Absent exclusion, Turkey spoils “security cooperation”
Flanagan 20, PhD in IR, adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation (Stephen “Turkey’s Nationalist Course,” RAND, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1096340.pdf)
Foreign and Defense Policy: From “Zero Problems” to “Precious Loneliness”
The AKP has moved away from the strategy of its first years in power, which gave priority to European integration, good relations with the United States, and the leveraging of Turkey’s economic strength and Ottoman heritage to build good relations with all its neighbors—a policy that was dubbed “zero problems.” Erdoğan is now pursuing a realist balancing strategy in foreign affairs, seeking to leave open options that will best advance his consolidation of power and Turkish national interests. Erdoğan’s often provocative actions and rhetoric that express his disappointment with Europe, the United States, and Israel have further strained relations with these longtime allies. Erdoğan is more focused on building the country’s stature in the Islamic world and forging new ties with Russia and China. He has not given up on the West but appears to hope that he can elicit favorable policy changes from allies and partners by demonstrating that he has options. Up until U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in December 2017, Turkish officials expressed hopes that Trump would bring a fresh start in relations with Washington, and Erdoğan has been using his budding relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron to bring a reset in relations with the EU.
Turkish leaders have tried to forge wary partnerships with historic rivals Russia and Iran, particularly as these two gained control over the end game in the Syrian civil war since 2015. Differences with Iraq, many Gulf states, and Egypt over the AKP’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, policies in the wake of the Arab Spring, and stance on Qatar have seemed to diminish the stature in the Arab world that Turkey had around 2010. As policy differences with nearly all its neighbors and allies have mounted, leaders of the AKP and the MHP have argued that Turkey must be more self-reliant in protecting its interests and accept a “precious loneliness” in taking principled stands to defend its values and national interests. The AKP’s foreign policy continues to reflect an anticolonial nationalism borne of this period and a suspicion of globalization and foreign influence widespread in all segments of Turkish society. Polls conducted in November 2017 indicated that more than 84 percent of Turks overall agree at least somewhat that global economic and political elites have too much power over Turkey and should be resisted, and 83 percent of respondents stated that they hold unfavorable views of the Unites States.2 If a viable opposition leader or coalition were to emerge in Turkey and dislodge Erdoğan and the AKP from power after 2023, one could expect a more conciliatory approach from Turkey, because the three leading opposition par- ties in the 2018 elections ran on platforms calling for revitalizing relations with NATO allies and the EU. Nevertheless, deep public suspicion of the United States and Europe would constrain the pace and scope of a future rapprochement.
Continuation of current trends over the next five to ten years likely will lead to Turkish foreign and defense policies that are contrary, in varying degrees, to the interests of the United States and other NATO allies and that undermine long-standing aspects of defense and security cooperation. This situation warrants a fundamental reassessment of U.S. and European strategy toward Turkey, preparations for disruptive developments in all aspects of relations, and initiatives that could maintain cooperation on abiding mutual interests over the next decade and help restore long-standing ties if these trends are reversed.