Funding for Taiwan requires tradeoffs from other areas
Porter and Mazarr 21, *Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. He is also Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, London, ** senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the US National War College, where he was Professor and Associate Dean of Academics; and has been President of the Henry L Stimson Center; Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Senior Defence Aide on Capitol Hill; and a Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Patrick and Michael, “COUNTERING CHINA’S ADVENTURISM OVER TAIWAN: A THIRD WAY,” Lowy Institute, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/countering-china-s-adventurism-over-taiwan-third-way)//BB
Finally, the hefty price tag of an unqualified commitment to protect Taiwan would need to be traded off against other potential investments. The United States must keep its eye firmly on the larger contest: the broad-based competition of systems and societies emerging with the PRC. Historical lessons on the character of such competitions,[53] the geo-economic character of a wider contest defined by the difficulty of military conquest, and China’s emphasis on gradual, non-military tools of influence suggest that global economic engagement, technological rivalries, investments in diplomatic capability, and information security and cyber capabilities will be more important to the outcome of the larger competition than the status of Taiwan. At a time, for example, when the central office charged with overseeing US cybersecurity has been described as “underfunded, outmatched and exhausted”,[54] it does not make sense to pour tens of billions into capabilities oriented for the defence of Taiwan.