EDI is key to deterring Russia---allies are expanding their efforts but US support is critical
*note---ERI and EDI are the same thing
Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk
Founded on 4 April 1949, NATO is an alliance to safeguard freedom and promote stability in the North Atlantic area through collective defense. 23 Originally twelve members, NATO expanded to twenty-eight, with most of the expansion occurring after the fall of the Soviet Union. 24 Despite numerous geopolitical shifts since its [*153] inception, NATO is still the "cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation and the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe." 25 Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members are committed to collective self-defense. 26 Thus, an attack against any NATO member is considered an attack on all NATO members, whereby, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, each member will assist the member attacked, including the use of armed force, to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." 27
Although Article 5 was not triggered when Russia invaded Crimea because Ukraine is not a NATO member, the prospect of a Russian attack on a NATO member, such as Estonia or Latvia, reinvigorated the concept of collective self-defense under Article 5. This was invoked only once in the Alliance's history after the terrorists attacks on September 11, 2001. 28 At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members agreed to respond to Russia and "pledged to stop cuts and increase defense spending to two percent of GDP [Gross Domestic Product] within a decade," leading many NATO allies to reverse years of defense spending cuts. 29 In 2016, spending cuts stopped across Europe and Canada for the first time in years and a three percent increase in defense spending is expected. 30 In addition to a pledge to increase defense spending, NATO set out plans to increase readiness and responsiveness in Eastern Europe, called the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). 31 The United States' role in the RAP became known as Operation Atlantic Resolve; led by the United States European Command (EUCOM). 32 In 2016, both EUCOM and NATO [*154] significantly expanded their collective efforts to counter Russian aggression by adding deterrence-based measures to the mission of Operation Atlantic Resolve and the RAP. 33 At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, NATO leaders determined the strategy to respond to Russia's growing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability in the Baltics was to increase its forward presence in the Baltics significantly. 34 The United States, along with NATO partners Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, and France, began the largest buildup of forces in Europe since the Cold War, adding an armored brigade combat team (ABCT) supported by air assault forces into seven nations stretching along the eastern flank of NATO from Estonia to Bulgaria in January 2017. 35
The Obama administration demonstrated its intent to shift United States strategy from "reassurance" to "deterrence" as it requested to quadruple the funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) for Fiscal Year 2017. 36 In pursuit of a capable deterrent force, the United States, in its informal role as military leader in NATO, has delineated five lines of effort: increased rotational presence of air, land, and sea forces; additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training to improve overall readiness and interoperability; prepositioning of U.S. equipment to enhance rapid response capabilities in Europe; improve infrastructure to increase flexibility and readiness; and build the capacity of allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe. 37
Despite the renewed emphasis on security within the European contingent of NATO, the United States would face a disproportionate burden within the Alliance, both militarily and financially, if Russia launches an attack across its western border in order to defend what some may consider a minor ally in Estonia or Latvia. 38 Although the Obama administration affirmed the United States' obligation under Article 5 to come to the defense of any NATO member, he stated that the rest of NATO must build its defense capacity to ease the burden on the United States, leading to doubts among European leaders. 39 President Donald Trump is even less reassuring than his predecessor was. He has indicated defense provided by the United States may be [*156] contingent on a NATO member's own defense spending. 40 Additionally, a "decade of foreign wars, a devastating global financial crisis, mounting public debt, and profound realignments in international political and economic power have inspired calls for fundamental change from the competing extremes of the American political landscape," towards an isolationist strategy. 41 There are indications of bipartisan public support for foreign policy retrenchment as well. According to one poll, fifty-seven percent of Americans think the United States should deal with its own problems, 42 whereas only forty-four percent of the American public would support the use of U.S. troops to defend the Baltic States from a Russian invasion. 43
Nonetheless, the importance of a credible deterrent and swift response to Russian aggression cannot be overstated. If Russia chose to attack a Baltic state, it will not only test the collective self-defense commitment under Article 5, it will test the credibility and durability of the United Nations Charter's prohibition of the use of force in other states. 44 Thus, NATO's response to any future aggression by Russia within the Alliance's territory "has significant implications for both NATO and the Charter." 45 As such, "[t]he United States should treat [the Baltic States] with the same importance as France, Germany and the United Kingdom." 46
Whatever course of action the Trump administration chooses to take vis-à-vis Russian aggression in Eastern Europe, it is clear President Trump will have to lead NATO through this potentially catastrophic situation with Russia while navigating a fiscal maelstrom of overseas defense spending. Setting up a European response to a Russian A2/AD environment in the Baltics 47 will cost billions of dollars in planning, movement of troops and assets, and development of effective offset strategy; 48 the United States must carefully consider any financial assistance it provides. 49