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Delays encourage allies to shift to China and Russia

E. John Teichert 22, Brigadier General, assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. "The Power of Proper Security Cooperation" March 15. https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/the-power-of-proper-security-cooperation/ //pipk

The United States aims to be the security cooperation partner of choice, but competitors get a vote. Chinese and Russian security cooperation activities span the globe, looking to gain access and influence, and often to supplant America’s positions. These competitors are active suitors with a broad portfolio of offerings to potential partners, and America’s missteps cede ground to Beijing and Moscow. As a result, key elements of American security cooperation ought to take this competitive environment into account to seize strengths and opportunities while stiff-arming weaknesses and constraints. With eyes around the world fixed on Eastern Europe, one oft-discussed topic is America’s record of security cooperation with Ukraine since 2014. But some of the most important lessons about U.S. security cooperation might come from another country: Iraq. My experience leading security cooperation efforts in Iraq offers a useful case study from which policymakers and practitioners can draw lessons for U.S. efforts elsewhere in the world.

When allies and partners consider America as a security cooperation partner, their leaders take a variety of factors into account, but foremost among these are quality, cost, and schedule. In general, American security cooperation activities provide quality weapons systems at a reasonable cost, but delivery schedules tend to lag, frustrating partners and empowering competitors. In order to meet American needs, security cooperation ought to be more timely, sustainable, consistent, and holistic.

As the senior defense official and defense attaché to Iraq during a recent 14-month period, I managed a security cooperation portfolio with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense’s five military services, in addition to programs with the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Ministry of Interior’s Border Guard Force. This $20 billion portfolio included programs ranging from long-term support for M1A1 Abrams tanks to pop-up security needs within the International Zone during high-threat conditions. It was an environment rich with examples of strategic competition. There, I learned of the power of properly applied security cooperation programs and the pitfalls of security cooperation missteps. These lessons have only been reinforced in my current position.

Accelerating Capability Delivery

From a quality perspective, the equipment that the United States can offer to a partner nation is often superior (with notable exceptions). A partnership with the United States should be considered a competitive advantage, especially when viewed through a long-term lens in which the U.S military commits to effective and sustainable capabilities known as the total package approach. This approach provides not just the weapon system itself, but a broader package of material and services including training, support equipment, spare parts, publications, lifecycle maintenance, and technical assistance. This stands in sharp contrast to security cooperation deals with competitors that rarely provide more than the initial weapon system as a part of their offerings.

Effective and reliable host nation activity on the ramp or on the range tangibly demonstrates the power of a thriving relationship, and a lack thereof can quickly embitter a partnership. This is notably true in Iraq as foreign-made T-90 tanks, CH-4 drones, T-50 aircraft, and Mi-28 and Mi-35 helicopters languish in an inoperable state while American equipment is largely reliable and operational. While the partner nation has to pay for such quality and longevity, they can at least trust that they are getting what they pay for and can expect to rely upon such systems for decades to come. Thus, cost should be considered neither a competitive advantage nor a competitive disadvantage, although the American total package approach undoubtedly provides an initial sticker shock until the benefits of this method of sustainability are thoroughly explained to a partner.

Timeliness, however, is a different story.

American security cooperation faces a notable competitive disadvantage in meeting the desired schedules of partner nations. The Title 22 Foreign Military Sales process, developed to provide a deliberate roadmap towards approval with a slew of checks and balances, often takes years to deliver even simple off-the-shelf capabilities. Meanwhile, strategic competitors offer quick-turn solutions to immediate problems that can satisfy demands in countries around the world.

In the case of Iraq, the security cooperation office could expedite the delivery of capabilities when necessary through the unique benefits of access to Title 10, Section 333 resources (known as Authority to Build Capacity) and some influence over the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund that circumvented normal Title 22 processes. Security cooperation offices in most other countries do not enjoy the flexibility that comes with multiple authority and resource options, and are often forced to rely upon slow and methodical Foreign Military Sales processes. In the end, improved responsiveness and shortened delivery timelines are essential to meet an array of partner nation requirements around the world. Strategic competitors are actively trying to exploit this weakness in the American security cooperation portfolio by offering what appear to be immediate solutions.

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