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This card flows for the K: The ontology debate isn’t as simple as proving progress is possible.
George Weddington 19, PhD candidate with research interests in social movement studies, Black studies, and organizational sociology, 7-20-2018, “Political Ontology and Race Research: A Response to ‘Critical Race Theory, Afro-Pessimism, and Racial Progress Narratives.’” Sociology of Race and Ethnicity, 5(2), pp. 278–288, doi:10.1177/2332649218785921, kav
Sabine Broeck (2017) provided an exquisite point to the criticism, such that it is not only that the distancing of the humanity of slavery was permitted by a dispassionate approach to the accounting of the slaves but that such distancing also erases the legacy of slavery as formative to “European thought, as well as on social, political and cultural practices, including academia’s self-sustaining discourses” (p. 139). Indeed, other thinkers, such as Denise Ferreira da Silva (2011), Hartman and Wilderson (2003), and Alexander Weheliye (2014), have argued that the formulation of key themes and concepts central to European thought have often omitted racial difference or occurred against the backdrop of slavery. Essentially, one of Afro-pessimism’s most relevant criticisms for sociology is the need to historically and critically trace seemingly commonplace sociological concepts in their legacy of slavery. Although it is uncontroversial to assume that slavery is of tremendous importance to the contemporary social conditions of black populations, slavery also implicates the epistemological foundations of sociology. Ray et al. provide only a glimpse of the full breadth of this criticism by focusing on Sexton’s arguments against the popular concept of “people of color.” Instead, as Broeck (2016) stated, citing Christina Sharpe (2016), Afro-pessimism demands “a white agonistic practice vis-à-vis the humanist legacy of one’s own training, which needs not the spectacular one-time-jump into disloyalty, but a fidelity to laboring on said protocol of white enslavist power, ongoing” (p. 140). Such a demand points to a wholesale interrogation of sociology’s epistemic relationship to slavery.
Furthermore, in the introduction to Red, White & Black, Wilderson (2010:10) offered an explicit criticism of empirical approaches to studying black populations, stating that tracking the experiential conditions of black populations obscures an ontological research paradigm. He went on to argue that a reliance on “facts” places a false burden on the project of Afro-pessimism, such that the reliance on empirical analysis of black populations exists to inaugurate an ongoing but ultimately futile industry of applying faulty theories and concepts to populations of black slaves. His point raises, perhaps the most explicitly, a criticism that disturbs Ray et al.’s prescription for labor-market studies. I will address this observation in depth shortly, but it is necessary to also briefly review Fred Moten’s (2013a) engagement with Wilderson’s (as well as Sexton’s) points and their implications for sociology. He wrote,
“Political ontology backs away from the experimental declivity that Fanon and Du Bois were at least able to blaze, each in his own way forging a sociological path that would move against the limiting force, held in the ontological traces, of positivism, on the one hand, and phenomenology, on the other, as each would serve as the foundation of a theory of relations posing the nothingness of blackness in its (negative) relation to the substance of subjectivity-as-nonblackness (enacted in antiblack-ness). (p. 749)”
Moten is pointing toward what I would posit is effectively the impasse for sociologists: if and how Afro-pessimism can be reconciled with sociology. He went on to write,
“The paraontological distinction between blackness and blacks allows us no longer to be enthralled by the notion that blackness is a property that belongs to blacks (thereby placing certain formulations regarding non/relationality and non/communicability on a different footing and under a certain pressure) but also because ultimately it allows us to detach blackness from the question of (the meaning of) being. (p. 749)”
What Moten is criticizing is a reflection of Wilderson’s point, that studying blackness, especially while accepting political ontology as a central facet of Afro-pessimism, is actually antithetical to the empirical study of black populations. What I wish to clarify here, as further review of the back and forth between Moten and Sexton would reveal, is that what is at stake is not a wholesale rejection of research on actual black communities, resistance, or culture (Sexton 2011). Instead—and this is where Moten’s engagement with Du Bois and Fanon must be closely read—Afro-pessimism situates political ontology as a reference point for understanding black social life, not as a thesis to be tested by inevitably faulty concepts (Moten 2008). It is on this point that opponents of Afro-pessimism all too often miss the nuance of its approach to the study of blackness as a prior historical and cultural racial construct by pointing out the empirical history of resistance, agency, and life of black peoples (Gordon 2018; Kauanui 2017; Thomas 2018). Indeed, Afro-pessimists would warn against conceptualizing blackness as solely the result of the actions and agency of black people. In positing political ontology as an approach to writing ethnography on black populations, Saucier argues that Afro-pessimism holds implications for the organizing and presentation of black life across disciplines, including sociology but also that there are opportunities for scholars trained as sociologists to engage with the approach.