Including Turkey means other actors bow-out of NATO initiatives
Antoine Got 20. Fellow, Geneva Center for Security Policy. M.A., International Relations, University of Edinburgh. "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO." War on the Rocks. 11-19-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART --- ability edited
As tensions grow, a key risk for NATO relates to the crisis’ potential to hamper its cohesion and ability to act decisively, as the alliance relies on the principle of consensus to successfully operate. Every major NATO decision embodies the collective will of all allies and results, therefore, from a complex but fragile process of negotiation wherein nations are invited to compromise on matters of mutual interest. The inevitable drawback to this is that every ally possesses a de facto right to veto any NATO issue if its demands are not met, which they may be incentivized to use as leverage to pursue national interests. The same can be said of the European Union, which operates on unanimity and where Cyprus recently made headlines for blocking sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, insisting on the imposition of E.U. measures on Turkey for its energy exploration in Mediterranean waters. The European Union was criticized for failing to agree on timely sanctions.
Unlike the European Union, NATO consultations are held behind closed doors, and disagreements largely avoid public scrutiny. In principle, however, any nation’s objections could stall key alliance policy or business. Last year, leaks revealed that Turkey had threatened on the eve of a NATO summit to block a key defense plan to protect the Baltic states and Poland against Russian aggression unless NATO backed its own recognition of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia as terrorists. Likewise, for years, Turkey had vetoed NATO cooperation with neutral Austria under its partnership program in response to Vienna’s calls for the European Union to halt membership talks with Ankara. Though in both cases deals were eventually reached to break the deadlock, and though such negotiation tactics are not uncommon, these incidents highlight a mounting climate of uncooperativeness and unwillingness to compromise between allies, making interaction increasingly difficult.
As Ankara grows more defiant, NATO members are indeed finding it difficult to reign in their southeastern ally. With the 2011 Arab Spring and its aftermath, the rapid deterioration of Turkey’s regional and domestic security environments has coincided with a growing perception that its Western allies are not giving enough credence to its core security interests. The stalled European Union membership project, together with America’s disengagement from the Middle East, support for the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia, and persistent refusal to extradite cleric Fethullah Gülen, the presumed mastermind of the failed 2016 coup attempt, have all contributed to strengthening the conviction that Turkish security interests are likely best served through autonomous action — and not by relying on a suspicious and divided West. This impression is reinforced by Europe’s vocal criticism of Erdoğan’s concentration of executive power, and by the country’s worsening economic and social woes.
Overall, these factors have eroded NATO’s credibility and influence over Ankara, just as the latter has become more conscious of its own considerable leverage over Europe due to its key role in Syria, which NATO sees as the defense of its southern frontier, and in easing the pressure to accommodate large arrivals of refugees on European shores. The former is linked to Turkey’s vetoing of NATO’s defense plan for Poland and the Baltics, which aimed at compelling NATO to provide greater support in Turkey’s defense of the alliance’s southern flank — something Ankara has demanded for years. Likewise, Turkey’s handling of its four million-strong refugee population, the largest in the world, has contributed to Ankara’s influence over Brussels through its instrumentalization of fears that it would “open the gates” to Europe for migrants and refugees, which Erdoğan announced earlier this year in violation of a 2016 E.U.-Turkish agreement. Given its shrewd sense that the tables have turned, Ankara has lost many incentives to cooperate. Of course, one key risk is that Turkey’s bold strategy backfires and leads to a fresh round of retaliatory measures such as collective sanctions or cutbacks in E.U. funds, with damaging effects on Turkey’s weakening economy.
For NATO, another conceivable consequence lays in the reinforcement of calls for greater European “strategic autonomy” in the realms of defense and security, with potentially harmful repercussions on the future of the transatlantic community. Against a backdrop of deteriorating Euro-Atlantic relations, several leaders have begun to publicly question the relevance and effectiveness of NATO as an organization. A staunch advocate of the “strategic autonomy” concept, Macron reacted to the clash with Turkey over the arms embargo on Libya by reiterating his assertion that NATO was “brain dead” for being unable to temper Turkish adventurism. In a recent interview, Armenian President Armen Sarkissian echoed these remarks by putting at stake NATO’s credibility over the organization’s seeming inability to influence its member’s involvement in the Caucasus. Were NATO to become increasingly paralyzed[limited] by souring internal relations, doubts about the effectiveness and reliability of the organization could further incentivize E.U. countries into acting beyond the NATO framework. Regrettably, this could result in accelerating E.U. states’ ostracizing of Ankara, while persuading some allies into seeking additional bilateral arrangements as more reliable forms of security guarantees.