The brink is low. Each increase in security cooperation risks other priorities. Congress has sufficiently streamlined now but continuing to avoid patchwork security cooperation is key to deterrence. Fiscal year restrictions means even minor delays can spillover
Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk
While engagement with foreign states is typically within the purview of the DoS, 179 the last fifteen years has seen a growing emphasis on the role of the DoD in security cooperation activities. 180 Corresponding to that [*184] increased role, Congress enabled the DoD to respond to threats and build partner capacity through a myriad of authorities and associated funding. 181 The increase in the number of authorities permitting the DoD to engage with foreign militaries, though instrumental in commanders' efforts to improve interoperability in combined operations, resulted in a security cooperation enterprise that is incredibly cumbersome, complicating the ability of the DoD to effectively prioritize, plan, execute, and oversee these activities. 182
The FY17 NDAA attempted to streamline the security cooperation enterprise by consolidating various train and equip authorities into one statute and codifying other security cooperation authorities into one chapter of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. 183 While this reform represented a vast improvement to the previous patchwork of legal authorities and assist DoD efforts to build capacity in the Baltic States under EDI, Congress can and should continue to improve security cooperation laws to maximize its impact in deterring Russian aggression against NATO allies. 184 Two courses of action Congress can take to improve efforts in accordance with the intent of EDI is to 1) authorize multi-year appropriations for EDI activities and 2) exempt certain expenditures of jointly procured equipment and military construction with certain allies, such as the Baltic States and Poland, from DoS concurrence.
1. Relax Funding Restrictions on Periods of Availability Most of the authorities within the security cooperation enterprise have a current fiscal year period of availability, 185 permitting the [*185] obligation of appropriated funds only within the current fiscal year. 186 However, the complex nature of security cooperation makes it difficult for commanders to identify needs, plan an activity, coordinate appropriately, and receive authorization all within one fiscal year. 187 While the FY17 NDAA permitted training and exercises to cross fiscal years, if started in one and completed in another, 188 time remains a severe constraint on most security cooperation activities. Additional time to plan activities will lead to better use of funds, serving a dual benefit of providing better products to foreign forces and more appropriately utilizing U.S. resources. The flexibility gained by relaxing the time constraints will permit the DoD to complete construction projects that would otherwise not get approved despite the apparent necessity as it is nearly impossible to manage under current the authorities. Lengthening the time of the authorities would also permit planning more complex exercises, which is especially important in areas such as cyber defense and hybrid warfare that are particularly relevant to NATO's counter-Russian aggression strategy. 189 Such relief would likewise enable U.S. forces to complete construction projects and "to accommodate delays in the ordering and delivery of equipment" in NATO partner-nations. 190 Adjusting the period of availability of security cooperation funds to "two-year funding could better account for the unpredictability of foreign partner schedules." 191