Feminist perspectives are needed in IR to reveal the issues in how power is viewed in traditional IR
Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Introduction, pgs 11-12 /// MF)
In IR, as in political science generally, power is usually defi ned as “power over,” specifi -cally, the ability to get someone to do what you want. It is usually measured by control of resources, especially those supporting physical coercion. The appropriate analogy might be power understood as tools: if you have them, you can use them to get certain things done if and when you choose, and some have more of these tools than others. This defi nition assumes measurable capacities, privileges instrumental rationality, and emphasizes separation and competition: those who have power use it (or its threat) to keep others from securing enough to threaten them. The emphasis on material resources and coercive ability defl ects attention from the fact that power reckoning is embedded in dominant conceptual orders, value systems, disciplinary practices, and institutional dynamics.
In IR, the concept of “political actor”—the legitimate wielder of society’s power—is derived from classical political theory. Common to constructions of “political man”—from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau—is the privileging of “man’s” capacity for reason. Rationality ostensibly distinguishes man from other animals and explains his pursuit of freedom—from nature and “necessity” as well as from tyranny. Feminist scholarship has exposed how models of human nature presupposed in constructions of political man are not in fact gender-neutral but are androcentric , based on exclusively male (especially elite male) experience and perspective. With reference to gender divisions of power, “woman” is excluded conceptually from political power by denying her the rationality that marks “man” as the highest animal. Substantively, women have historically been excluded from political power by states’ limiting citizenship to those who perform military duty and/or are property owners. Under these conditions, most women are structurally excluded from formal politics, even though individual women in exceptional circumstances have wielded considerable political power. Women worldwide have largely won the battle for the vote, though defi ni-tions of citizenship continue to limit women’s access to public power and women’s political power is circumscribed by a variety of indirect means (discussed more in Chapter 3 ). Most obvious are the continued eff ects of the dichotomy of public–private that privileges men’s productive and “political” activities over women’s reproductive and “personal/familial” activities. For example, sovereign man and sovereign states are defi ned not by connection or relationships but by (masculinist) autonomy in decision-making and putative freedom from interdependence and collective responsibilities. Although Aristotle acknowledged that the public sphere depends upon the (re)production of life’s necessities in the private sphere, he denied the interdependence that this implies in articulating political theory.