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2ac/1ar --- AT: China War

China can’t fight – imperial overstretch

Blumenthal, 17 - Daniel Blumenthal is director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (“A Strategy for China’s Imperial Overstretch” The American Interest, 3/1,

Notwithstanding the facile talk of China’s “gains” from Donald Trump’s imagined withdrawal from the world, Beijing is no position to lead the world. Instead it is very close to imperial overstretch. A new U.S. strategic approach should hasten a Chinese reckoning with its geopolitical troubles.

Contrary to the recent, post-Davos “wisdom” about a new era of Chinese global leadership, things do not look good for Beijing. The Chinese economy continues to struggle and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary-General Xi Jinping believes that China faces a deteriorating security environment. Even so, China continues to expand its grandiose foreign policy ambitions, slowly extending its control over the South China Sea while also planning to create a “New Silk Road” linking Asia with Europe. But China is biting off more than it can chew.

The CCP was founded on an anti-imperialist doctrine and is offended by the suggestion that it rules an empire. Nevertheless, it does. Indeed, China is the world’s last standing multi-ethnic empire. Its physical borders today mirror those of China’s last imperial dynasty, the Qing Dynasty, whose emperors conducted the greatest imperial expansion in China’s history. From the 17th to 19th centuries, they succeeded in conquering Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Taiwan. By virtue of these achievements, the Qing expanded the empire to a truly continental scale.

With the exception of Mongolia and Taiwan, all of the Qing’s imperial conquests, including Xinjiang and Tibet, are again under Chinese control today. And Beijing has regained de facto suzerainty over Hong Kong as it exerts close to total control over the city-state’s politics.

Finally, the international community long ago accepted the CCP’s position that Taiwan is part of China, never mind that this “claim” is mostly based on the Qing imperial conquest of the island more than a century ago. Beijing’s continued hold over its empire is unique in global affairs. For some context, imagine if Turkey still controlled the Ottoman lands of the Levant and the Middle East. Or for another comparative image, what if the Austo-Hungarian empire still controlled much of Europe?

Today the CCP’s desire for more territory does not stop with the old Qing maps. Though the Qing Empire was not a maritime power, the CCP has “discovered” new imperial territories in its surrounding seas. Chinese commentators frequently refer to China’s “three million square kilometers of blue territory,” which would incorporate “nearly 90% of the area within the major bodies of water within the First Island Chain, including the Bo Hai, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea.”

China has claimed everything within the “nine-dash line” as its “indisputable territory”—this arbitrary series of dashes on Chinese maps encompasses the South China Sea. To advance this claim, Beijing has built over 3,000 acres of new “island” bases and deployed military forces to help control the surrounding waters. It has set up a provincial administration to govern these maritime “territories,” which directs its fleets of maritime militias and law enforcement agencies to harass foreign vessels.

All told, China’s territorial claims now extend from the westernmost reaches of Xinjiang, bordering Afghanistan, to the easternmost point in the East China Sea. The sheer expanse of Beijing’s claims might explain why Xi is so pessimistic about China’s security. The PLA must defend an overwhelming amount of land and maritime territory from “enemies” foreign and domestic.

Nonetheless, Xi Jinping is pressing ahead with a key component of his national development strategy, called “One Belt One Road” (OBOR)—a network of economic infrastructure projects linking China with more than sixty Central Asian, Middle Eastern, and European countries. This plan is intended to proceed along two distinct routes. First, the Silk Road Economic Belt, consisting of rail routes and oil and natural gas pipelines, will stretch overland from China, through Central Asia to Eastern Europe.

Second, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, made up of a series of port projects, will extend through the Indian Ocean and into the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean Sea. The underlying promise of OBOR is that Chinese infrastructure investment can link together China’s maritime and continental interests. Xi wants this program to be his stamp on China’s future, just as Deng Xiaoping was known for the policy of “reform and opening.” In practice, China will have even more territory and assets to protect.

Where Are the Resources?

Xi faces substantial economic headwinds as China enters a period of long-term economic stagnation. After the 2008 financial crisis, the Chinese government conducted one of the largest stimulus plans in history, leading to overcapacity and debt. The PRC’s national debt is in excess of $28 trillion. In a further sign of financial deterioration, Beijing’s foreign exchange reserves have fallen from $4 trillion in mid-2014 to $3 trillion at the end of 2016. China’s GDP growth rate has slowed to as little as half of what it once was during the mid-2000s. Some believe that the statistics of recent years are falsified, and that the annual growth rate has been between 3 and 5 percent for at least three years. That still might seem high for a Western country, but for a China still under pressure to create employment and social stability, it spells trouble ahead.

In addition, China has a rapidly aging society as the result of decades of the One-Child Policy. The Chinese workforce continues to shrink annually and the expense of caring for hundreds of millions of elderly Chinese is overwhelming. Beijing will spend vast sums of money cleaning up its environment—remediating soil pollution alone could cost over $1 trillion. Even doing the minimum to address these social ills will strain China’s fiscal resources.

If Xi were to face a real cost-imposing strategic challenge from the United States, it is hard to see how he could continue to devote the necessary resources to all of his social and foreign policy aspirations.

The Costs of the Empire

In pursuit of his ambitious foreign policy strategy, Xi Jinping has urged the Party to think of China as both a maritime and continental power. The Chinese government has continued to devote resources both to China’s naval build-up and to its vast internal security enterprise. At its current buildup rate, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have 430 major surface combatants and almost one hundred submarines by 2030. It is on the path to possessing the world’s largest merchant marine and coast guard fleet as well. While the defense budget growth is slowing a bit, this past year the PLA still saw a budget increase of nearly 8 percent.

To advance (or, from Beijing’s perspective, protect) its maritime plans, China has increased the tempo of its maritime exercises. For example, it sent its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, through the Miyako Strait within Japan’s southern island chain, in December 2016, going beyond the first island chain to conduct drills in the Western Pacific. Its maritime militias and coast guard fleets maintain a steady presence around the Senkaku Islands. Chinese vessels continue to maintain a presence around the Scarborough Shoal, which Beijing seized from Manila in 2012. Meanwhile, PLA rocket forces continue to improve their lethal precision strike capabilities, with over 1,000 SRBMs alone aimed across the Taiwan Strait. The PLA’s military build-up and increased “presence missions” require substantial new budgetary outlays.

On China’s mainland, 800,000 People’s Armed Police (PAP) troops patrol the streets of Chinese cities to crackdown on protests and prevent violent uprisings, particularly in the western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. Within what is known as the “Han heartland,” the CCP faces unrest as well. In turn, Beijing has engaged in the harshest crackdown on social and political activity since the massacre at Tiananmen Square. Repression is expensive, as is running an empire.

Beijing’s Continental Consolidation

The tenacious efforts by both the Republic of China and the PRC to reacquire and consolidate the territory of the Qing Empire remains among the least studied phenomena in China’s strategic history. Instead, most observers of China accept the official narrative of China’s “century of humiliation.” While China was doubtless a victim of Western imperialism, when it comes to imperialism, it has been no slouch itself.

All efforts by China, including the OBOR plan, on the Asian continent are driven in part by the need to pacify its territorial periphery. A 2015 Chinese National Development and Reform Commission report states:

We should make good use of Xinjiang’s geographic advantages and its role as a window of westward opening-up to deepen communication and cooperation with Central, South and West Asian countries, make it a key transportation, trade, logistics, culture, science and education center, and a core area on the Silk Road Economic Belt.

There are doubtless many strategic and economic reasons for OBOR. Xi wants to put his stamp on China’s economic development strategy, rid his economy of overcapacity, create new export markets, and attempt to re-establish the centrality of the Middle Kingdom in world affairs. But the most pressing continental priority for Xi is to further integrate Xinjiang into China proper and keep potential “separatists” at bay.

This plan is all very expensive. If, according to Chinese estimates, all OBOR infrastructure investment were realized, the bill would be $6 trillion (not all paid by China, of course). The China Development Bank already has stated that close to $900 billion of projects are either planned or underway. China will finance OBOR projects through institutions such as the China Development Bank, the China Eximbank, the Silk Road Fund, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

This all sounded plausible while Beijing enjoyed double-digit economic growth for three decades. But now China must make hard choices about where to allocate its national security resources. Thus far, the United States has not hastened that reckoning. But China’s current imperial overstretch provides Washington with an opportunity to do so.

No China rise impact – numerous checks on aggression.

Eikenberry, 15 (Karl W, retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2009 to July 2011, "China’s Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," , CMR)

For all its ambition, China’s strategic options are not unlimited. Indeed, its foreign policy choices are severely constrained both by formidable domestic problems and by unfavorable international factors that the United States would be wise to consider when formulating its response to China’s increasing influence.

Internally, Beijing’s leaders face an interwoven array of daunting social, environmental, economic, and political problems that, left unresolved, will limit the state’s ability to generate national power and could even threaten the Communist Party’s monopolistic grip on political and societal control. A brief look at five of these issues makes clear the severity of the situation.

Economic Restructuring: Some 100,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) account for about half of China’s economic assets. Despite 15 years of reform efforts, only half of the SOEs have been corporatized, and their return on assets is not significantly different from those of the traditional SOEs. Overall, SOE financial performance has deteriorated significantly since 2008, becoming a major drag on economic growth. This drag serves as a source of serious political opposition to enterprise reform, thereby limiting the national leadership’s effort to focus on strategic sectors such as aviation, energy, and telecommunications.13

Nevertheless, the impetus for reform has not slackened over the past year, as both state and local SOEs have been selling off non-strategic assets in accordance with Party policy direction. Serious political obstacles to economic reform remain, however, including the fact that, for all of their inherent inefficiencies, SOEs predictably provide jobs to workers, who, if unemployed, might question both Party wisdom and its unchallenged supremacy. At the same time, labor costs are rapidly rising. In 2013, for example, China’s 269 million migrant workers earned an average of $410 per month, an increase of nearly 14 percent from 2012 and almost twice the rate of the nation’s GDP.14 As a result, Chinese firms are being forced to change their enterprise models and export strategies as foreign companies choose lower-wage alternatives to China.15

The three-decade transition from an agrarian to industrial-service economy, which saw the transition of some 300 million people from rural to urban areas, will continue over the next two decades, with another 350 million people—a number in excess of the entire U.S. population—still to follow. The economic impact of this colossal resettlement has been staggering. Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011.Chinese investment in real estate, which was $120 billion in 2003, grew to $980 billion in 2011. The infrastructure required to support this exploding urban population is massive.16

Adding to these difficulties, PRC debt loads have exploded over the past decade. Government debt (a large percentage of which is higher-risk local government debt) to GDP ratio stood at 53.5 percent in 2012, up from 32.5 percent in 2005.17 Of greater concern is the recent rapid rise of total debt (encompassing that from the corporate, household, and financial sectors), which increased from 150 percent of GDP in 2009 to 250 percent in 2014.18 Included in these figures are loans to SOEs that have poor repayment records, but that are often protected by political patronage. Moreover, the recent and dramatic rise of China’s shadow banking industry has complicated the central government’s efforts to bring lending under control.19 

Aging Population & Social Welfare Costs: The scope and pace of aging in China’s population pose other significant economic problems for the Party. Over the next twenty years, the ratio of workers to retirees (at the current retirement age of sixty) will decrease from five-to-one to two-to-one. This dramatic demographic shift is both exacerbated and made more urgent by the success of the “one child policy” in place since 1979. It will not only erode the huge economic stimulus and advantage of a young working population, but it will also come at a point in China’s modernization when it is more vulnerable to the “middle income trap.”20Huge expenditures will be required to put into place more comprehensive national health care and pension systems to help avoid that potential pitfall.

Unequal Income Distribution: China’s gap between its rich and poor, measured by its Gini coefficient, has widened greatly since its opening to the world in 1979. In 2012, the head of China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Ma Jiantang, pegged it at 0.47-0.49, which is slightly below that of the United States, but high for a developing country.21 The reasons for this growing gap in wealth distribution are well understood: rapid urbanization on the backs of migrant workers not offered basic social services (a variant of America’s own illegal immigrant phenomenon, except that those affected are PRC citizens); the disparity in wealth between the coastal regions and China’s interior provinces; the cumulative impact of quality education and health care disproportionally available to the Party, government, and urban elite; and widespread corruption (discussed below). In 2013, the Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress noted the pressing need to attend to this problem, but failed to offer any concrete proposals for doing so.22

Environmental Degradation and Food Safety: China’s economic miracle has occurred in tandem with environmental catastrophe. Air and water quality, especially in China’s major urban areas, is among the worst in the world. In 2012, China’s Vice Minister of Environmental Protection, Wu Xiaoqing, stated that 40 percent of the country’s rivers and 55 percent of its groundwater were unfit for drinking. Moreover, he noted that in rural China some 320 million people lack access to safe drinking water.23 The cost of such economic externalities came to roughly $230 billion in 2010, or about 3.5 percent of GDP.24 The scale of investment needed to adequately address known environmental threats is extraordinary. For example, between 2011 and 2020, the government plans to spend $850 billion in water-related projects alone.25 Food safety is also a major issue and an increasingly politicized one. It was only in the face of mounting public pressure that the Ministry of Environmental Protection admitted (in 2014) that the acreage of soil contamination (from heavy metals, pesticides, and other toxins) of China’s farmlands had reached a record high of 20 percent.

Political Decay: Most worrisome to China’s leaders is the danger of losing their monopoly on political power. President Xi (like his predecessors) routinely calls official corruption a cancer that, if unattended, will destroy the Party. But by insisting on exclusive occupation of China’s commanding political heights, the Party itself becomes more vulnerable to dysfunction, corruption, and political decay as the number of political, economic, and social contradictions multiply. China witnessed approximately 180,000 protests in 2010. Reflecting Party anxieties, the state spends large sums of money to ensure “stability maintenance.” As recently as 2013, China’s expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.As recently as 2013, China’s expenditures for internal security exceeded those for its armed forces.26

Perhaps the Party leaders’ greatest dilemma is that, while they understand the need to decentralize economic and resource allocation decision-making, they seem driven to pursue further political consolidation in hopes that political and economic power can somehow be disentangled. As a result, the development of an independent economic entrepreneurial spirit, the establishment of a more robust rule of law system, and the growth of civil society are all significantly retarded in China, even as pressure for change continues to mount.

International Constraints on China’s Rise

PRC leaders also face daunting obstacles in the international arena. These include factors related to history and geopolitics, military potential, and ideological appeal.

History and Geography: China shares land borders with 14 countries, three of which it has fought limited wars with during the past fifty years: Russia (as the Soviet Union), Vietnam, and India. A major land dispute with India remains unresolved, while China’s historical influence in the Russian Far East dating back to the Qing Dynasty continues to cause unease in Moscow. China’s expansive maritime claims in the East and South China Seas have not only stimulated increasingly fractious disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, but have also led to disagreements with North Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Pursuit of these claims has also excited responses in Washington because they involve two American treaty allies and potentially undermine the principle of freedom of navigation—a vital U.S. security interest.27

Indeed, even as Party leaders seek to restore the prestige and influence of dynastic empires in centuries past, China’s neighbors show no desire to return to a tributary political order. Moreover, China is not an ethnically monolithic state. Its populace includes restive non-Han Muslim citizens in its northwest Xinjiang Province who have ethnic kin in Central Asia, as well as a large and culturally distinct Tibetan population in its southwest. Additionally, the PRC lays claim to ade facto independent, democratic Taiwan that evinces little desire to unify with the mainland. Even the full assimilation of Hong Kong has proven both politically and socially challenging, as demonstrated by the continuing pro-democracy movement. The tightening and expansion of Chinese power is consistently contested both within its borders and in its immediate neighborhoods.

Military Limitations: Despite extensive modernization over the past 25 years, the People’s Liberation Army still lacks extended force projection or sustained blue water naval capabilities. China’s military can bring impressive power to bear at particular points along its border and near coastal areas. It can also impose increasing costs on U.S. forces operating near its territory. However, the PLA lags far behind U.S. armed forces in terms of aggregate Asia-Pacific regional, and especially global, capabilities.

Moreover, given the costly political, economic, and social challenges that China’s leaders must address over the next two decades, it seems unlikely that the Chinese armed forces will continue to enjoy the double-digit annual budget increases that it has been provided since the mid-1990s. In addition, problems with corruption, a lack of leadership initiative thanks to an over-centralized command structure, and the still unproven ability of the PRC research and development establishment to produce equipment and systems that rival those of the United States and its key allies all cast doubt on the PLA’s ability to become a world-class military power in the near- to mid-term.

Absence of Allies and Partners: A state’s power is measured by its own usable capabilities and those of its relevant allies and partners in various contingencies.Competent allies magnify a state’s power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. Competent allies magnify a state’s power, and here China is at a tremendous disadvantage when compared with the United States. China has only one treaty ally—North Korea—and is sharply at odds even with that regime, whose interests are not always in line which those of the PRC. The one cooperative security organization it nominally leads, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, but no one takes it seriously as a functional military alliance. More important, the current warming relations between Moscow and Beijing will likely cool once Beijing intensifies its efforts to establish a new China-dominated Silk Road through Central Asia, a move the Kremlin views as Chinese encroachment on a traditionally Russian sphere of influence. Meanwhile, after losing its sway over its former quasi-ally Myanmar, China’s most reliable source of influence within ASEAN is a struggling Cambodia. And to date, the PLA has yet to establish any foreign military bases of consequence.

The contrast with U.S. capabilities and assets could not be more striking. In the Asia-Pacific region alone, America has active military alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and special relationships with Singapore, New Zealand, and Taiwan. It has some 80,000 servicemen and servicewomen stationed throughout the region. It also leads the 28-member NATO Alliance, the most powerful military coalition in the world. While China can unilaterally apply concentrated pressure at specific locations on its periphery, the United States can call upon a worldwide network of friends and allies to flexibly deal with a wide variety of regional and global security challenges.

Weak Ideational Appeal: China’s global economic power is significant but its growth trajectory is slowing. Even if Beijing can buy influence with its cash reserves, its political model is not one that many states (never mind Hong Kong and Taiwan) aspire to adopt, sharply limiting China’s “soft power” appeal. The United States ranks ahead of China around the world (except in the Middle East) in favorability ratings, and significantly so among those 18–29 years of age.28 The once and very temporarily vaunted Beijing Consensus, a system that marries market mechanisms to authoritarian political control, remains a mirage. The Communist Party might yet develop a form of governance that is universally attractive, but for now, China finds itself at a distinct disadvantage in the battle of political ideas.

No escalation or draw-in

Taylor, 14 -- Head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center – Australian National University (Spring, Brendan, “The South China Sea is Not a Flashpoint”, )

History initially suggests that the South China Sea is not a flashpoint. The loss of life resulting from the use of force there pales in comparison to those in East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. For instance, in the unresolved Korean War (1950–53), which remains at the heart of continuing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, an estimated two million military personnel were either killed or unaccounted for.7 A comparable number of casualties occurred in the Chinese Civil War (1946–1949), which left today’s Taiwan flashpoint as a direct product.8 Further, at a time when some analysts are talking up the prospects of war between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, it is worth recalling that an estimated 15–35 million perished during the course of the second Sino–Japanese War (1937–45).9

While history is not destiny, more recent estimates suggest that the combustion of any one of these flashpoints today could prove equally devastating. Richard Bush and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, for example, predict that a conflict over Taiwan could spark a nuclear war involving 1.5 billion people and produce a fundamental change in the international order.10 Similar estimates produced at the time of the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crisis suggested that war on the Korean Peninsula could cost half a million lives and up to US$1 trillion in its first ninety days.11 Conflict between Asia’s two most powerful navies in the East China Sea could prove equally devastating, particularly given that China and Japan are also the world’s second- and third-largest economies, respectively. Total trade between these two historical great powers of East Asia currently stands at U.S. $345 billion.12

It is hard to envisage a credible scenario where a skirmish in the South China Sea could erupt into a conflict of similar proportions. The nationalist foundations of these disputes are fundamentally different from those underpinning East Asia’s traditional flashpoints. By way of example, recent polling suggests that 87 percent of the Chinese public view Japan negatively, whilst 50 percent anticipate a military dispute with Japan.13 Reflecting this sentiment, when Tokyo announced its decision to purchase contested Islands in the East China Sea from their private owner in September 2012, this sparked widespread anti-Japanese protests across China that spread to more than 100 cities.14 Such public displays of nationalist sentiment stand in marked contrast to June 2013 anti-China protests in Hanoi following Vietnamese allegations that a Chinese vessel had rammed and damaged a Vietnamese fishing boat. Subsequently, a mere 150 protesters gathered in the city center.15 Crowds of comparable size have attended anti-Chinese protests in the Philippines. For instance, a March 2012 protest outside the Chinese Embassy in Manila that organizers expected to draw 1,000 protesters attracted barely half that number.16

The strategic geography of the South China Sea also militates against it being a genuine flashpoint. Throughout history, large bodies of water have tended to inhibit the willingness and ability of adversaries to wage war. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, for instance, John Mearsheimer refers to “the stopping power of water,” writing of the limits that large bodies of water place on the capacity of states to project military power—relative, at least, to when they share common land borders.17 Even when clashes at sea do occur, history suggests that these generally afford statesmen greater time and space to find diplomatic solutions. As Robert Ross observes, in such cases “neither side has to fear that the other’s provocative diplomacy or movement of troops is a prelude to attack and immediately escalate to heightened military readiness. Tension can be slower to develop, allowing the protagonists time to manage and avoid unnecessary escalation.”18

Ross’ observation, in turn, dovetails elegantly with the issue of proximity, which Hoyt regards as a defining feature of a flashpoint. The antagonists in the South China Sea disputes are less proximate than in the case of the Korean Peninsula—where the two Koreas share a land border that remains the most militarized on earth. The same can be said of the Taiwan flashpoint. Indeed, the proximity of Taiwan to the mainland affords Beijing credible strategic options— and arguably even incentives—involving the use of force that are not available to it in the South China Sea.19

Finally, and related to the third of Hoyt’s criteria, the South China Sea cannot be said to engage the vital interests of Asia’s great powers. To be sure, much has been made of India’s growing interests in this part of the world— particularly following reports of a July 2011 face-off between a Chinese ship and an Indian naval vessel that was leaving Vietnamese waters.20 However, New Delhi’s interests in the South China Sea remain overwhelmingly economic, not strategic, driven as they are by the search for oil. Moreover, even if New Delhi had anything more than secondary strategic interests at stake in the geographically distant South China Sea, it is widely accepted that India’s armed forces will for some time lack the capacity to credibly defend these.21 Similarly, while much has been made of Tokyo’s willingness to assist Manila with improving its maritime surveillance capabilities,22 for reasons of history and geography, Tokyo’s interests in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, the Korean Peninsula, and even the Taiwan flashpoint dwarf those which it has at stake in the more distant South China Sea. The extent to which this body of water genuinely engages the vital interests of China and the United States continues to be overstated.

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