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The whole point of hybrid war is that it doesn’t escalate by design. Russia will take actions approaching redlines but won’t actually trigger them – solves conflict

Alexander Lanoszka 20, PhD, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, Balsillie School of International Affairs, University of Waterloo, “Thank goodness for NATO enlargement”, Int Polit (2020) 57:451-470

The defensibility of NATO’s northeastern flank NATO enlargement has provided a key source of insurance by raising the costs of direct Russian aggression against alliance members. This is true even in arguably the weakest part of the alliance, the Baltic littoral region. Conventional wisdom holds that the defense of this region against Russian aggression is especially costly for the USA and NATO to undertake. The countries located there are exceptionally vulnerable. Whereas most benefciaries of NATO enlargement are at least largely separated from Russia thanks to Belarus and Ukraine, the Baltic countries are directly contiguous and have only a short land connection to continental NATO by way of the Polish–Lithuanian border. According to this perspective, a rebalancing of alliance commitments in Europe is necessary because the local military balance favors Russia too much and the political will to defend the Baltic states is too low. The USA will never ‘trade Toledo for Tallinn’ (Shifrinson 2017, 111). Note the contradiction: According to critics, enlarging NATO simultaneously provokes Russia and weakens the alliance. But what rational cause would Russia have to be dismayed when a potentially adversarial military alliance willingly takes on major liabilities? The alliance security dilemma—whereby the strengthening of one coalition may inadvertently create insecurity for another—suggests that Russia would be justifiably concerned if NATO either incorporated states that meaningfully aggregate capabilities or increased military ties with such powerful states (Snyder 1984, 477). By NATO enlargement critics’ own admission, the Baltic countries subtract from, rather than add to, what the alliance can do. Russian might have reasons to protest enlargement, but these reasons likely concern the perceived slight to its honor when former Soviet states became formal defense partners of the USA (Götz 2017, 236–239).4 NATO enlargement has not been responsible for Russian authoritarianism or international revisionism because it never threatened Russia. Pessimism regarding the defensibility of NATO’s so-called northeastern flank is also unwarranted. To begin with, much of the policy literature on this region concentrates on Russia’s strengths while ignoring its key weaknesses. The Baltic countries would almost surely lose set piece battles against Russia, but deterrence ultimately hinges less on being victorious in a potential war than on imposing unacceptable costs on the adversary. The Baltic states have already begun embracing unconventional strategies intended to boost national resiliency and make occupation difficult (Collins and Beehner 2019). Guerrilla tactics and territorial defense serve to augment their denial capabilities that in turn would complicate Russian efforts to hold territory and pacify the local population. Moreover, Russia may have local escalation dominance, but it does not have global escalation dominance, given the forces that NATO members possess. A large-scale land grab made at the expense of any of the Baltic countries might precipitate escalatory dynamics that it could not control. Nuclear war may be a remote possibility, but it cannot be discounted altogether. One reason why Russia has resorted to so-called hybrid tactics against the Baltic countries—such as political subversion and eforts to foment unrest—is that it does not wish to provoke a reaction that it cannot handle (Lanoszka 2016). Put simply, Russia may believe in NATO’s Article Five collective defense commitment more than NATO members themselves do.

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