as a form of Coercive hegemony China continued to pursue through 2018 an aggressive strategy to expand and maintain a foothold in the South China Sea. It claimed rocks, islets, and archipelagos in this body of water to enlarge its maritime territory and reach deep into Southeast Asia, close to the Malacca Strait. China achieved this objective at the expense of several Southeast Asian states who also claim jurisprudence in this area. These are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. These states' claims clash with China's in the area that the Chinese refer to as the “Nine-Dash-Line.” China bases its territorial claim on historical maps, albeit they are not entirely conclusive. A 2016 verdict by an International Tribunal based in The Hague ruled negatively against China: In a case where the Philippines filed a complaint against Chinese conduct disregarding its maritime borders, the verdict ruled against China and in favour of the Philippines. China, of course, ignored and disavowed the ruling, as well as making clear that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the matter (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016). China has gone beyond publicly announcing its territorial claim. Instead, it has actively started to produce real and tangible facts by engaging in the process of “island building.” The construction process begins by China taking an islet, which sometimes is not larger than a rock, and transferring building materials via ship to create helipads, harbours, and airstrips. Some have compared these artificial islands with sort of China's stationary aircraft carriers. China wants to send a loud and clear signal to regional neighbours and the rest of the world, particularly to other great powers. It wants to underscore its maritime territorial claims, with absolute and full vigour and unwavering resolve. Hence, rather than leaving unperturbed uninhabited and partially submerged islands, rocks, and islets, without any physical signs of territorial claim and sovereignty, China builds this new-aged military bases. These are all projections of China's geostrategic reach. China's fortification drive and island-building program in the South China Sea is consistent with revisionist and coercive policies. It deliberately revises borders. This trend is reminiscent of the violent rising by other great powers in history. France, Germany, and Imperial Japan in the 18th and 20th centuries, respectively, pursued such territorial expansion and aggressive practice. This aggressive territorial expansion constitutes the type of evidence that many analysts will cease on to conclude that China is on a collision course with other great powers and neighbours. The policy will lead to diplomatic and possibly military conflict over these territories. In this sense, it will be a harbinger of China's violent rise.

Russia-China alliance – now is key to prevent it

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

6.2 Model Case 2: The emerging Sino-Russian Entente as a form of coercive hegemony At the end of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC and the Soviet Union became close allies. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Josef Stalin formally instituted this political, ideological, and military alliance by negotiating and signing the Treaty of Moscow in 1950. At this juncture, the Soviet Union was the senior partner whereas the newly established PRC was the junior member of the alliance. China was still recovering from the Japanese occupation and protracted civil war. A decade after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, it became evident that political interests and ideology were not sufficiently strong to keep these two actors together in an alliance. Thus, from 1960 onward, the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly evident and pronounced, even including a 7-month undeclared military border conflict in 1969 that exacerbated further the Sino-Soviet split. The tense rivalry and differences between these two communist actors ultimately led to a de facto end to the alliance in 1979. At this point, China's tendency to side with the West and the United States became more evident, too. It led to the official opening of relations with the United States in the same year. Already several years prior, in 1972, unofficial diplomatic ties under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger opened the door to China. Renewed relations led to China's gradual embrace of the market economy. This decision was fundamental in China's development and economic success from the early 1980s to approximately 2014. Interestingly, though, China has grown closer to Russia more recently. 11 We identify two interconnected examples to highlight and underscore better the recent Chinese and Russian connection: First, it is China's tacit support for Russia's annexation of Crimean, and, second, the treaty on energy cooperation negotiated and signed by China and Russia concomitantly to the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the Eastern Ukraine war in 2014. First, China's reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea was mute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). We must emphasise that before 2005, the PRC would have severely condemned and sternly opposed Russia. Russian annexation of Crimea was anathema to China's fundamental principles and priorities (Sun, 2015). On the one hand, it was a violation of sovereignty and the noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. On the other hand, the annexation challenged China directly on two additional fronts: First, its zealous commitment to defend its territory against aggression and, second, its commitment to protect minorities within Chinese borders. Notwithstanding, China remained uncharacteristically distant and quiet. Second, the media outlets reported the energy treaty with Russia as the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship amid the Eastern Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions against Russia. It was also a Russian carrot extended to China for its allegiance, tacit political support of the Crimea annexation, and the significant Chinese financial package. This agreement was crucial for Russian prowess at a juncture when it was simultaneously fighting an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine and escalating its military involvement in the Syrian civil war to protect the government of its political ally, President Bashar al-Assad. In exchange for its advanced hefty financial package, Russia agreed to sell oil and natural gas at rates considerably lower than current market prices. 12 It is plausible to argue here that the PRC agreed to the terms of the 2014 energy agreement on two grounds. First, the economic benefits accruing to China were too vast and attractive to ignore. Second, the agreement granted the PRC the first opportunity and greatest satisfaction to become the senior partner in the Sino-Russian alliance since the signing of the Treaty of Moscow in 1950, when the Soviet Union was the senior partner. The trend in China's international relations examined thus far would suggest a Chinese move toward revisionism, aggressiveness, and coerciveness insofar as the PRC condoned Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Besides, China and Russia appear to share their opposition against united actions by the West's politico-military alliance. The Sino-Russian universal resistance against the West seems to be supported by evidence from the West's sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Eastern Ukrainian crisis. China's reaction suggests that it is preparing the grounds in case of future challenges to its rise by the West. It appears as if China is signalling to the West and the entire world that it is prepared to defend its place among great powers, even if it entails the use of force and mass violence. Such actions are consistent with the violent ascent of rising great powers in the history of the world such as Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan. From this vantage point, the previous analysis suggests that China is on track to follow the footsteps of those other yesteryear revisionists and coercive rising hegemons.

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