Aid to Ukraine is the brink. It’s temporary reinforcement. But, doubling-down on permanent security cooperation requires a tradeoff with Asia. Turns the case.
Wertheim 22, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is the author of “Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.” “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/)//BB
Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due.