Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Solves Chinese deterrence.

Mira Rapp-Hooper 20. Senior fellow for Asia Security at the Council on Foreign Relations. PhD in Political Science, Columbia University. "From Primacy to Openness: U.S. Strategic Objectives in Asia." CFR. 1-25-2020. https://www.aspeninstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Rapp-Hooper.pdf. accessed 6-24-2022 //ART

While the United States cannot avoid a stronger China able to exert significant regional influence, it can nonetheless secure its longstanding political, security, and economic interests in the region and avert the conditions that would most directly threaten them. Since the late nineteenth century, the United States has sought to prevent a hostile hegemon from dominating Eurasia, as this condition would impede commercial interests and potentially expose the U.S. homeland to military threats.19 Potential domination may come in novel forms, but the same objective remains worthy today. The United States should seek to avert the hostile domination of Asia. We cannot envision the precise form it will take, but Xi Jinping is seeking some form of a sphere of influence in Asia. And while a state’s domestic regime preferences do not neatly predict its regional behavior, Xi’s affection for a closed Chinese information environment already has a foreign policy analogue. Other international governance attempts may have similar features. For several years, strategists have argued that the United States must oppose a Chinese regional sphere—a geographic area in which China exercises predominate influence in military, diplomatic, or economic terms. Chinese influence in parts of Southeast or Central Asia, however, is not a prima facie threat to American interests. Nonetheless, U.S. strategy must hedge against the possibility that China’s regional aspirations are fundamentally irreconcilable with its own objectives.

Washington should seek to prevent China from establishing a closed sphere of influence—a bloc that would allow it to dominate part or all of Asia in a manner that displaces U.S. political, economic, or military power. An exclusive zone could leave the United States unable to access vital markets and strip it of its forward defensive position, thereby threatening U.S. prosperity and national security and, by extension, domestic freedom. This grave condition would occur if China co-opted the political, economic, or military independence of other states, preventing them from making free choices through coercion. Closure of the global commons could have similarly grievous effects.

The positive objective of U.S. strategy should therefore be an open Asia. Openness characterizes both American strategic priorities in the region as well as the types of interactions the United States should seek to facilitate in their service. An open Asia is one in which regional states have political and economic freedom of action and are able to make independent strategic decisions without being forced into blocs or camps that could result in their hierarchical dominance. Under this concept, Asia’s commons must also remain open, essential as they are to international commerce. Openness favors sustained interstate cooperation, beneficial trade, and the free flow of information across borders. It also calls for transparent international governance, even among those states that are not themselves full-fledged democracies.

An openness-based strategy seeks to prevent shuttered economic, political, and security spheres in Asia by helping regional states preserve their flexibility and independence and doing the same in the skies and sea lanes. It rejects the notion that regional states should “choose” between the United States and China and instead incentivizes them to eschew great power dominance in favor of agency. At a time when the CCP seeks a more closed Chinese society, commons, and domestic and international information space, the United States should strive to preserve the region’s dynamism and fluidity. An openness-based strategy acknowledges that the United States will not retain strategic primacy in Asia. It also recognizes that Washington does not require unequivocal regional dominance to prevent China from establishing a hierarchy of its own.

Securing Openness

Openness in Asia will not be easily obtained. It will require the United States to focus consistently on Asia as its primary foreign policy theater, allocate substantial military resources to the region, develop a viable island chain defense strategy, improve its coordination against sub-conventional threats within U.S. agencies and with foreign partners, and invest in regional openness economically, technologically, and domestically. Despite a relatively more constrained position in Asia, the United States can secure openness, but its objective is far from guaranteed.

Regional openness requires a strong American military presence but does not demand military primacy. The United States and its allies must retain sufficient strength to deter China from making a bid that could result in its hierarchical dominance of any part of the region, to defend against it if it were to mount one, and to keep the global commons open. These defensive requirements, in turn, mean that the United States absolutely must maintain its treaty alliances and forward position in Asia. Since the early Cold War, Washington has understood the First Island Chain archipelago to be its defensive front line, but China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) approach makes the direct defense of allies increasingly tenuous. If it lacks the ability to defend and deter on behalf of its treaty allies, the United States will struggle to maintain the regional position that will allow it to meet its minimum deterrence requirements. Washington currently lacks a strategy for First Island Chain defense. A counter-A2/AD strategy that relies on land- and sea-based missiles may be the most feasible approach but will be politically taxing to enact. Beyond an ally-focused defense strategy, military openness will be far easier to obtain if the United States can continue to strengthen its strategic position in Southeast Asia. It should buttress capacity-building efforts with Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines; prioritize defense cooperation with India; and synchronize similar disparate efforts with Japan and Australia. Despite modest improvements, it must also increase significantly its Foreign Military Financing to the region.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.