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US deterrence of China hinges on credible signals and engagement.

Yves-Heng Lim 22. Senior Lecturer at the Department of Security Studies, Macquarie University. "The fragility of general deterrence: The United States and China in maritime East Asia." Comparative Strategy, Vol. 41, Issue 2. 3-21-2022. https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2022.2039006. accessed 6-25-2022 //ART

The erosion of US general deterrence in maritime East Asia has attracted significant attention over the last few years. To a certain extent, the discussion has been more focused on how to bolster US deterrence posture –typically through changes to the forces deployed by the US in the area. This approach has generated remarkable insights into the shortcoming of the US position, but it has at the same time pushed the question of the mechanisms of deterrence erosion in the background. This question is, however, important because it clarifies the limits of what could be achieved by changes along one dimension of US deterrence posture. In broad terms, this section argues that the erosion of US general deterrent posture in maritime East Asia can be explained by three primary mechanisms: an enduring local imbalance of interest that favors China, a changing balance of power that has eroded US position in the region and a difficulty in drawing red lines that has been compounded by China’s “circumvention” strategy.

Credibility and the imbalance of interests

Deterrence threats are inherently linked to the ability to make a credible commitment. As explained by Glenn Snyder, the calculations of a prospective “aggressor” directly depend on

(1) his valuation of his war objectives; (2) the costs which he expects to suffer as a result of various possible responses by the deterrer; (3) the probability of various responses; and (4) the probability of winning the objectives with each possible response.

A non-credible commitment implies that the probability of response is negligible and makes “aggression” inherently more attractive.

A debate exists among deterrence theorists about the malleability of commitments and the degree to which they can be manufactured. In his seminal works, Thomas Schelling argued that the credibility of one’s commitment could be manipulated by the employment of proper techniques and strategies. Multiple studies have however shown that, in practice, credibility depends primarily on the actual interests that the deterrer seeks to protect. Alexander George and Richard Smoke famously argued that credible commitments could not be created ex nihilo: “effective deterrence and effective signaling require in the first instance that the interests of the United States be sufficiently engaged by what is at stake in the area or the country in question.” Subsequent research conducted in the 1980s have largely confirmed this point: the deterrer’s level of interest in the protégé played a pivotal role in the success or failure of deterrence.

More recently, researchers have shed new light the importance of “intrinsic interests” as a constitutive part of the credibility of deterrent threats. Daryl Press distinguishes between three categories of interests:

Vital interests are those related to a state’s survival. Important interests is a broad category; it encompasses crises over stakes with real material value that do not significantly threaten the state’s survival. Concerns, on the other hand, relate to a state’s values and ideals but do not involve significant material stakes.45

All other things being equal, the more vital interests are -i.e. the more is at stake for the deterrer- the more credible is the deterrent threat.

Press proposes, however, a problematic definition of vital interests. While the inclusion of the protection of a state’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and population is uncontroversial, the inclusion of the objective of “ensuring that no country […] consolidates its control over the world’s major economic regions” overextends the notion of vital interest and appears at least partly incompatible with the classic distinction between the interests covered by direct –which are truly vital- and those covered by extended deterrence –which are not. This is not to say that preventing the rise of a hegemon in a distant region will not rank high among the “important interests” of a great power that already has controls over its own region is secured. But the emergence of a peer competitor in a distant region simply does not present the same immediate risk and threat than a direct attack on one’s state.

Reclassifying the “distant hegemony” problem as an important rather than vital interest highlights an issue with the broad category of “important interests.” “Countries,” Press argues, “have a myriad of ‘important interests,’” but this pluralistic nature of “important interests” makes it difficult to treat them as a homogenous category. Some interests are bound to be more important than others. The existing literature proposes two complementary avenues to assess the relative significance of any given important interest. On the one hand, a deterrer’s assessments of a protégé’s importance can be largely determined by the latter’s geographical position, the existence of a formal alliance, the level of economic ties and the level of arms transfers. On the other hand, the relative importance of a protégé might result from the interest the deterrer has, not in the protégé per se, but in the region or subsystem where deterrence occurs. This translates into the notion of “regional salience” that represents “the tightness of political, military, and economic linkages between a major power and a region.” Though difficult to assess directly, regional salience can be typically approximated by the relative importance of the region in the major power’s alliance portfolio and foreign trade.

When considered through the prism of “intrinsic interests,” maritime East Asia presents the US with a significant problem: a significant imbalance of interests exists between the US and China, which favors Beijing and tends to make credible deterrence threats more difficult to formulate for Washington.

China has vital interests in maritime East Asia. Beijing’s enduring ambiguity on the possible application of the concept of “core interest” (hexin liyi) beyond the traditional issue of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, has generated some debate over the last decade, but there is little doubt that Beijing considers both the ECS and SCS to be vital interests. Beijing has repeatedly stated that it has “indisputable sovereign rights” over the Diaoyu/Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly islands and adjacent waters and has, quite unsurprisingly, listed the defense of its sovereignty as one of its “core interest,” turning these islands and waters into de facto “core interests.”

From a more perhaps practical perspective, Chinese strategists are moreover acutely aware of China’s vulnerability to threats coming from the sea. The 2013 edition of Academy of Military Science’s The Science of Military Strategy archetypically argues:

Opposing an enemy invasion from the sea is the foundational strategic idea behind the establishment of our Party’s navy; it is the fundamental, long-term strategic mission of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Our political, economic, cultural and communicational centers are located in coastal provinces. Twelve coastal provinces […] concentrate 38.5% of the population, 34.3% of the middle-sized and large cities, 66.1% of [China’s] GDP.

China’s interest in the near seas, or maritime East Asia, follows in this sense the logic of a buffer, providing China with a modicum of strategic depth. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes have also evoked the possibility for China to adopt a “bastion strategy” for its sea-based nuclear deterrent, making the near seas a critical component of China’s nuclear deterrence strategy as a whole.

By contrast, US interests in maritime East Asia, while undoubtedly significant, do not meet the threshold for vital interests described above. To a very large extent, the list of US interests in the region matches the list of examples offered by Daryl Press to illustrate the notion of “important interests”: “defending allies, protecting trade partners, protecting the rights of commercial shipping to navigate through international waters.” The 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy lists, for instance, three main objectives for the US - “to safeguard the freedom of the seas; deter conflict and coercion; and promote adherence to international law and standards” - which almost perfectly match Press’s list of important interests.

Other approaches to the notion of interest also suggest that US interests in the region are important but not vital. The criterion of economic dependence that measures the relative importance of a protégé is difficult to apply in the context of maritime Asia. In narrow terms, data gathered by the CSIS61 shows that only six percent of US trade transits through the SCS. Details about US’s reliance on ECS trade routes are less clear, but non-China-bound US trade routes in the area are essentially limited to South Korea, which accounts for less than 4 percent of US foreign trade.62 The second element that contributes to the relative importance of the ECS and SCS is the direct involvement of two US allies as claimants in the disputes -Japan in the ECS and the Philippines in the SCS. The two alliances have evolved in different directions over the last decades, with the US-Japan alliance being considerably reinforced under the tenures of Koizumi and Abe while US-Philippines relations were put under significant strain under the tenure of Rodrigo Duterte. It remains that in both cases, the US is involved in a game of (primarily conventional) extended deterrence, which, by definition, covers important but not vital interests.

An application of the “regional salience” framework, which focuses on the relative importance of regional trade and regional alliances in the deterrer’s portfolio,65 suggests a higher level of US interests that are not sufficient to transform US important interests into vital ones. On the one hand, East Asia accounted for around one quarter of US trade in 2018. But the fact that this figure includes US-China trade –which alone accounts for 16% of US trade66- creates an awkward situation where the relative importance stems from the high level of trade between the US and the prospective target of US deterrent efforts. On the other hand, Washington has important alliances in the region as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand all belong to the list of Major Non-NATO allies –though relations between Washington and its Southeast Asian allies came under significant strain over the last decade. As explained above, however, these alliances create a situation of extended deterrence, where, by definition, the US is not protecting vital interests. In fact, Press takes the example of South Korea to illustrate the distinction between US vital and important interests, arguing: “South Korea has been an American ally for decades and helps the United States frequently […]. But South Korean sovereignty is not vital to America.”67 This conclusion applies more generally to US East Asian allies.

A changing balance of power

One of the most obvious requirements of deterrence is for the deterrer to possess the means to carry out its threat should the deterree decide to ignore threats and cross red lines. As argued by Colin Gray: “even a credible determination to fight might avail little if the quantity and quality of combat power threatened falls short of some critical threshold of effect as seen by the intended deterrees.” One of the critical points repeatedly raised by deterrence theorists has been that military capabilities relevant to a given deterrence situation often do not reflect the overall balance of military power between the two parties. The success of deterrence is tightly linked to the credibility of a threat, and [n]ormally, one cannot readily threaten to use force in retaliation without having force at hand. This means that, to deter, a state must threaten not just verbally but with specific and appropriate military preparations which place it in some position to respond.

What is an “appropriate” –or relevant quantity and quality of– forces can however be difficult to identify clearly. In his study of the Cuban Crisis, Daryl Press considers three relevant balances of power –the conventional balances in the Caribbean and in Europe, and the nuclear balance between Washington and Moscow.

The debate about what capabilities should be factored in the “relevant balance of power” remains in many ways open, but the “local” balance of military power is most likely to play a predominant role in determining deterrence calculations. This predominance makes intuitive sense because “decisionmakers are not interested in abstract measures of national power,” but “ask themselves: Can the adversary do what he threatens to do and achieve his objectives at a reasonable cost?” In other words, an aggressor has few reasons to be concerned with capabilities that, for any number of reasons, cannot be brought to bear in the theater where the challenge takes place, and a deterrer without the adequate denial capabilities “onsite” leaves open a window of potential vulnerability that can be exploited for a rapid victory and changes to the status quo.

The above argument suggests that the most pivotal “capability factor” in the US-China deterrence equation lies essentially at the local, East Asian balance of power. For the clearest part of the post-Cold War, US ability to deter what “Chinese adventurism” has been essentially linked to US denial capabilities and the fact that “the United States enjoyed dominance vis-a-vis China in nearly all military domains.” This dominance was essentially linked to Washington’s “command of the commons, i.e. “command of the sea, space and air,” which has provided the US with the ability to project overwhelming power in the East Asian region and guarantee that any Chinese attempt to change the status quo through the use of force or coercion could be rapidly thwarted. The pivotal importance of US command of the commons appeared perhaps at its clearest in the context of the 1995-6 Taiwan Strait crisis. While Washington’s decision to deploy two carrier groups constituted an unmistakable signal of US commitment to the security of Taiwan, it also made obvious that Taiwan and the US could maintain air superiority in a war fought in the Taiwan Strait.75 Put simply, the US dominated the escalation ladder in the Taiwan Strait, and more broadly in the East Asian region, leaving Beijing with few attractive options to mount a challenge against Washington’s preferred regional order.

This situation has been rapidly changing over the last two decades or so as Beijing engaged in the fast-paced modernization of its military. The scale of China’s military modernization in the last two decades admittedly suggests that Beijing is pursuing multiple objectives, but there is little doubt that a large part of Chinese efforts is driven by the desire to erode Washington’s capacity to project military power in the East Asian theater. A debate has recently emerged about the adequacy of the “counter-intervention” or Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) concepts to depict China’s strategy, but as Timothy Heath and Andrew Erickson rightly point out:

[t]he actions China’s military has taken to modernize its capabilities speak volumes. Open sources reveal clearly: China is developing, deploying, doctrinally supporting, and training to effectively employ many sophisticated, expensive systems clearly tailored to counter U.S. intervention.

This strategic ambition is reflected in the particular direction that the modernization of Chinese military capabilities has taken. China was the first nation to deploy operational Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) designed to target aircraft carriers and possibly other large moving warships, DF-21D and DF-26,79 and operates 1.000+ km-range YJ-62 and CJ-10 anti-ship missiles. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the PLA Naval Air Force (PLANAF) deploy today more than 1,200 4th-generation fighter aircraft, which carry long-range air-to-air (i.e. PL-15) and anti-ship missiles (YJ-12). China has also devoted considerable effort to the improvement of its land-based long-range air defense systems, with the purchase of large numbers of Russian S-300 and S-400 and the deployment of the HQ-9 air defense systems.82 HQ-9 batteries have been deployed in the Paracels, and structures built on China’s artificial islands in the Spratlys suggest that one of those SAM systems will be deployed in this area in the near future.

In parallel, the PLA Navy has dramatically consolidated its sea denial capabilities in the near seas and beyond. As of 2020, China deploys the largest fleet of diesel-electric submarines of modern design worldwide with 42 boats –Kilo, Song, Yuan– that are or will likely be equipped or retrofitted with the Russian Klub or China’s brand-new YJ-18 ASM.84 China has also progressively replaced its obsolete Han-class SSN by six Shang. The first pair of Shang was reportedly disappointing in terms of quietness, but the four Shang-II, launched in the 2010s, are reportedly on par with US Los Angeles-class SSN in terms of quietness and are likely to carry YJ-18.85 Surface forces might play a relatively less central role in an A2/AD campaign, but it still worth noting that China has built more than 40 major combatants over the last fifteen years, as well as its sixty Houbei fast missile boats and forty Jiangdao corvettes, and that all carry a wide array of long-range anti-ship missiles.

The rapid modernization of China’s military forces over the last decades brings about major changes in the balance of power in maritime East Asia. At the turn of the millennium, China operated an antiquated force, with a handful of modern platforms imported from Russia that it often struggled to operate properly. In any scenario of conflict in maritime East Asia, US forces benefited from a decisive advantage -as exemplified for instance by the fact that the PLAAF operated fewer 4th generation aircraft than two US carriers. Today’s PLA Navy, Robert Ross argues, operates “submarines, surface ships armed with antiship cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles [that] now challenge U.S. access to East Asia’s ‘internal’ seas, including the South China Sea.” In the air, the PLA Air Force might not be able to gain air superiority over the region, but it can already effectively contest US air superiority, and the balance is moving fast in China’s favor. All other things being equal, the relative rise of Chinese capabilities alters the equilibrium in a way that erodes US general deterrence posture because it modifies the cost/benefit calculations of both Washington and Beijing –in the latter’s favor - regarding the alteration or preservation of the status quo.

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