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Doctrine and deployments mean Arctic War goes nuclear.

Féron, 18—Postdoctoral Research Associate at Columbia University School of Law (Henri, “A New Ocean: The Legal Challenges of the Artic Thaw,” 45 Ecology L. Q. 83 (2018), dml)

The Arctic is at risk of becoming a military flashpoint. The likelihood of military tensions over control of newly accessible natural resources should not be overstated, as most Arctic resources are clearly in the EEZs or continental shelves of this or that Arctic State.270 Yet the Arctic thaw inevitably opens new invasion routes that Arctic States must take into account when planning their defense—be it through the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, or the RussoScandinavian borders.271 Loud calls on all sides against the militarization of the Arctic have been followed by quiet improvements in Arctic military capabilities, especially by Russia.272 The central concern here is the deep fracture between the seven Arctic NATO states and Russia, the geographically largest Arctic state. Russia was not represented at Arctic security forums following the Ukraine crisis, increasing the room for distrust, misunderstanding, and overreaction in the Arctic context.273 Indeed, key Russian security documents such as the 2014 Military Doctrine, the 2015 Maritime Doctrine, and the 2015 National Security Strategy identify NATO’s expanding influence as being among the top security threats to Russia, and highlight the need to defend Russian Arctic interests.274 Security tensions are already having economic implications, as anti-Russia sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine crisis have blocked a number of Russian Arctic resource development projects by preventing U.S. and EU companies from contributing equipment, technology, and financing.275

These outcomes appear to have been wholly preventable—a product of mutual fear rather than necessity. Four periods can be distinguished in Russian Arctic security policy in the post-Cold War era, with none clearly directed at threatening the interests of other Arctic states. Ekaterina Klimenko, writing for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, first notes an almost complete disbanding of Russian Arctic forces in the 1990s, as the country was reeling from the Soviet collapse.276 The 2000s then ushered a period of national power restoration, notably through the State Rearmament Program, which unsettled neighbors despite the spending targets remaining much more modest than in the Soviet era.277 Klimenko notes for instance that while the Program paid particular attention to the overhaul of Russia’s northern fleet, in particular for submarine patrols in the Arctic, the number of operational submarines at Moscow’s disposal actually fell by three-quarters from 1986 to 2010.278 Klimenko then highlights a period of attempted cooperation beginning in 2008, as a key Russian policy document insisted that it was a top strategic priority for Russia to keep the Arctic a “zone of peace and cooperation.”279 This posture presumably reflected the fact that Russia simply cannot afford to substantially fortify its extremely long northern coastline, especially considering that the Russian military budget is only about a seventh of America’s, and that the country’s economy was hit hard by plunging oil prices.280 In any case, this period was marked by Arctic advances such as the Ilulissat Declaration of 2008, the Norway-Russia Agreement on the Barents Sea in 2010, and the setting up of Arctic security roundtables.281 Note also that Russia’s 2013 Arctic Strategy outlines exclusively defensive goals for Russian armed forces in the region, such as safeguarding sovereign rights, providing strategic deterrence, and repelling aggression.282 Finally, the 2014 Ukraine crisis began a period of rapidly deteriorating Russo-Western relations and a strengthening of Russia’s Arctic posture, for instance through large military exercises mirroring those of NATO and the setting up of a Joint Strategic Command for Russia’s northern forces.283 Klimenko notes, however, that many Russian military developments in the region since 2013 are products of plans that were announced long before the Ukraine crisis, such as the State Rearmament Program.284 So while it may be expected that other Arctic States would seek, like Russia, to proportionately protect their Arctic interests, there does not yet appear to have been any particular event making Arctic militarization an ineluctable necessity.285

Be that as it may, the Arctic is also at risk of nuclear escalation. Because it represents a direct way for the two most important nuclear powers to bomb each other, it has been regularly patrolled by long-range nuclear bombers and by nuclear-armed submarines since the Cold War.286 The mutual downsizing of arsenals after the collapse of the Soviet Union did relax the nuclear danger for a time.287 Yet tensions are on the rise again after Washington noticed its withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) roughly three months after 9/11.288 President Bush claimed this move was necessary to defend against “terrorists who strike without warning, or rogue states who seek weapons of mass destruction,” but the ensuing development of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities also destabilized the global nuclear balance.289 BMDs fuel an arms race logic insofar as countering them requires firing more missiles than they can intercept, so the expected response to U.S. BMD development by nuclear powers not allied to Washington is to maintain, modernize, and perhaps develop their nuclear arsenals.290 BMDs are particularly relevant to the Arctic because the most important American BMD base is Fort Greely in Alaska, where dozens of ground-based mid-course defense (GMD) interceptors are emplaced to defend against incoming ballistic missiles by intercepting them midcourse.291 Russia has in response deployed some S-400 missile defense units, which are similar to American Patriot systems in their multi-role ability to target both aircraft and ballistic missiles, albeit with a greater range.292

The Arctic thaw could further destabilize the global nuclear balance. It could facilitate the deployment of the American sea-based Aegis BMD in the Arctic Ocean (designed to intercept midcourse short-to-intermediate range missiles), as well as the deployment of surface anti-submarine warfare capabilities to hunt nuclear-armed submarines.293 The development of American BMD capabilities in the Arctic could also provoke China into developing a larger nuclear arsenal and deepening military cooperation with Russia, as Beijing is already actively developing counter-measures against the development of U.S. BMD capabilities in the Pacific.294 The Doomsday Clock of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists now suggests we are only “two minutes” away from an apocalyptic “midnight,” closer than we were during the 1980s, and “the closest the Clock has ever been to Doomsday . . . .”295

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